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ABSTRACT
Current normative analyses and recommendations in medical ethics do not sufficiently analyze the social
context of concrete ethical ..problems.

This results in

-impractical or ineffective policy recommendations or case
responses which reinforce the social context which created
the ethical problem.

A

. r

social analysis is possible which

displays how the social context directs the communication
and action of physicians and patients, and in turn
reinforces and further establishes these influential social
factors.

Such a social analysis provides a means of

integrating short-term case-responses with long-term
institutional policy and structural change.

The latter, on

this analysis, is the more ethically "complete", and
unintegrated short-term responses threaten to undermine
these efforts.
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Introduction
A contextually-bound, social analysis of medical
interactions clarifies the philosophical-ethical issues that
arise therein.

The recommendations which are based on this

analysis are of two complementary forms: 1) short-term
responses which are normatively inadequate, and 2) long-term
efforts to alter the social circumstances which constitute
the ethical problems.

Contemporary discussions in medical

ethics typically assume some sort of social " picture." These
assumptions direct the recommendation resulting from the
analysis.

Policy recommendations frequently do not

accomplish their objectives when implemented.

Case analyses

fail to respond to the social circumstances which resulted
in an ethically problematic case.

The case analysis

frequently reinforces these social circumstances because it
needs to assume their stability in constructing a response.
Recognition that these disparities are due to the focus and
implied social " analysis" of the different approaches draws
attention to the necessity of social analysis in applied
medical ethics.

The confusion which intentional models of

ethical analysis generate when applied to policy issues
further suggests the desirability of the move from a
psychological to a sociological understanding of human
behaviour.

Drawing on work in my Master's Thesis (Burgess,

1

1983), I have illustrated the problem with the issue of
informed consent (Chapter I).
I recommend an ethnomethodological approach to
understanding physician-patient encounters.

Following the

work of Sue Fisher (1979; 1982, 1983, 1986), I suggest that

a complete analysis must recognize and account for the
effects of institutional· and cultural factors on these
encounters.

As most poigriantly a�gued by Jeff Coulter

(1979), the methodological assumptions of such a social
analysis is a reasonable response to some current problems
in the philosophy of mind (Chapter II).
Once again drawing from research conducted with
Sue Fisher (cf., Fisher, 1983, 1986; Fisher and Groce,
forthcoming; Burgess, 1983, 1986), I have presented three
paradigmatic cases for analysis (Chapter III). The social
analysis of these cases illustrates how the context of
physician-patient interactions directs the communication and
decisions that are lik ely to be produced therein.
Clarification and criticism of the notion of
informed consent is aided by the social analysis.

The

abstract goals of • patient's best interest• �r • freedom from
physician's influence" are not practical or meaningful.

The

layered social analysis displays that some of the ethical
concerns which informed consent has been meant to respond to
cannot be dealt with in this manner.

Careful social

analysis clarifies the limitations of the doctrine, and
2

suggests more effective recommendations.

The implication of

the overall social-normative analysis is that ethical
recommendations can arid must be constructed as complementary
efforts designed both to help concrete individuals and to
change the practice of medicine as well as patient and
physician "attitudes. " The structural level of analysis has
shown that the�e latter, more comprehensive goals are
difficult to achieve because they challenge broader societal
p�actices and political agendas (Chapter V). The ·integration
of ethical analyses and recommendations with a social
analysis enhances the clarity of the philosophical
discussion as well as the defensibility and effectiveness of
the recommendations.

3

Chapter I
Importance of Empirical and Contextual Analysis
The thesis of this chapter is that different types
of medical ethical analyses (i.e., case-, issue-,
policy-oriented) present disparate responses to similar
problems due to their different foci vis-a-vis the social
context.

Since each type of analysis has much to recommend

it, we might reasonably expect that there might be some way
to unite these different analyses.

In particular, I think

that the psychological-intentional model of analysis of
ethical actions cannot unify these normative analyses, nor
is it the best method of understanding
institutionally-situated action.

A contextual-social

approach, discussed in Chapter II, more adequately fulfills
these purposes and results in more applicable and effective
recommendations.
Current discussions in medical ethics can be
distinguished in different manners.

One distinguishing

characteristic is the particular approach.

There are

case-illustrated philosophical discussions, issue-oriented
discussions, case-by-case analyses, issue-oriented case
discussions and policy discussions.

A second means of

distinguishing the different approaches is to consider the
type of intervention or social change that are recommended.
4

While some suggest that individual physicians or patients
act differently, others take a wider focus, and recommend
that the profession or institution should form policy to
change the problematic behavior, or that laws should be
enacted to enforce the ethically required change.

More

extreme are views suggesting that the problems in health
care are reflections of those of society in general and so
effective responses will take the form of social change on
the largest scale, social revolution (i. e. , Navarro, 1973,
and Waitzkin, 1983, both suggest that ethical and social
problems in the delivery of medical care must be responded
to with a change in the capitalist economy) .

These two

different ways of characterizing medical ethics discussions
cut up the literature along similar lines; case-studies
generally suggest individual changes in behavior while
issue-oriented discussions are more likely to produce
policy.
It is my contention that the reason the
discussions happen to divide in such a manner is due to
different forms or " scopes" of social analysis that are
either implicit or explicit in the approaches.

Starting

with the most " philosophical, " there are discussions which
can be characterized as case-illustrated philosophical
analyses.

These are primarily concerned with utilizing the

controversial ethical issues that arise in biomedical
pra�tices to clarify standard philosophical discussions.
5

The social factors relevant to the discussions are those
which are demanded by philosophical considerations.
Metaethical discussions and the like will occasionally
utilize such examples.

Charles Fried, in discussing and

evaluating use of the self-defense exemption to the rule of
non-maleficence, uses the following example:
IX. A retarded and sickly child is the only
available donor of a kidney for an otherwise
normal sibling. The donor would surely not
survive the removal of his kidney. (Fried, 1978:
49)

The role that the example plays in the discussion is to
clarify our moral intuitions on the use of force to avoid
personal harm in situations where the "defense" is not
against an attacker in the usual sense.

Fried also uses the

case of organ transplant, the withholding of treatment and
scarce medical resources to illustrate his argument (Fried,
1978: 52). The conclusion of his discussion is not so much a
reference to how such cases should be decided or handled as
much as a clarification of the role intention plays in the
general applicability of categorical norms (Fried, 1978:
53). The social picture presented in these discussions
establishes the ethically relevant criteria needed to
illustrate the borderline issues and to argue for important
distinctions in the formulation of general ethical
principles and theory.
The use of such cases as examples is a recognition
6

that medical practice presents us with difficult ethical
dilemmas.

The medical-ethical. case is used for the

philosophically practical purpose of illustration and
argument.

The accompanying social picture, which is the

reason why the medical cases are so useful, presents the
ethical questions in a limited context.

This limited, and

familiar, context is useful because it focuses our attention
on those factors which must be considered in the application
of moral principles to the case resolution.

The focus of

the discussion, however, is on ethical principles and
theories.

The cases considered are a means of

clarification.

The social picture is not based on a social

analysis, but rather the case is chosen precisely because it
illustrates the social factors needed to make the argument.
While the general ethics discussion may enlighten the reader
as to how certain ethical principles might apply to medical
cases, such is not the purpose of the writings and this
effect is secondary and unintended.
A second approach in medical ethics literature is
an issues-oriented approach which does have the purpose of
exploring how ethical principles and theories apply and
assisting in resolving ethical problems that arise in
medicine.

In an introductory anthology, edited by R. Munson

(1983), J. Gay-Williams, considers the issue of euthanasia
in a brief issue-oriented discussion (Munson, 1983:
156-162). Using arguments from varying theoretical
7

perspectives, Gay-Williams maintains that euthanasia,
defined as " intentionally taking the life of a presumably
hopeless person, " is immoral.

Gay-Williams rejects the

passive/active euthanasia distinction, claiming that passive
euthanasia is not euthanasia proper, since it is not
deliberate or intentional taking of life.

Arguing from a

natural law perspective, Gay-Williams indicates that we have
an essential tendency to self-preservation.

This is

sufficierit, it is argued, to show that euthanasia is wrong.
Shifting to a discussion of self-interest, Gay-Williams
argues that, since the acceptance of euthanasia might
undermine the drive to survive and is too dependent on very
limited capacities to predict the outcome of disease and
medical developments, it is immoral from the perspective of
self-interest.

Finally, arguing from " practical effects, "

the author claims that acceptance of euthanasia could result
in an overall decline in the quality of medical care and
sets society on the slippery slope of allowing society to
contain and kill off those who are disapproved of and
labelled by mental or medical health officials.

The entire

argument is backed entirely with references to theoretical
and ethical distinctions.
Another example of what I am referring to as an
issue-oriented approach is the well-known article by R. M.
Veatch called " Models for Ethical Medicine in a
Revolutionary Age" (1972) . In this article, Veatch draws out
8

the social and ethical implications for different
conceptions of the relationship between physician and
patient.

He refers to different possible models as 1) the

engineering model, 2) the priestly model, 3) the collegial
model and 4) the contractual model.

Veatch's arguments are

based on ethical principles and concerns, as well as a
discussion of the social state of affairs that is promoted
by each model.

He condemns the ethical abstinence of the

engineering model, the ethical elitism of the priestly model
and the idealism of the collegial model.

The contractual

model, conceived along the lines of the religious notion of
covenant rather than a more legalistic conceptualization, is
what Veatch finally recommends as the most desirable model
for the physician-patient relationship.
There are obvious conceptions of social relations
and of society in Veatch's argument.

Consider his criticism

of the collegial model:
for the most part we have to admit that ethnic,
class, economic, and value differences make the
assumption of common interest which is necessary
for the collegial model to function a mere pipe
dream. What is needed is a more provisional model
which permits equality in the realm of moral
significance between patient and physician without
making the utopian assumption of collegiality.
(Veatch, 1972: 7)
In both Gay-Williams' and Veatch's arguments there
is explicit use of premises that are empirical
generalizations about society.

Gay-Williams asserts that
9

society is not capable of distinguishing and enforcing
different policies toward the terminally ill and those who
are labelled deviant.

Veatch asserts an asymmetry in

medical knowledge and claims that class, ethnic, economic
and value differences render unrealistic any expectation of
collegiality between physician and patient.

No empircal

support or theoretical framework is suggested for such
statements.

Rather, they are assumed to be

non-controversial statements about a familiar state of
affairs.

Neither is there reference to specific cases.

The

discussion is issue-oriented in that it explores the ethical
implications of the acceptance of certain moral attitudes or
types of actions.

The outcome or conclusions of such

discussions are either condemnation (in Gay-Williams'
discussion) or condemnation and recommendation (in Veatch's
discussion) of particular moral stances.

There is no

mention of concrete actions that might help to alleviate the
ethical concerns expressed in particular cases.

Though

Veatch's conclusions may be a policy recommendation in that
he suggests a particular model for medical practice (Veatch,
1972: 7), he does not give concrete suggestions of how to
implement the model.

It is not clear how physicians or

patients can shift or grow into Veatch's model, nor what
sort of institutional policies might encourage such a
shift.
A third type of discussion might be characterized
10

as a combined issue-oriented case-study approach.

Case

studies are used to illustrate an ethical problem that
occurs with a degree of frequency in medical practice.

The

cases may be used to show the development of the issue as an
ethical problem rather than simply to show that the ethical
problem has occurred in at least one case.

The

issue-oriented component of the discussion establishes the
issue as an ethical issue and suggests what sort of response
is ethically appropriate.

The fact that the issue has been

illustrated and developed through case studies has the
benefit of making the recommended responses more obviously
applicable or sensitive to the social factors surrounding
the occurrence of the ethical problem.
One example of this approach is found in Veatch's

Case studies in Medical Ethics (1977). Interspersing ethical

discussions and case studies, Veatch works through most of
the issues typically discussed in current medical ethics
literature.

On the issue of informed consent, for example,

he presents three cases to illustrate the general issue as
well as standards of disclosure, non-beneficial research on
children and consent that would invalidate the result of
research, as in the use of placeboes (Veatch, 1977:
290-306). On the issue of informed consent for
non-experimental therapy, Veatch presents a brief history of
the issue's development in American medicine.

He then

presents a case titled " The Practice-of-the-Profession or
11

Reasonable-Person-Standard" (Veatch, 1977: 302-304). Veatch
cites a case where a patient sued physicians who suggested
and performed a myelogram which resulted in injury to the
nerves in his lower back causing " diminished sensation in
the front of the left leg below the knee and a weakness in
the left foot" (Veatch, 1977: 304). Dr. Anderson, one of the
physicians, argued from the standard of practice in the
community, claiming that other physicians in the area would
not have informed a patient of the remote risk of serious
spinal injury.

The complainant, Mr. Berkey, argued that

physicians are governed by a standard of disclosing what a
reasonable patient would want to know, even if the risk is
extremely small.
Veatch discusses the issue of standards of
disclosure, citing legal cases.

He indicates that the

" community standard of practice" is based on the principle
of benefitting the patient.

" The decisive factor" as to

whether the physician should tell the patient is whether the
physician thinks that the information would benefit the

patient (Veatch, 1977: 305). Veatch points out that Natanson

y,

Kline is cited in the court argument of the case study

as support for the community standard of disclosure.
court ruled in Berkey v,

Anderson that the medical

The

community standard is insufficient and that such a situation
is governed " in the same manner as others in a similar
fiduciary relationship" (Veatch, 1977: 305).
12

Veatch develops the discussion of informed consent
in non-experimental therapy by citing cases which illustrate
patients who 1) are said to manufacture side effects if they
are informed, and 2) are surprised and upset by extra
charges and use of an independent laboratory (raising the
issue of confidentiality).

Issues are illustrated by the

cases, implications and conflicts are indicated in detail
through the discussion.

The discussions are drawn to a

close with statements of what issues are at stake.

For

example, after the case where a patient is said to
manufacture the side effects she was warned might occur,
Veatch comments:
To reveal extremely rare risks of diagnostic
procedures can produce disturbances for a patient,
as suggested by this case. It shows that informed
consent for medical treatment is a problem not
only for major, complex medical and surgical
procedures but for the most routine procedures as
well. (Veatch, 1977: 306-307)
This approach has the very considerable
advantage of clearly illustrating, through very concrete,

usually true, examples, what the issue is that is being
discussed.

The use of court cases also brings the legal

dimension into the discussion.

I consider this approach

issue-oriented because it seems primarily to raise and
demonstrate the ethical issues but does not tend to
recommend explicitly any concrete responses.

In this sense,

it is more concerned with establishing the issues as
13

legitimate ethical problems.

The spread or scope of the

particular ethical issues is also sometimes suggested, as in
Veatch's comment that the one case shows that informed
consent is also a problem in " the most routine procedures. "
In other words, even in routine procedures the same
normative analysis can be applied to reveal the ethical
problem.

This is perhaps an implicit suggestion to

practitioners and ethicists that they should be aware that
informed consent is an issue that might arise even in
routine procedures.
Note that the social details of such discussions
are set by the scope of the cases used.

Consideration of

the "manufactured symptoms" case was limited to similar
cases; those that were routine procedures and which had a
In the case of the suit over

small chance of side effects.

the lack of the patient's knowledge of a rare side effect,
the considerations were broadened to bring into the
discussion legal rulings on the legal status of the
physician-patient relationship and its implications for
disclosure standards.

But these legal considerations serve

mainly to aid in pointing out the ethical issue.

The scope

of social observation or analysis in these discussions is
limited to consideration of how such ethical issues occur in
certain social settings and to establishing that there is
reason to consider them as legitimate ethical issues.
Perhaps there is an implicit assumption that, as responsible
14

moral agents, physicians will act on the knowledge to change
their behavior in a manner that will at least acknowledge
the ethical issue.

If so, then this too makes certain

social assumptions about physicians' character, behavior and
the social setting in which they operate.
More specifically, such implicit assumptions would
suggest one form of recommendation.

If physicians are at

least as moral as most of us and are likely and able to act
on their new knowledge of the ethical side of their medical
practice, then an ethicist simply needs to establish the
issues.

There may, however, be good reasons to doubt that

the mere indication of a moral problem will affect the
behavior or a moral agent.

Perhaps this assumption is not

made by those engaged in such discussions but they are
merely setting the ball rolling for more effective change.
If such is the case then further discussion is obviously
needed with an emphasis different from that of these
discussions.

The second social assumption, that simply

desiring to change the situation empowers physicians to make
effective change in their practice, may also be naive.
Whether such is the case is an empirical question yet to be
answered.
More practical and yet probably more limited in
its scope is an approach taken in ethics grand rounds in
teaching hospitals.

In an attempt to get staff and

residents to be more aware of the ethical issues in medical
15

practice, many faculties of medicine have sponsored case
discussions where the emphasis is the ethical rather than
the medical issues.

These discussions may be more practical

simply because of the fact that they occur in a situation
where many of the participants are clinicians who want to
know how to respond in such a situation.

So in a case

discussion of the "manufactured symptoms" the discussion
that Veatch included as part of the case presentation would
be likely to occur.

In that discussion a resident suggests

that the proper response is to withhold information about
such side effects and the staff physician responds that such
is not an option since "patients and their lawyers" have
ruled out such action.

Though likely to be in greater

detail, such a discussion is of the type that occurs in the
case presentations.

Professional responsibility, legal

liability and patients' interests are all weighed in an
informal discussion or by the commentator.

The main

question usually addressed is "How ought a medical
practitioner act in this and similar situations? "

So the

level of intervention is primarily that of appealing to the
individual practitioner to behave appropriately.
The scope may be more limited than issue-oriented
case discussions such as Veatch's, in the sense that time
limitations may prevent similarities to other cases and
related ethical issues from being indicated and
illustrated.

And the same social assumptions as were
16

pointed out for the previous approach seem to be operative
here as well.
A final characterization of an approach to medical
ethics discussions is what I will call policy discussions.
Policy discussions usually, though not without exception,
occur in the context of a policy making group which has some
sort of institutional authority.

Policy making bodies are

convened to consider concrete responses to recognized
problems.

Hospital committees and medical professional

groups engage in policy-oriented discussions regarding such
issues as "no-codes " and the termination of treatment.
Organ donor contracts, printed on drivers' licenses
represent a means of implementing particular patients'
wishes and is the result of policy discussions of ethical
aspects in organ transplantation.

The writing and legal

status of living wills is a possible legislative response
arising from policy discussions of euthanasia (cf., U.S.
President's Commission Report, 1982: 155-166 for discussion
of legal and ethical ramifications of "instruction
directives " and designating proxies).

Such policies are

more overtly political in the sense of either establishing
formal policies or of summoning support to appeal to other
legislative or policy setting groups to make changes in
their policies or laws.
Policy discussions outside such policy setting
groups tend to focus on issues of allocation that are in
17

need of a response on the level of a social policy.

For

example, Ethic��d· Heaith-c�xe-Poiicy, edited by Veatch and
Branson (1976), presents discussions of health care delivery

policies by different authors.

The ethical issues are

justice, the "right" to health care, distribution of scarce
resources and research efforts (e. g. , the totally
implantable art�ficial heart),·and non-medic�! community
participation in health care decisions (threatening
professional autonomy).

Such issues clearly need some

discussion of social systems within which the issues must be
considered.

As such they explicitly bring in considerations

of such social theories and issues as social justice
(Outka), distributive justice (Fletcher), contract theory
(Green), liberalism (Callahan, Steinfels), and technology
assessment techniques (Walters). Disagreements are sometimes
over the social analysis used (e. g. , "The Right to Health
Care and the Anxiety of Liberalism: A Reply to Daniel
Callahan" by Peter Steinfels).
Another example of policy discussion is found in
an anthology edited by T. A. Mappes and J. S. Zembaty (1981,
1986: cf. , Capron 1974: 340-438: and page 49 of this chapter
for a more complete list).

Alexander Capron discusses the

function of informed consent, concentrating on extreme
therapies such as transplants (Mappes and Zembaty, 1981:
74-78). The general roles of informed consent are described
as 1) the promotion of autonomy, 2) protection of the
18

patients' or subjects' status as persons and 3) avoidance of
fraud and duress.

Capron emphasizes that a formal

requirement of disclosure increases patients' or subjects
ability to exercise informed choice.

He then enumerates six

elements of informed consent set out by the federal
government for the protection of human subjects (U.S.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare: The
Institutional Guide to DHEW Policy on the Protection of
Human Subjects 7, 1971, as amended in 1974):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

A fair explanation of the procedures to be
followed, and their purposes, including
identification of any procedures which are
experimental;
A description of any attendant discomforts and
risks reasonably to be expected;
A description of any benefits reasonably to be
expected;
A disclosure of any appropriate alternative
that might be advantageous for the subject;
An offer to answer any inquiries concerning
the procedures;
An instruction that the person is free to
withdraw his consent and to discontinue
participation in the project or activity at
any time without prejudice to the subject •

• . • No such informed consent, oral or written,
. • • shall include any exculpatory language through
which the subject is made to waive, or appear to
waive, any of his legal rights, including any
release of the organization or its agents from
liability for negligence.
Following Capron's article is a legal opinion
by Judge Spotswood

w.

Robinson III in the Canterbury v,

Spence (1972) case (Mappes and Zembaty, 1986: 90-94).

Robinson argues that a physician has a duty to inform
19

patients about dangers that "are material" to a patient's
decision.

He refers to a "reasonable person" standard for

determining what dangers are material to the decision.
exceptions are suggested.

Two

One exception is where "the

communication of the risk information would present a threat
to the patient's well-being" (Robinson, 1972: 788). The
other is where in an emergency situation (i. e. , life
threatening) the patient is unable to give consent
(Robinson, 1972: 789). Explicitly condemned is withholding
information so that patients will not refuse therapy that
the physician deems necessary.
Policy discussions are more practical than
issue-oriented discussions in that they conclude with some
form of concrete recommendation.

The discussions in the

Veatch and Branson volume (1976) are the most general in
that they critique and make explicit use of social theories
and theories of social justice and analysis.

Since they are

not restrained by an institutional mandate to make
recommendations that will be effective within an existing
system, they can be more critical of current systems than
any of the other analyses can be.

The Institutional Guide

to Department of Health, Education and Welfare (DHEW) Policy
may also be fairly open in terms of requiring change, if
deemed necessary, in the policies of institutions and
perhaps even legislative change.

Judge Robinson's comments

must remain within the legal tradition, since that is the
20

institution and authority within which his opinion is
sought.

Yet all of these discussions have in common that

their recommendations are policy; they suggest that certain
practices within either institutions or society must be
constrained by ethical considerations.

And, in each case,

the arguments used to support the recommendations are either
base upon the explicit use of a form of social analysis or
are made within an assumed institutionalized social
framework.
What all the policy discussions have in common is
a recognition that there are ethical issues which need to be
responded to at a policy level.

This is at least an

implicit recognition that these ethical issues are not
easily dealt with at the level of physician-patient
relationships.

Social factors such as limited access to

medical information and resources and conflicts of interests
within the health care system serve to limit the
effectiveness of appeals to individuals to act more
ethically once educated as to the existence of the ethical
issues.

Policy recommendations, including those which

suggest the need for significant large scale social change,
are attempts to respond to this need.
The same ethical issue may be approached through
any of these different ethical discussions.

Informed

consent, for example, may be a topic of discussion in a
simple case presentation, a case-oriented issue approach, a
21

straightforward issue-oriented approach, or in a variety of
policy discussions.

But the type of approach taken also

seems to influence the type of recommendation that results
from the ethical deliberations.

Each approach is useful,

whether for the immediate resolution of a case, illustration
of an issue, normative analysis of underlying ethical
issues, or for policy recommendations.

But variation in the

breadth of focus on social factors influences the
recommendations which are likely to result.

I will now

discuss what these recommendations have in common as a first
step to unifying the social foci of the different types of
discussions.

�al Change
Concrete ethical problems always occur in a social
setting.

That is to say that, in order for the problem to

come to public attention, it must be observable.

It is true

that some ethical theories hold intentions or motives to be
crucial in determining the ethical status of an act.

But

the illustrations, cases and issues discussed in medical
ethics are subjects for discussion because they are
observable.

Attitudes and motives may be ascribed in order

to provide an explanation for the behavior--whether as a
reason or as an excuse.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that

concrete or "encountered " ethical problems are observable
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actions or some statistical representation of them (in
allocation discussions).

Since they are raised as problems,

the likely response will be a recommendation that is a means
to change the situation.

In other words, the encounter with

an ethical problem is an encounter with concrete social
circumstances.

A recommendation that is based on a

normative analysis will either endorse the particular
circumstances or will make some suggestion as to how the
situation should be changed.
It might be objected that this entire discussion
is irrelevant to those who adopt an ethical theory which
bases some or all of its ethical judgments on the moral
agent's intentions.

Kant's requirements that we always

treat persons as ends and act out of a sense of duty would
be an example of such a theory.

Perhaps one of the most

popular of such judgments, based on natural law deontology,
are those based on the principle of double effect.

This is

a principle that is appealed to in such cases as a medical
procedure required to save the life of a pregnant woman
which will result in the fetus' death.

The important detail

which makes the principle of double effect applicable is
that there are two conflicting moral claims: the mother' s
and the fetus' lives cannot both be saved.

Ethical theories

such as Catholic natural law considers any evaluation of one
life as more important than the other to be unethical but
recognizes that in such situations some decision must be
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made.

The principle of double effect may be appealed to in

this case to justify operating on the mother even though it
results in the fetus' death.
Munson (1983: 33) succinctly specifies the
necessary conditions for an action to be morally permissible
under the principle of double effect:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The action itself must be morally indifferent
or morally good.
The bad effect must not be the means by which
the good effect is achieved.
The motive must be the achievement of the good
effect only.
The good effect must be at least equivalent in
importance to the bad effect.
If the act is done with the intent of saving

the mother and is not a direct act of killing the fetus or a
case of using the death itself as the means to saving the
mother' s life, though it does in fact kill the fetus, the
act may be morally justified on this principle.
Craniotomies are ruled out since they directly kill the
fetus.

The removal of a pregnant woman's cancerous uterus

is permissible even though it does result in the death of
the fetus.
While they differ from ethical theories which do
not focus on intention, intention-oriented ethical theories
help in similar ways.

That is to say that they establish

whether or not certain actions are moral and determine which
actors are morally culpable or praiseworthy.
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Recommendations for future behavior will rule out those
procedures which violate the conditions of double effect and
approve those which meet them.

In this sense the

recommendations which come from intention-oriented ethical
theories do not differ in form from those which originate in
other types of ethical theories.

If the recommendation is

addressed to individual moral agents, it will be an
exhortation to use the principle of double effect in those
cases where it is applicable to determine the ethically
appropriate course of action.

In this case it is personal

behavior that is to be determined by this moral principle.
If the recommendation is directed to policy considerations,
it will give criteria for membership in a class .of actions
which will then be approved or disapproved.

The procedure

of removal of a pregnant woman's cancerous uterus, mentioned
above, might be an approved policy, perhaps after approval
by an ethics committee which will attempt to determine
whether the four conditions mentioned above are met.
Prohibitions such as the one against euthanasia in "The
Ethical Directives for Catholic Hospitals " (Munson, 1979:
35-36: cf., Encyclopedia of Bioethics, Appendix, 1978:

1756-1757) would be an example of a forbidden procedure and
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an official definition of what particular procedures are to
be taken as members of that class:
The direct killing of any innocent person, even at
his own request is always morally wrong. Any
procedure whose sole immediate effect is the death
of a human being is a direct killing • • • •
Euthanasia (" mercy killing") in all its forms is
forbidden . • . • The failure to supply the
ordinary means of preserving life is equivalent to
euthanasia.
It is important to notice that even these
intention-oriented analyses make recommendations that
certain� are approved or forbidden.

General

recommendations will always take the form of specifying
types of behavior morally condemned or accepted and criteria
for membership in the relevant class.

As such these

recommendations take the same form as those which are based
on ethical theories which place less or no emphasis on
intention.

While the normative analysis may make use of

intention in determining what ethical behavior is, the
ethical recommendations are expressed in terms of
permissible and prohibited behaviors.

Such behaviors are

social in that they are observable and involve other
persons.

In fact the actions are usually approved or

prohibited on the basis of the social relationship between
the actors (e. g. , the prohibition of direct killing is a
prohibition against an action toward another person as well
as against an intention or attitude).
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In this sense all

ethical recommendations are recommendations that direct
social behavior, whether or not they suggest appropriate
intentions or attitudes.
There is also a practical reason to prefer
analyses which apply normative principles to actions rather
than intentions.

It is notoriously difficult, if not

frequently impossible, for observers an doctors to have
infallible, or even dependable, knowledge of motives and
intentions.

This may be due to the abstract concept of

"intention " not having a psychological referent in many
instances of intentional behavior (see Chapter I I). But this
analysis is designed to respond to publicly identifiable
ethical problems, with recommendations whose effectiveness
is measured by the elimination or reduction of (ethically
condemned) behavior.

If some persons act in ethically

unobjectionable manners on motives which we might
disapprove, that is a matter of character and virtue with
which I am not here concerned.
Any recommendation based on ethical analysis will
be either to change the situation analyzed or to maintain
it-.

If the ethical analysis results in approval of the

action, then either no change will be recommended, or change
to encourage recurrence of the action.

If the ethical

analysis results in condemnation of the action, then the
recommendation (if any) will be to change the situation to
avoid recurrence of the action.
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Of course, based on the

limitations of certain forms of analysis as discussed
earlier, some analyses may treat certain social features as
unalterable.

Such analyses may conclude of morally

condemned actions that nothing can be done to avoid their
recurrence·.

The analysis here defended (the

social-normative analysis) is, in part, a response to this
inadequacy.
The focus on ethical action to the exclusion of
intention may be a result of this analysis' orientation.

If

someone acts in an ethically appropriate manner for motives
which we might condemn (i.e., fear of punishment,
disrespect, etc.)

the ethical concern over the motive is

not likely to arise.

It is when the motive manifests itself

in terms of unethical behavior, or when a disclosed attitude
is judged to be likely to lead to unethical behavior, that
the motive or attitude is criticized.

Recommendations which

promote ethical behavior, and prevent unethical behavior,
are effective in so doing without considerations of the
ethical status of actors' motives and attitudes.

The change

recommended may be either that individual actors consider
certain details in determining their proper course of action
or that certain moral polices be adhered to.

In this sense,

most recommendations based on ethical analysis will take the
form of recommendations for social change.
Limiting the discussion to applied ethics, it is
reasonable to assert that any recommendations will take the
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form of social change.

Social change is taken here to have

a broad definition that includes the various levels of
intervention that have been discussed in the first part of
this section.

To be more specific, whether recommendations

take the form of exhortations to individuals that they
modify their behavior, claims that professional groups or
institutions should change their actions or policies, or
suggestions and calls for legislative changes or a form of
social revolution, they are all recommendations for social
change.
Medical ethics discussions have often left the
impression that policy discussions, though normative, are
quite different from typical ethical or normative issues.
For example, Ruth Macklin (1981: 513) claims that:
Policy issues are surely normative ones, but they
may include political and economic, as well as
moral considerations, arising out of vested
interests or prior commitments.
Some political theorists have argued that political theory
and polit ical ph ilosophy cannot operate without making
normative assumptions or judgments (Jagger, 1983). It is far
from clear that� recommendation based on a normative
analysis is exempt from "vested interests or prior
commitments" or that any argument for social or political
change is complete or convincing without backing the
normative elements with ethical argumentation.
29

The

different levels of intervention all recommend social
change.

They are essentially recommendations which are made

and implemented within social settings and so require the
consideration of political and economic vested interests and
"prior commitments. "
Consider the issue of informed consent.

A

physician's resistance to the requirement that he or she
fully inform a patient of the risks and alternatives might
be based on concern that the patient might reject medically
required treatment.

Such a concern may be embodied in a

moral argument to the effect that the responsibility of the
physician is to take care of the patient's health needs
(cf. , Veatch, 1977: 305) . Or perhaps the underlying worry is
that the patient is not fully rational in rejecting or
considering the information, since the background medical
education is lacking (cf., Ingelfinger, 1972) . But the
physician's resistance might also be based on prior
commitments to such values as health or to treating all
similar medical cases similarly.

Patient choice will

possibly disrupt such consistent treatment or perhaps
prevent the physician from treating some illness.

In other

words, a prior commitment to treating illness may be partly
or fully the basis for the physician's doubt of the ethical
or practical wisdom of informed consent (cf. , Robinson,
1972: 789).

An example of the influence of political
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commitment on ethical anlysis and subsequent recommendations
can be found in the use of "edge of the wedge " or "slippery
slope" arguments in such issues as euthanasia or abortion.
On such issues the argument claims that legislatures and
those who implement policies on "killing " are incapable of
making the kind of subtle distinctions that are required to
keep the accepted moral policy from sliding "down the slope "
to include killing those who are not the intended
benefactors of the policy but for some reason are socially
undesirable (cf. , Kamisar, 1958; Ramsey 1978: 217, 225).
What sort of ethical recommendation might be
exempt from such prior commitments or political or economic
interest?

A brief catalogue of the issues typically

considered in biomedical ethics texts might be a good place
to start.

Ronald Munson (1983) has the following categories

or titles in his table of contents:
Abortion and Infanticide
Treating or Terminating: The Problem of Birth
Defects
Euthanasia
Paterna l ism, Truth Telling, and
Confidentiality
Medical Experimentation and Informed Consent
Psychosurgery and Behavior Control
Genetics: Control, Counselling and Research
Competition and Allocation (for resources)
The Claim to Health Care
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Mappes and Zembaty's anthology adds the following to the
list:
Patients' Rights and Professionals' Obligations
Health, Disease and Values
Involuntary Civil Commitment
Suicide and the Refusal of Lifesaving Treatment
Apart from the explicitly political topics (i. e. , behavior
control, involuntary civil commitment, competition and
allocation of resources, the claim to health care, and
patient rights and professional obligations) any of the
issues are of the sort that can be discussed abstractly,
apparently excluding vested interests and prior commitments
of an economic and political nature.

That is to say that

these issues can be analyzed in the manners earlier
described as issue oriented, case-study or a combination of
the two.

As observed earlier, such analyses also tend to

produce recommendations that either establish the issue as
an ethical issue, perhaps in the hope that practitioners
will pay heed, or const r uct particular responses that the
practitioner can use in similar cases without requiring
changes in the medical setting or policies.
It is also obvious that such issues frequently
involve discussions of social policy and practices,
attempting to develop responses that are sensitive to the
social contingencies and the variety of opinions on the
values and appropriate means.
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So particular case studies on

informed consent o r withholding infor mation, in obse rving
that the physician is the person with the information that
the patient needs or _ is threatened by, recognizes a common
social fact about physician-patient relationships: There is
an asymmetry in knowledge which gives the physician a degree
of authority and power over the patient (cf. , Fisher , 1979,
1982, 1983; Todd, 1982; ·Friedson, 1970a).
Case-recommendations which are directed to inter vening in
concrete interactions focus on indicating how practitioners
can change their behavior, o r more generally, what general
rules they should follow.

Social change at " higher " levels

of intervention, i. e. , those that require changes in
policies or institutions, are not considered in case-studies
since they are simply not the focus of such analyses.
Per haps the most comprehensive policy discussion, the
President' s Commission for the study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research ( 1982:
115-164), discusses increasing public access to medical
information, r eviewing medical school selection criteria and
cur r iculum, nursing practice and legal means.
The significant point here is that no matter the
level of intervention to which a recommendation is directed,
since the recommendation is for social change it can ignore
the social factors, since they deter mine the
recommendation's relevance and effectiveness.

It is obvious

that abstract normative ethical theory (i. e. , metaethical
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accounts of the good, theories of justice, etc. )

can be

constructed without reference to concrete social situations,
finding instead that hypothetical examples can control for
relevant similarities and avoiding troublesome
dissimilarities.

Once the concern shifts from abstract

philosophical issues to the construction of effective
recommendations, however, this theoretical distance cannot
be maintained.

The fact that an ethical problem is

perceived reveals that the problem exists in a social
setting, not merely as a private psychological event.

If

the normative analysis confirms that there is an ethical
problem, then the recommendation will be directed to change
the situation.

Since the recommendation is an attempt to

make a relevant social change, it must be sensitive to those
ethically relevant social factors which will affect the
normative analysis.
is insufficient.

Even this amount of social sensitivity

The recommendation ought also take into

account those social factors which will mitigate or enhance
the effectiveness of the recommendation.

Otherwise,

unforseen consequences are likely to follow the
implementation of the recommendation which may create more
problems than the recommendation resolved.
Recommendations aimed at affecting the· most
concrete or "micro" level often ignore those social factors
that are not immediately relevant to the ethical analysis of
implementation of the recommendation.
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To do this may

invalidate the accuracy of the analysis or the effectiveness
of the recommendation.

On the other hand, recommendations

typically directed toward changing social structures, or
creating new ones (e.g, Institutional Review Boards and
Hospital Ethics Committees), neglect some of the more
concrete social factors and result in ineffective
recommendations.
Consider, for example, the ethical issue of
informed consent.

All the ethical discussions agree that

there are circumstances that demand medical intervention
without fulfilling the requirement of informed consent, such
as an emergency with an unconscious unidentified patient or
when the information itself presents an obvious threat to
the life or mental health of the patient (cf. , Robinson,
1972). Most ethicists reject the withholding of information
by the physician for the reason that the patient, if fully
informed, might reject what the physician perceives to be
medically required treatment (Robinson, 1972; Capron, 1974;
Zembaty, 1979) Once this normative analysis has been made,
the resulting recommendation must be directed at some
particular level or levels.

Some analyses seem to leave the

recommendations implicit, such as Veatch in his Case Studies

in Medical Ethics (1977: 306-307). This analysis concludes

that informed consent can be a problem in the most routine
of cases.

Some commentators suggest that the physician is

reasonably assumed to be the expert on such social and
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medical factors as the remote risks of major and minor
effects that are not the therapeutic goal as well as
possessing the knowledge and experience within which the
proportion of risk can be assessed { Ingelfinger, 1972 ;
Alfidi, 1975). Physicians may then be said to be the best
judges of what ought to be disclosed to each particular
patient.

Extending this line of reasoning, Veatch suggests

that only through compassionate and ethical physicians will
patients get what is in their best interests { Veatch, 1981:
Chapters 5 & 9). This suggests that the level of
intervention is quite concrete, perhaps the education of
physicians as to the ethical dimensions of such issues.
Other recommendations resulting form the normative
analysis direct. attention toward legislative and policy
recommendations.

An example of this type of recommendation

would be the United States Department of Health, Education
and Welfare's Institutional Guide to PHEW Policy on the

Protection of Human Subjects { 1971) which lists elements of
informed consent to be included and a prohibition on
exculpatory language.

Judge Spotswood W. Robinson I I I's

opinion in the Canterbury v .

Spence case (Robinson, 1972)

which sets out the previously noted exemptions to informed
consent is also such a policy oriented recommendation .

The

effect of such recommendations may. be to guide institutional
ethics committees and hospitals in constructing forms for
informed consent, as well as giving concrete guidelines to
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practitioners who must present the information to patients
and subjects and receive informed consent.
Yet both of these approaches, at least in
isolation, have significant deficiencies.

The lower level

of intervention, that of educating and emphasizing to
physicians that they have this responsibility, neglects the
social fact recognized in the policy oriented
recommendations: Physicians as a group have prior
commitments that may color their view of when it is
appropriate to withhold information for the patients' own
good.

In response to this factor, the policy

recommendations spell out in more detail the sort of
information to be disclosed and what reasons are legitimate
to justify paternalism (when it is appropriate).

But the

policy recommendations must also depend on the physicians to
make the judgments as to when the particular . patient
qualifies as one of the specified exceptions.

Furthermore,

the simple disclosure of the information on forms or
verbally by practitioners does not guarantee comprehension
by the patient.

An inadequate policy response to this

problem is to require review of forms and educational
materials to assure that medical terminology is translated.
There may also be a requirement that patients or subjects be
given time away from the medical setting to consider their
decision and to formulate questions.

Nevertheless, the

emotional and psychological burden of an ill patient may be
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relevant in a particular case and such issues must
inevitably be decided on a case by case basis.

This is of

course a strength of the lower level recommendations over
the higher level or policy recommendations.

The former

emphasizes the individual practitioner' s responsibility
while the latter may seem to pre-empt professional autonomy
and personal responsibility by stipulating the particular
obligations.

Clearly the best type of recommendation is one

which sets out what the particular obligations are and the
basic means that are to be employed but also encourages the
practitioner to use considered judgments as to how best to
achieve the designated ethical value.

But even the ethical

goals that the recommendation is meant to serve may depend
on the social analysis.

Some ethical discussions recognize

this in the observation that ethical issues are dependent on
the particular descriptions of action.
Consider the issue of moral agency or
responsibility.

In a case of a person accused of murder

what must be determined is whether or not the person acted
freely and intentionally to commit the crime.

The

prosecution might present the account that the accused had
been harassed and threatened by the murdered person and had
planned the murder ahead of time.

The defense might agree

that the defendant had been harassed and threatened by the
victim but had acted out of fear and that the act was one or
self-defense in that the defendant perceived herself to be
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in danger.

The prosecution's account encourages us to

consider certain factors to be the defendant's motive while
the defense claims that the same factors are morally
relevant in a completely different sense ; they excuse the
defendant from her other wise unacceptable behavior.

The

difference in the two claims has to do with the role that
the particular factors played in the action being judged.
In this manner certain factors that on one account play a
role of excusing otherwise morally questionable actions
(self-defense) may, on another account, be combined with
other factors to establish moral culpability (premeditated
murder).
The above account of the different roles that
certain factors can play focuses on the psychological impact
of harassment and threats on the accused.

The "other

factors" referred to in the above discussion are the crucial
points to be established.

In fact, what must be claimed by

the defense is either that there are some morally acceptable
cases in which threats and harassment relieve a person of
the prohibition on killing, or at least that such conditions
render the individual morally excusable since she is unable
to act as a fully autonomous person in these circumstances.
The first account is generally referred to as some form of a
self-defense argument and the second as a "crime of passion "
(or temporary insanity).
Such accounts of the circumstances surrounding a
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morally questionable action are also relevant in more
general discussions.

The general form would be one which

considers whether the social setting of particular moral
concerns renders moral agents less autonomous ( e. g. , whether
n captive

populations n can give valid informed consent).

In

specific cases we consider the plausibility of the
psychological account: whether or not the factors in the
case affected the accused in the manner described.

Th e

ethical issue is whether the psychological effects of the
social setting alter the person ' s moral responsibility.

If

the psychological account is accepted as plausible in the
particular case, then it must be admitted that such an
account has a more general applicability in all similar
cases.

Similar cases are those in which the relevant

factors are present.

But it is not clear whether what will

be accepted (say by jurors) as the relevant factors are the
psychological account (i.e. , what one claims to have •felt n )
and/or a description of the social setting and in a manner
that makes the action forgivable ( i. e. , that it would be
understandable or forgivable in • these circumstances• to
kill and not QD.ll that one felt threatened) • .
The ethical requirement , based on
universalizability or some version of the principle of
justice, is that we t reat all moral agents with equal
respect .

It would be prejudicial to do otherwise.

Consequently we must find morally relevant differences
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between the judgment in those cases where a fully autonomous
person kills another who poses no threat to the murderer or
anyone else.

Ceteris paribus we ought to treat all

murderers similarly.

Self-defense is the judgment that the

killer acted on the reasonable belief that she was in danger
of temporary insanity, or even of continuous or permanent
insanity, and this is a recognition that the killer was
incapable of exerting rational self-control.

What counts as

reasonable belief must be more than the testimony of the
killer; the social context is relevant as evidence for or
against such a claim.
In the murder accusation, the factors are the
harassment and threats of the defendant from the deceased
and particular observable or verifiable signs that the
defendant's reactions to the victim's behavior are best
explained by one theory rather than another (the
prosecution's argument rather than the defense's).
Acceptance of such an account in the particular case sets
precedent for a similar line of argument in other (similar)
cases.

In other words, the account must be accepted as

plausible in general.

The normative claim in the particular

case can be expressed in a universalized moral statement: In
cases of harassment and threats resulting in the killing of
the offensive person the killer may be excused of his or her
actions if it can be established that the act was the only
way to protect himself or herself from serious harm.
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Or

perhaps a less controversial form would be that the charge
not be murder (i. e. , reduce the charge to "manslaughter ") if
it is established that the killer acted irrationally out of
passion due to the victim's threats and harassment.

Legal

issues of what is sufficient to establish the legitimacy of
such claims in particular cases turn on the concept of
"reasonable doubt " as determined by a jury .

Ethical

discussions, however, do not have recourse to such a
procedural response.

Rather we must attempt to specify what

conditions would justify accepting this account of the
action over one which would find the defendant fully, or
somewhat, responsible for killing the victim.
Since the crucial consideration for moral
discussions such as the one above is whether or not the
killer is autonomous, any account which excuses the agent
from normal moral obligations must explain how the actor's
autonomy was either threatened or infringed upon in a manner
sufficient to justify the act of killing.

Ethical claims

paralleling the "crimes of passion " legal excuse are that
the killer's autonomy was restricted in such a way as to
relieve the person of moral responsibility for the killing.
So the entire discussion of when the killing is justified in
the face of threats and harassment by the victim will turn
on what are unacceptable amounts of infringement and
restriction of autonomy.

Descriptions of threats

(infringement) and of non-autonomous acts of passion will
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have to be accounts of observable behavior in order for the
ethical judgments to be applicable.

So while the ethical

claims are based on judgments of particular instances of the
psychological impact of certain behaviors on the killer's
autonomy, the universalized ethical statement will, for
practical purposes, need to be based on verifiable accounts
of social behavior.
This is tantamount to claiming that ethical
judgments are about classes of social behavior.
claim is clearly controversial.

Such a

Surely it is true that a

description of the behavior may meet the conditions we would
typically accept as indicative of a loss of control without
the killer's autonomy necessarily being impaired in such a
way as to reduce the moral culpability.

It is precisely

such facts which give credibility to act utilitarianism.
But does such an exception to the rule invalidate the rule?
A more detailed account of what is entailed by the general
ethical rule is in order.
Choosing only one of the above conditions, it may
be claimed that a certain level of harassment and threats
relieves the harassed and threatened individual of
responsibility for the killing of the threatening and
harassing person.

The reason for the suspension of the

usual attribution of responsibility is that the necessary
condition for moral responsibility has been interfered
with--the killer is rendered less or non-autonomous by the
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killed person's threatening and harassing behavior (insanity
plea).

In other words, the conditions under which the

killing has taken place render the killer incapable of
engaging in the sort of moral deliberations one is morally
obligated to engage in before acting in such a blatantly
immoral fashion.

Assuming that ought implies can, then one

can only be held responsible for that which is within one's
capabilities.

The killer cannot be held responsible for

failing to do that which was not possible.

Of course there

may be other reasons for punishing the killer, such as
discouraging such acts in general or the symbolic value of
promoting negative consequences for such behavior.

It may

also be claimed that the killer's autonomy was impaired, not
incapacitated, so perhaps it would be appropriate to reduce
the punishment but not to remove it.

Universalizability,

fairness or a principle of justice all seem to demand that
similar cases be treated similarly.

So we must, in all

fairness, determine what details count as the morally
relevant conditions which demand similar treatment.
Conceptually, the important fact is the impairment
or reduction of autonomy.

So in any case where there is a

similar effect on autonomy we must treat the agent as we do
in this case.

But it is also likely to be true that

different individuals can endure different levels of
harassment and threats before their autonomy is affected.
This in fact does seem morally relevant for each case.
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In

other words, holding constant the "level " of threats and
harassment, we can imagine that there is a spectrum of
personalities which will vary from those persons who are
quick to anger to those who are rarely exciteable or
reactionary under such circumstances.

A

rule or policy

which considers autonomy of persons to be impaired under
specified levels of threats and harassment will not be
sensitive to these various levels of tolerance for such
behaviors.

But a policy which is based on consideration of

individual levels of tolerance will hold different persons
to have varying levels of responsibility under similar
circumstances.

Clearly these different policies will differ

in judging those cases where the killer is seen to have high
levels of tolerance and thus to have been more autonomous in
the act of killing.

The issue then becomes one of whether

it is fair to hold some persons more responsible than others
in similar circumstances.

This is , in a way, to penalize

the tolerant individuals for being so tolerant by expecting
more of them.

Conversely, this policy would reward, or at

least not hold responsible, those who are especially quick
to anger for their nasty disposition.
If one accepts the more particularized version
(that an individual is responsible according to his or her
disposition and consequently the actual effects of the
threats and harassment on autonomy is what is of moral
significance), then other even more particular details also
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seem important.

The tolerant individual's level of

tolerance may have been affected by such conditions as lack
of sleep , other encounters with abusive persons , etc.

The

explosive person may also be unusually tolerant on the
particular day due to surrounding circumstances.

If what is

of central moral concern is the actual effect of the threats
and harassment on the individual's autonomy , it seems that
such factors also play a significant role.

In other words ,

even the most tolerant of persons have bad days when they
are quick to anger.

So the estimate of how autonomous the

act of killing was would need to be based on an evaluation
of the net effects of the threats and harassment on the
particular individual's autonomy considering how generally
tolerant of such things the person is and on whether there
are any other circumstances that might alter this estimation
of the person's autonomy.

Provided that we accept that the

focus is to be on how autonomous the person was in killing ,
these considerations do not seem to be unreasonable.
On the other hand we might adopt the moral policy
that individuals should only be held responsible for fully
autonomous acts in the absence of a certain level of threat
and harassment.

This might seem an easier policy to enforce

and would not hold persons responsible for the particular
level of tolerance that they have grown to have.

It is at

least highly plausible that varying levels of tolerance for
different personalities are due to environmental or genetic
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It may

differences beyond the control of the ind�vidual.
therefore be fair to hold this standard.

But even this

policy does not free us of all social-psychological
considerations.
First of all we must determine that level of
threats and harassment over which it is unreasonable to
expect an individual to exercise full autonomy.
be a minimal or median standard?

Should this

That is , should we hold

all moral agents responsible only to that standard we can
expect of the least tolerant or autonomous of us?

Or should

we hold the least tolerant responsible to a standard that
most of us can live up to?

(This issue will be discussed in

connection with the reasonable person standard in the next
section).

Second, how do we determine whether or not the

designated level of threat or harassment was present?
Clearly this latter question is one which must be settled by
a close examination of the circumstances in which the
threats and harassment took place.
imagined them?

What if the killer

They are then present as an impairment of

the killer's autonomy so it seems that they are relevant to
the determination of the level of moral culpability.

At the

other extreme it is possible that the threats and harassment
were expressed by the victim but that the killer did not
hear or understand them.

Such a situation can hardly be

construed as an impairment of the killer's autonomy.

If the

expression is non-verbal then their presence is still more
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difficult to ascertain and their effect masked.

Yet all of

these examples have one thing in common: They show that
there is no impairment of autonomy if the killer did not
comprehend the threats and harassment.

Certainly it seems

to beg the question if we simply assume that the killer
heard them since he or she did kill the victim.

But how do

we tell that the killer acted in response to the threats and

harassment?

Far from settling any of the ethical issues

involved in this issue, this discussion has demonstrated
that there are complex psychological and sociological
questions involved in setting the ethical policy and in
applying it to particular cases.

If such confusion can

arise in the enforcement of a reasonably simple ethical
prohibition, it may be even more difficult to determine the
ethical ends and appropriate means of bringing them about in
the socially complex realm of medical ethics.

Having

recognized the need for social analysis to guide
recommendations for social change, I now turn to a
particular illustration.

Informed consent is one such

policy that presents a complex of ethical and social
dilemmas.

Informed consent
Informed consent is fundamentally an attempt to
respect the autonomy of patients in the process of medical
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treatment or research .

It is basically a requirement that

patients or subjects be qiven the opportunity to consent to
(or dissent from) treatment based on relevant information.
Patients are autonomous agents whose choices must be
honored .

Capron lists six functions of informed consent

(Capron, 1974: 364-376):
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

To Promote Individual Autonomy .
To Protect the · Patient-Subject ' s Status as a
Human Being .
To Avo id Fraud and Duress.
To Encourage Self-Scrutiny by the Physician
Investigator.
To Fostor Rational Decisionmaking . ·
To Involve the Public [ in Promoting Autonomy
as a General Social Value and in Controlling
Biomedical Research] .
Notice that none of these is, strictly speaking, a

medical goal .

The requirement of informed consent of

patients or subjects is a restriction of medical practice .
It is a re�uirement that medical practitioners have
patients' agreement prior to its execution.

And the consent

must be "informed. " That is to say that it must be based on
information that gives the patient. a basis for rational
decision.

In this manner., individual autonomy is promoted.

Unless there are strong reasons against it, there is a
presumption in favor of patients having control over what
happens to their bodies and lives.
Requiring that patients and subjects of research
be told about procedures and give consent prior to treatment
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is also a means of protecting them .

Research with little or

questionable therapeutic benefit is not obviously in the
subjects' interests so it is only with their knowledgeable
consent that their participation can ethically be accepted .
This is due to the fact that they are put at some degree of
risk in the procedures and so their protection is best
served by their being informed of such risks .

It is also

possible that certain researchers or physicians may act
unethically and treat patients/subjects in a manner that is
clearly not in their interests .

Informed consent is one

means of making such an occurrence less likely .

By

protecting patients' autonomy in the decision regarding
participation, their "status as a human being " is
protected .

Thus it is expected that attempts at fraud or

duress, or any similar unintended effects, will be less
influential in the presence of informed patients and
subjects .

This too is acheived primarily through

maintenance of patients' autonomy .
Capron's last three functions are more abstract or
general .

If the medical profession is expected to present

information to patients and subjects, it is reasonable to
expect that the professional will take care not to be
embarassed by its less scrupulous or thorough members .

This

"self-scrutiny " is to promote reflective rather than
non-reflective habitual practice .
physicians' increased autonomy .

so

In this sense it promotes
If patients are to consent

from an informed basis, rather than from a simple trust in
the profession or their physician, then it is also expected
that both practitioners and patients/subjects will give a
significant role in the decisions to the relevant factors.
This ought to promote decisions that are as rational as
possible based on the available information (Capron ' s "e ").
If such information did not play a significant role, it
would be more likely that decisions to treat or do research
would be ba sed on less rational grounds such as hunches,
whims and desperation.

Finally, it is expected that

informed consent will involve the public in promoting
autonomy in general and in controlling biomedical research.
At the very least this function is thought to be
accomplished through patients/subjects as members of the
public, becoming more autonomous in their medical care and
in the selection of the sort of research and risks for which
they will agree to be subjects.

So these six of Capron ' s

functions of informed consent reduce to various means of
promoting autonomy, both that of patients and physicians.
Before discussing the form that informed consent
must take to begin to fulfill this function, there are
limitations that are important to recognize.

"Therapeutic

privilege " is the ethical justification given for
withholding certain information from p�tients.

This is not

valid in the case of research subjects because the reason

that is given for treating without consent is always
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"therapeutic. " It is said to be in the patient's best
interest to withhold the information.

"Presumed consent " is

when it is in the patient's interests to proceed without
consent rather than to wait for consent.

This action is

usually justified in cases of emergency treatment of
unconscious patients.

When time is not so limited, "proxy

consent " allows a responsible person to consent in behalf of
unconscious or clear ly incompetent patients.

Beauchamp and

Childress suggest that the paternalistic act of withholding
information is justifiable in the case where the medical
practitioner considers the information to be harmful to the
patient (Beauchamp and Childress, 1979: 74). Judge Spotswood

w.

Robinson I II, in his opinion in Canterbury v.

expresses this concern:

Spence ,

The second exception obtains when risk-disclosure
poses such a threat of detriment to the patient as
to become unfeasible or contraindicated from a
medical point of view • • . • The critical inquiry
is whether the physician responded to a sound
medical judgment that communication of the risk
information would present a threat to the
patient's well-being. (Robinson, 1972: 789)
In other words, it is permissible to withhold information
from a patient when, on the basis of a sound medical
judgment, the information itself constitutes a serious risk
to the patient's life or health.

The most crucial, and

ambiguous, terms in this doctrine are "sound medical
judgment " and "risk " (i. e. , there will be a range of
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information which might be construed as imposing a risk to a
patient who is critically ill on the account that
maintaining a " will to l ive" is crucial to recovery and any
significantly bad news may adversely affect this desire).
If this is an act of justified paternalism , then
it ought to stand up to the general requirements for acts of
justified pate�nalis�.

Jane Zembaty argues persuasively

that paternalism is justified in those cases where the end
result is a greater promotion of autonomy than if the
non-paternalist !c action (s) was taken ( Zembaty , 1986). This
is . in k eeping with John Stuart Mill's argument that one
ought not be allowed to sell oneself into slavery for the
reason that the loss of autonomy is permanent while the
prohibition on the particular action is only a temporary
infringement on autonomy.

But Mill also argues that in

other cases a person's physical or moral good is
insufficient grounds for the suspension of the value of
autonomy (Mill, 1962: 135). Zembaty's and Mill's discussions
indicate that the justification of withholding information
from a patient must be based on the long-term promotion of
autonomy, not the promotion of the patient's. health.

In

other words, since the paternalistic actions are prohibited

on the grounds that they violate the person's autonomy, it
seems that they may be justified in those cases where they
actually promote the person's long-term autonomy more than
the non-paternalistic options.
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Nielsen (forthcoming) has

supported a similar position.

He { unlike Zembaty) does not

accept paternalism as justified if the person is currently
autonomous, rejecting on empirical grounds the ability to
objectively predict the effect of information on another's
autonomy.

For Nielsen, paternalism is only justified in

those cases where the person is incompetent, where
incompetent is defined as not being able to make rational
decisions { if such is a case of paternalistic action at
all } .

While Zembaty has attempted to make room for at least

a minimal acceptance of paternalism in medical practice,
Nielsen carefully circumscribes such practices to those
cases where the patient is clearly not capable of exercising
autonomy.
The treatment of those incapable of giving
informed consent is usually given a different justification
from that of paternalism.

This is because of a wide

acceptance of a definition of paternalism along the line of
Dworkin's:
[ Pater nalism is ] the inter fer ence w i th a per son's
l iberty of action justified by reasons referring
exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness,
needs, interests, or values of the person being
coerced. { Dworkin, 1972: 65).
Mappes and Zembaty, following Feinberg's discussion
{ Feinberg, 1973: 7, Chapter 2), consider coercion to include
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only intentional use of threat and of harm, so they redefine
paternalism:
Paternalism is the interference with a person's
autonomy justified by reasons referring exclusively to
the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or
values of the person being .Q..Qn.s..tll�. (Mappes and
Zembaty, 1981: 12)
But such a definition excludes the possibility of
paternalism in the case of those who are not autonomous
(cf. , Culver and Gert, 1982: 130 ; Beauchamp and McCullough,
1984: 84) . That is to say that one must be autonomous in
order for one's autonomy to be interfered with.

If one is

unconscious, irrational or under some severe form of
constraint, one's actions are not autonomous.

In the case

of not informing a patient who is not autonomous it could
not be said that the medical practitioner is being
paternalistic, since the patient's autonomy is not present
to be infringed upon.

In such cases it is preferable to get

informed proxy consent (Nielsen, forthcoming ; Robinson,
1972) . And in emergencies, other ethically relevant concerns
such as promoting the patient's welfare and health are
generally seen to take precedence over getting substituted
consent or waiting for the patient to become competent.
The exceptions to informed consent are typically
justified either on the grounds that the patient is not
currently competent and therefore there is a long term
promotion of autonomy, or that the patient's immediate need
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for medical treatment outweighs the value of delaying
treatment for the patient to return to competency or for
professionals to find a proxy.

Since the latter emergency

exception to paternalism and informed consent typically
saves a person's life or at least promotes a quality of life
by preserving certain physiological functions (e. g. ,
cardiopulmonary resuscitation may prevent brain damage;
immediate treatment may avoid loss of limb, etc. ), it may be
reasonably claimed that this action also promotes long term
autonomy.

So the doctrine of informed consent, and the

exceptions to it, are directed toward preserving and
promoting patients' and subjects' autonomy.

This may

reasonably be referred to as the main goal of informed
consent.
Why is it that patients' and subjects' autonomy
needs to receive such protection?

Konold (1978) has pointed

out that ancient medical codes and prayers tended to be
paternalistic in nature.

He indicates that even the most

historically persistent of these codes, the Oath of
H ippocrates, counsels the physician to refuse certain
patient requests and to judge what confidences to keep
(Konold, 1978: 164). More recently, the " Nuremberg Code of
Ethics in Medical Research" was developed to govern medical
research and to provide ethical and legal standards to judge
the Nazi practice of human experimentation (U . S . Defense

Department. Nuremberg Code, Trials of wa r Criminals Before
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the Nuremberg Military Tribunals , 1974). In 1964 the world

Medical Association adopted the " Declaration of Helsinki " to

guide physicians involved in biomedical research on human
subjects (World Medical Association, 1975). These
international concerns about the ethics of research centered
around the issues of voluntariness and information to be
provided the subjects.

These concerns have been echoed in

efforts by professions and governmental bodies within
numerous countries, including the U.S. (National Commission
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, 1978) and Canada (Medical Research
Council of Canada, 1978). In addition to the avoidance of
such atrocities as occurred in the Nazi experiments, these
efforts a re a recognition that medical research has a goal
different from the typical therapeutic goal that
characterizes the relationship between medical practitioner
and patient.

The fact that the research is aimed at the

production of medical knowledge which may benefit future
patients may seem to justify the particular subject bearing
certain risks.
subject.

But this decision cannot be made for the

Even the inherent paternalism in most therapeutic

relationships cannot justify the medical researcher acting
in behalf of a subject, since not therapeutic benefit but
the gain in knowledge and potential benefit to future
patients would be the basis of the decision to participate .
This documentation of responses to the perceived
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problem of informed consent in research on human subjects
points to the obvious conflict that may arise in research,
where the goal is not unambiguously the patient's health.
Since the research goal is seen to provide a conflict of
interest sufficient to require informed consent, it may
provide a model for understanding the same requirement in
therapeutic treatments.

It may be that establishing the

ethical issue will help to clarify the reason why the issue
has received so much public attention.

This may need to be

supplemented with a description of the changes in general
" societal " perceptions, which will follow the ethical
discu ssion.
Judge Robinson has already been quoted in
conjunction with legitimate limitations on the doctrine of
informed consent.

But Robinson a lso rejects a particular

justification for the withholding of information:
The physician's privilege to withhold information
for therapeutic reasons must be carefully
circumscribed, however, for otherwise it might
devour the disclosure rule itself. The privilege
does not accept the paternalistic notion tha t the
physician may remain silent simply because
divulgence might prompt the patient to forego
therapy the physician feels the patient really
needs. That attitude presumes instability or
perversity for even the normal patient, and runs
counter to the foundation principle that the
patient should and ordinarily can make the choice
for himself. (1972: 789).
This legal statement represents quite well the ethical
concerns expressed in the doctrine of informed consent.
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The

autonomy of the patient is seen to be a principal concern in
the therapeutic relationship, as in any other relationship .
The fact that the physician has information that
is material to the decision as to how to treat a patient
becomes important in that the patient needs the information
to make a rational decision .

The presumption includes the

patient's agency; it is expected that the patient is ideally
the one deciding to accept or reject specific treatment
options, under the guidance of the physician's knowledge and
recommendation (cf., U.S. President's Commission Report, ·
1982: 36-39 on joint decisionmaking is critical of this

presumption).
This ethical description is noticeably at odds
with the picture of the doctor-patient relationship depicted
in the early codes such as the Oath of Hippocrates, where
the physician is encouraged to decide what i s in the
patient's interests and keep within the profession knowledge
pertinent to such decisions .

But the shift of context for

informed consent from the rather obviously relevant area of
research into the therapeutic relationship is also due to
social perceptions which have brought this issue to public
attention.
The shift in attitude toward physicians has been
noted by many authors writing on informed consent.

Mappes

and Zernbaty (1986: 48) claim that the shift is from an
assumption that physicians were best placed to act in
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patients' best interests to one which assumes that patients
should be actively involved in these decisions.
three factors responsible for this change.

They list

First, the

physician-patient relationship has become more impersonal as
the practice of medicine becomes more technological and
specialized.

Secondly, the increase of illness due to the

medical trea tments that the profession has used (iatrogenic
illness) has led some to question the "activist " orientation
of many physicians.

Third, physicians are increasingly

gaining a reputation of being of a particular socio-economic
class, with implied educational biases, and thus are
suspected of having significant value differences from a
large proportion of patients.
Robert Veatch, in the introduction to his well
known article, "Models for Medicine in a Revolutionary Age, "
indicates that ethical issues in health care are gaining in
publicity partly due to the growing acceptance of a "right
to health care" (Veatch, 1972: 5). Medicine has only
recently been able to make significant differences in

people' s health and the concept of justice is being extended

to physical and mental wel l-being ( Veatch, 1972: 5 ; World
Health Organization, 1958). This is lending credence to the
right to health care and thus to the impetus behind
increased patient participation in health care decisions at
both the level of informed consent and allocation of
resources.

Barber argues that in this age of "citizen and
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civil rights, " medical research and treatment has become a
sort of social problem.

He indicates that what is

considered a social problem is variable since it is defined
as "a social condition that a sizable group comes to define
as both bad and improvable or removable" (Barber, 1980: 2).
Pellegrino and Thomasma, in considering the
philosophy behind medical practice, recognize that societal
deference to technology and those educated in it has
resulted in a loss of control of the "values and purposes of
that technology. "

(Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1981: 255).

They also observe that a particular patient's illness may
result in a loss of the "ability to speak about his
values. "

(Pellegrino and Thornasma, 198 1: 254). They

continue:
Especially in tertiary care settings, we have
observed that the values of the patient in
decisions decline and the values of the
institution or the health care team rush to fill
that vacuum. (Pellegrino and Thornasrna, 1981: 2 54)
While Pellegrino and Thornasrna emphasize patients'
illness as the source of this loss of autonomous voice in
health care decisions, there are sociologists of medicine
who argue that it is the institutionalization of health care
and the cultural authority of the physician wh ich together
account for this loss.

Though we w ill return to these

discussions later, it is relevant in this context to point
out that such social analyses have been based on historical
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accounts (Stevens, 1971; Starr, 1982; Conrad and Kern, 198 1 ;
Freidson, 1970b ) , as well as on empirical research into
current medical practice (Fisher, 1979, 1982, 1983, 1986;
Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1970 ; Waitzkin and Stoekle, 1976 ;
West, 198 0, 1982 ) .
Whatever weight is given to these explanations,
the social climate has supported a concern for patient
participation in medical research and therapy.

One of the

chief outlets for this concern is the issue of informed
consent.

Informed consent is an ethical issue in its own

right as has been shown by the earlier discussion of
autonomy and paternalism in the withholding of medical
information.

What has yet to be discussed is what the

precise goal of a doctrine of informed consent should be and
how such a goal could be accomplished in the complex social
context that makes up the delivery of health care.
Capron's six functions of informed consent have
already been discussed.

But a relevant distinction can be

drawn between function and purpose or goal.

A medical

treatment may be given for a purpose or to achieve a
particular therapeutic goal and yet may have other effects,
desirable or not, that it may be said to "function " to bring
about.

Thus one of the functions of certain radiation

therapies in the treatment of cancer has been the increased
incidence of certain iatrogenic osteosarcomas.

Or a codeine

prescription for the relief of pain may also function to aid
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in relieving (or creating) gastro-intestinal problems.

In

an analogous manner, informed consent is meant to be a means
of preserving patient autonomy by requiring informed
participation of patients in health care decisions.

But it

may also seive to increase a general respect for autonomy
and rational decisions.

Or it may function to increase

public input into research.

But these are not necessarily

or obviously the best means to accomplish these ends; they
are simply unintended though not undesirable results.
The goal of a doctrine and practice of informed
consent is the promotion of patient autonomy in the receipt
and delivery of health care.

But what sta te of affairs is

to be promot ed as an expression of such an abstract goal?
It seems that many discussions of standards of disclosure,
comprehension, whether consent must be writ ten or oral, and
other procedural issues all differ on the point of what is
to be acheived by informed consent.

Indeed, Veatch seems to

recognize this in his discussion of standards of
disclosure.

He argues that the acceptance of a "medical

community of practice " is based on the principle of
benefit ting the patient (Veatch, 1977: 30 5). This is because
the decisive factor then becomes whether the physician
thinks the information would benefit the patient.
the court ruling in Berkey v.

He cites

Anderson as supporting the

conception of the physician-patient relationship on the

model of other similar fiduciary relationships and thus
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supportive of the "reasonable person " standard of disclosure
{ cf . , pages 11-13). This would emphasize the goal of
allowing patients access to information in order that they
may make their own decision, rather than so they can be
informed as to what they are consenting to.

Beauchamp and

Childress (1979: 73-74) suggest that such a goal might be
better served by an "individual patient standard " where the
particular patien t' s concerns and beliefs are taken into
consideration to determine if any additional information not
required by the reasonable person standard ought to be
provided in this case.
In arguing for a standard of disclosure that
includes purposes of research, as we11· as risks and options,
Ramsey (1970: 24) has suggested that the patient/subject
becomes a "joint adventurer in the common enterprise of
human medical progress " (cf. , U. S. President' s Commission
Report , 1982: 36-39 on joint decisionmaking).

This is a

recognition that medical research cannot progress without
the participation of human subjects nor of medical

researchers.

Thus both groups play indispensible roles in

the advancement of medical science through research on human
subjects.

But since it is the subjects of research that

bear the risks on their persons, it is reasonable that they
share with the researcher in possessing such information as
is relevant to the types and probabilities of risk.
Ingelfinger argues that informed consent of such a type
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practically requires that the patient receive not only
pertinent information but also a medical education that
allows for proper interpretation of the information imparted
(Ingelfinger, 1972). He concludes that the requirement of
informed consent in experimental therapy only serves to
notify patients that part of their treatment is an
experimen t.

He continues:

Beyond this accomplishment, however, the process
of obtaining "informed consent, " with all its
regulations and conditions, is no more than
elaborate ritual, a device that, when the subj ect
is uneducated and uncomprehending, confers no more
than a semblance of propriety on human
experimentation. The subj ect' s only real
protection, the public as well as the medical
profession must recognize, depends on the
conscience and compassion of the investigator and
his peers. (Ingelfinger, 1972: 466)
It is not clear what particular level of education that
Ingelfinger think� patients or subj ects would need to have
in order for the practice of informed consent to be more
than an "elaborate ritual. "

But it does seem clear that

Ramsey and Ingelfinger have drastically different pictures

of what can reasonably be expected from a practical
application of the doctrine of informed consent.

Veatch has rej ected the "collegial model" of
physician-pat ient relationship on the basis of its
unrealistic estimate of the similarities between physicians
and patients as social classes (Veatch, 1972: 7). He
suggests a "more provisional model " which he characterizes
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as a contractual relationship where patient and physician
work toward a common goal; patient health.

This seems to be

a middle ground between Ramsey and Ingelfinger, insisting on
patient participation but admitting that physician
understanding and comprehension may remain more extensive.
Each normative analyst criticizes the current
practice of consent and, using ethical principles, suggests
an altered practice.

But their rejection or expectation of

"collegiality" or of "joint adventurer " or of a "contractual
relationship " and other descriptive accounts are based on
some practical estimate of what is realistic.

Some. such as

Ramsey, may be more optimistic about the educability of
subjects, or may consider the practical constraints
inconsequential in the face of the ethical arguments.

To

see how a social analysis might unify or critique these
diverse approaches, it is helpful to describe the social
circumstances which ethical analysts might be trying to
achieve.
All of these descriptions of the problematic state
of affairs and the improved picture that is to be brought
about by informed consent are quite vague.

It seems that at

least three different goals or "social pictures" may be
defended.
A) The first starts with a critique of the current
situation as problematic because patients tend to agree to
procedures whose details, effects and options are not well
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known to them.

This is ethically problematic because most

patients are autonomous agents who ought to make decisions
based on rational grounds.

The lack of relevant information

and the rationality of the consent is therefore
questionable.

Such consent may partly be based on trust in

the medical professional.
two ways.

But this trust is problematic in

First, it is an unreasonable burden to place on

the medical practitioner and is irresponsible of the
patient.

Second, such an attitude allows value differences

between patients and physicians to go unnoticed even though
they may affect decisions .

The goal of an applied doctrine

of informed consent is to alter this state of affairs so
that patients' consents are based on relevant information,
the ir physicians' advice and their own values.

The crucial

change is that the patient. become aware of exactly ldlfil is
being consented to and the implicat i ons of such a
treatment.

The patient will then be given the opportunity

to agree with the physician's advice from an informed basis,
rather than such agreement being based simply on a trust
which may be rather naive (note that the standard of
disclosure--reasons and risks of treatment--serves as the
rationale for physician choice of medical options) .

(Cf. ,

the U. S. President's Commission Report, 1982: 50, for a
discussion regarding the fact that some apparent trust may
be due to patients' failure to k now or believe that they
have the prima facie right to self-determination. )
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The practical recommendation which follows from
this analysis and goal is the provision of information and
time for deliberation to the patient.

Agreement, either

verbal or written, to the procedure would basically be an
indication that the patient has received the information and
agreed to the treatment.

The change is that where the

patient formerly trusted the nedical practitioner to deliver
health care productive of patients' best interests, now the
patient is to be educated as to the reasons for the
physician's choice and consent on that basis.
A criticism of this analysis and response is that
it produces informed consent only in that patients are now
given a better understanding of proposed treatments and the
reasons for them but are not really given more control or
choices.

Such consent is based on the receipt of

information by the patient and the patient's trust of the
physician to perform in a manner productive of the patient's
best medical interests.

But the requirement of informed

consent is based on the ethical importance of autonomy.

As

such the emphasis is on the patient's self-determination.
In order to fulfill such an ethical goal it is not enough
that the patient's consent be based simply on an
understanding of the reasons and implications of the
procedure recommended by the physician.

The moral doctrine

of informed consent is an attempt to assure that the patient
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has chosen the procedure over other options, not that the
patient has chosen the physician and his or her choices.
B)

So a second goal, to be distinguished from the

first which aims at servin� patients' best int.erests, is one
which attempts to change the social picture so that
patients' interests a re served.

The difference between

these two goals is the shift of emphasis from preserving the
authority of the medical professional to determine what is
in the patient's best interests, to one which treats such
determination as a judgment of interests which only patients
are ethically qualified to make.

So any recommendation must

determine what social change will either guarantee or
increase the likelihood of this occurring and by what means
the change can be brought about.
The distinction between these first two goals have
been made in such discuss ions as have been referred to above
(Veatch, 1977: 305 ; Robinson, 1972: 789 ; Ingelfinger, 1972 ) .
Authors such as Ingelfinger do not suggest that the social
picture as it currently stands needs to change much, perhaps
because the patients' medical interests are still served.
So while he criticizes the unrealistic hopes of others as to
what informed consent can achieve, he does not argue for any
new or different measures.

Robinson, on the other hand,

suggests that physicians are legally bound to provide
patients with information � opportunity to decide for
themselves among options, rather that that they simply be
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informed as to the reasons for, and impl icat ions of, the
recommended treatment.

Veatch, a much more prol ific wr iter

and offering an analysis of the situation that is perhaps
more sophisticated, is more diff icult to tie down to one
position.

Through what appears to be exhortations to

phys icians and pat ients, Veatch seems to encourage a change
in att itude which is to " permit equality in the realm of
moral significance between physician and pat ient without
making the utopian assumpt ion of collegiality."
1972: 7). In his discussion of Berk ey y,
Natans on v ,

(Veatch,

Anderson and

Kline , Veatch also seems to agree that informed

consent is to promote the goal of pat ient cho ice rather than

pat ient's best interest (Veatch, 1977: 306) �ut neither of
these discussions make concrete recommendations that both
courts and physicians, and perhaps eth ics committees, use
the reasonabl e person standard of d isclosure, rather than
that of the practice in the commun ity.
C) The th ird poss ible goal or desired social
picture treats the ethical issue of informed consent as " a
t ip of the iceberg."

Informed consent as an eth ical issue

po ints to the existence of a larger problem in health care
practice, the difference in power between physician and
pat ient.

Power can mean many d ifferent things, but in this

analysis it indicates the reduction of pat ients' ability to
choose for themselves.

All commentators adm i t that

phys icians possess the skill and knowledge which pat ients
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need when ill.

The problem of informed consent arises

because patients may be treated without the respect for
their autonomy that is their ethical " right." Initially this
was seen as problematic because patients' interests were not
always served, as in research and experimental treatments.
The first goal of protecting patients' best interests were
not always served, as in research and experimental
treatments.

The first goal of protecting patients' best

interests addresses this concern.

More recently, the

concern has spread to allow patients the right to refuse
treatment that physcians recommended, granting the patients
the right to determine what is in their best interests.
This is a better defined and more rigorous normative
analysis of patient autonomy.

But the social analysis of

the delivery of health care has raised the question as to
whether such a goal is realistic.

Veatch considers the

" assumpt ion of collegiality" to be " utopian." Further
recognition of this fact is implicit in Robinson's denial of
therapeutic privilege for the good of the patient (in the
physician's opinion) , and in Ramsey's ethical goal of making
sub jects " joint adventurers" in medical research (Ramsey,
1970: 24) .
The third goal of informed consent differs from
the second on the basis more of social analysis than of
normative analysis.

Both positions maintain that the

ethical goal is to place patients firmly in control of
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determining what is in their best interests.

Achieving this

goal in the delivery of health care will require more than
setting disclosure standards and informed consent
procedures.

The third goal differs in its targeted social

picture by recogni z ing with Veatch that the current social
situation in the delivery of health care is one which makes
the assumption of collegiality, which grants phys ic ian and
patient equal moral voice, terribly unrealistic.

But rather

than give up such a social picture altogether, the third
goal is precisely to actualize this picture.

Informed

consent is then seen as part of a program whose goal is to
alter the social circumstances of the delivery of health
care in such a way as to promote pat ients' increased
autonomy.

In order to begin such an ambitious task it is

important to understand and identify those factors in the
delivery of health care which are involved in the
suppression of pat ient autonomy.

Informed consent is an

excellent place to start since it too is aimed at the
promotion of patient autonomy.

But the typical practice of

informed consent, while based on the normative concern for
patient autonomy, is clearly too limited an approach for
accomplishing even the second goal; that of allowing
patients to determine their own interests rather than
expecting physicians to do so for them (cf. , U. S.
President's Commission report, 1982 : 46. The Commission's
survey found that 72% of the public wanted to share
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decisions with physicians while 8 8 % of the physicians
surveyed believed patients wanted physicians to choose for
them. ).
·The encouragement of patient autonomy through the
doctrine of informed consent is a very abstract, or not
obviously applicable, ethical maxim.

In attempting to break

this concept into smaller more manageable and applicable
ones, the issues of standards of disclosure, competency,
undue influence, rationality and comprehension become the
focus.

As has been argued, such concepts, especially if

they are to play important roles in practical
recommendations, are difficult to define and controversial
in their application.

But even if such concepts were agreed

upon and their import determined for the concept of autonomy
in the context of informed consent, any recommendations
resulting from the normative analysis would need to utilize
some socially determinable markers to employ the suggested
parameters.

Thus some form of social analysis is necessary

in any applicable determination of moral responsibility and
criticism of current situations.

Consequently this

discussion will now turn to consider what form this social
analysis needs to take and how the ethical analysis relates
to the social analysis.
For the purpose of determining a relevant
framework for social analysis, I now turn to the work of
discourse analysts, especially Sue Fisher and Jeff Coulter,
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to construct a framework for social analysis.

Fisher's work

is based on a layered analysis which analyzes medical
interactions and distinguishes levels of social analysis
with constraining social factors.

Coulter ' s work continues

the argument that a sociological-contextual approach (like
Fisher's) is superior to the psychological-intentional
models .
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CHAPTER I I

Social Analysis: A Method
The task of this chapter is to describe and defend
a framework for social analysis.

In order to be helpful,

the social analysis needs to provide a basis for
understanding the genesis of the concrete actions to which
normative analysis applies.

It must supply both the details

relevant for normative ethical analysis and the details
relevant for the social construction of effective
recommendations.

Furthermore, the assumptions upon which

the social analysis is built must be at least reasonable,
and preferably the most reasonable of all the alternatives.
This chapter will describe a form of social analysis, called
discourse analysis.

The discussion will then turn to the

assumptions on which this analytic framework is based.
Social analysis has traditionally had a variety of
foci, any of which would be fruitful to explore.

In finding

a place to start, I choose to begin with the fact of

meaningful communication.

It seems an undeniable fact that

social activities and communication occur.

Starting with

this fact, we can ask how participants in the social world
successfully perform these activities.

One approach to this

task is represented by reality reconstruction.

Generally,

the emphasis in this approach is to get an "insider's view"
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of the particular social activity, which may be any
observable behavior.

This qualitative approach proceeds by

observation and interview, perhaps aided by a familiarity
with traditional sociological concepts and what has been
written about the activity being studied.

What is studied

or observed is the significance that interactions and acts
have for the participant (cf., Blumer, 1969: 4-5). Herbert
Blumer called this approach " symbolic interactionism "
because it focuses on whether participants see something as
real, as evidenced in their interactions, rather than on
whether what they treat as real is accurate or " true "
(Blumer, 1969: 4-5) . The reliance on sociological traditions
and literature need not cause a bias ; it is a means of
avoiding random observations with the likelihood of personal
bias.

The analytic concepts gleaned from this background

understanding are to be taken as " sensitizing concepts"
which may be revised in the field as they are reinforced or
contradicted by observation (cf., Glaser and Strauss, 1967 ) .
The focus is on the interaction of persons in
order to find the significance of the whole event or of
particular elements.

Secondly, the use of background

understanding is . to suggest what to look for, but is not
taken as a pre-established " rule." Both data-based and
theoretical sociology provide conceptualizations as to how
the social world is " cut up" and how it " works." These
conceptualizations may be treated by a symbolic
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interactionist as sensitizing concepts.

The traditional

focus on demographic information is a good example of this.
One might suppose on the basis of common knowledge,
theorizing and perhaps some studies, that fema le patients
would respond differently than male patients.

Rather than

setting out to prove this as a hypothes is, one could begin
to observe and record interactions to see if such is the
case.

If we were to find a pattern that is general ly

supportive of the genera lization but had exceptions, it
might then be interesting to look more closely at the
exceptions to see what they have in common.

Perhaps an

alternative, or complementary, analytic element might
provide further clarification of the pattern of action.

For

example, Bernstein and Kane (1981) found that differences in
labe l ling was correlated with patients' sex and
expressiveness.

While non-expressive women were more likely

to be diagnosed as having a psychosomatic disorder,
expressive men and women were about equally probable to be
so labelled.

Note that an exception is only visib le against

a background of a general ru le.

So the genera l rule may not

be fa lsified as much as shown to be an incomplete depiction
of how "things usua l ly go."

It is not that patients' sex

was found to be irrelevant, but rather that the action is
more complicated than the broader rule can depict.

In the

example, if women are general ly less expressive than men in
medical interactions then the genera l rule holds that women
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as a class are more frequent ly diagnosed as psychosomatic.
The latter general rule, though fai l ing to explain as wel l
as the two-factor correlation, nevertheless may accurately
descr ibe a pattern, directing attention to a possible
problem (sexism in medical practice) and the manner in which
it occurs.
sociology

and the "Mundane "
Socio logists who study everyday activities focus

on the mundane rather than the extraordinary (Schwartz and
Jacobs, 1979: 235) . This focus on everyday activities, such
as giving and obeying commands or maintaining a personal
space in a public place (Goffman, 1963: 3-32), is an
innovation in both sociology and phi losophy.

Both

disciplines have longstanding rationalist traditions for
which theoretical concerns set the boundaries of the
discussions.

Whi le common knowledge of the world has played

a role in both disciplines, the focus of most discussions
has been on theoretically i nterest i ng issues such as
reconci ling mind and body dualism or identifying social
norms and their effects on groups of people in society.
Neither trad ition gave much insight into how different
individuals were able to get along in spite of such large
scale "problems. " For the "person in the street, " neither
the mind-body problem nor the influence of social norms ever
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entered into practical considerations which might be used as
examples by the theorists.

My hand just does rise when I so

choose and a desire to marry and have children in a stable
social and economic situation seems to be a personal desire,
not an external social norm.

The theoretical issues seem to

disappear when the focus of analysis is how these everyday
activities are possible.

Nevertheless , this

"micro "-analysis requires further theoretical work on what
explanations best account for the actions.
Ironically, the focus on everyday activities and
how they are "accomplished, " or successsfully executed,
yields two problems.

Descriptions of what must be

postulated to un derlie these activities in order to explain
how they are accomplished must account for many of the
implicit beliefs an d shared social activities common to the
actors.

These elements of the everyday activities of people

may not be recognizable as constitutive of their actions by
any one but social scientists.

So to make the claim that

these beliefs and activities were secon d nature to the
participants, it is important to describe them in a manner
that might at least be recognizable and verifiable by anyone

who participates in those activities, though their role
vis-a-vis the activities might not be recognized by the
participants.

The second problem that arises out of the focus on
detailed description of how the mundane activities of
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everyday life are carried out is that the role of these
social features described as underlying the activities,
making them practically possible, is likely to be considered
trivial to the participants.

Discussions of the accuracy o r

the influence of the social factors postulated as underlying
their practices would seem incredible to the participants.
If asked why she used a certain behavior (i.e., avoiding eye
contact, terse r esponses, backing away) to keep her personal
space, the observed woman might well wonder what the
interviewer was talking about ; at least she might simply
assert that it is just what she does in some cases without
thinking about it ; or she might explain why the other
interactant made her uncomfortable.

If a histo�y lecturer

were asked if he believed that the world existed during the
period of history he was lecturing on, he would likely think
we were joking or taunting him.

The focus and detail needed

to carry out the research r equired to understand these
mundane activities leads us to describe much of the context
o r "beliefs" which are even more t rivial than the
interaction studied, from the participants' point of view.
The description of these elements are quite possibly not
recognizable by the actors without considerable explanation
as to what we are tr ying to portray.
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Schwartz and Jacobs { 1979 : 2 14) describe such
participants' knowledge, or Garfink el's "social facts" as :
1.
2.

Features of the society that members knew,
discovered, used and (above all) talk ed about
in the context of daily activity.
Features of the society which were
"accomplished" by practical reasoning in every
day life.
These "social facts" are what members use to

perform and rationally account for their everyday
activities.

Commonly understood features of the social

ord er are rarely made explicit, since they form the basis of
rational explanation and action.

Activities and

explanations or accounts are based on such implicitly and
explicitly acknowledged features.

That is what mak es the

activities intelligible and reasonable.

This common sense

of social structures forms the basis of all social
activity.

These "social facts" are real in that they have

social consequences.

Awareness of them allows members to

use practical reasoning in successfully performing their
everyday activities.

Shared knowledge of them makes

members' actions reasonable to other members and is the
basis of cooperative action and conversation.

One of the

central questions for ethnomethodologists is, " What is the
relationship between social structure and practical
reasoning in everyday life ?"

{ Schwartz and Jacobs, 1 979 :

2 1 4).
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The relation between implicitly understood
practices and practical, everyday communicative actions, is
an important issue for ethnomethodologists.

Theoretical

sociologists and social-political philosophers have created
a wide range of social theories, norms and descriptions of
social structures to account for the functioning of
societies and groups within them.

Qualitative sociologists,

phenomenologists, existentialists and some Wittgensteinian
philosophers are more interested in how particular people
live their everyday existence.

The element of truth in the

theoretical approaches is that there do seem to be certain
shared social forms which are expressed, and direct the
activities of people (though not deterministically) .

The

generalizations that accurately depict patterns of everyday
activity express social facts which shape our actions and
communication in a manner that can be described in this
general form.

The founder of " cognitive sociology, " Aaron

Cicourel (1973) is concerned with an empirically-based
understanding of how these methods are acquired by
individuals and then used to create the world within which
practical activities are manageable.

Practitioners of

Cicourcel ' s cognitive sociology, together with those of
linguistics and sociolinguistics, have made various attempts
to specify what is necessary to account for how it is that
we come to have such complex abilities (cf. , Chomsky, 1 9 6 6 ;
Lyons, 1970) .
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Other sociologists have started with the fact that
we have the ability to carry out social activities and
conversations and then they set out to describe how
particular events are accomplished.

Conversational analysts

such as Harvey Sacks and Emmanuel Scheglof f concentrate on
elements within the conversation itself to explain the
outcome or the joint participation of the actors in
producing a common understanding of the situation.

They

consider such elements as the patterned · occurrence of
utterances and they attempt to construct the rules which
describe them (Scheglof f, 1968 ; Sacks, Scheglof f and
Jef ferson, 1974 ; Scheglof f and Sacks, 1974). Frankel (1983:
45), another conversational analyst, describes the practical
value of making explicit such elements of the interaction in
medical settings:
The value of an interpretive view in medicine is
that it radically transforms the nature of the
physician's participation in the health care
encounter from an objective, dispassionate giver
of advice to an interactional partner who actively
participates in the social construction of
il lness, its treatment and ou tcome .
The description of the function of certain rules
of conversation shows that the physician plays a role in
shaping the conception of illness, treatment and prognosis
which becomes the topic and outcome of the encounter.
focus is not specifically linguistic.

The

Rather, the analysis

of the interview is an examination of how the outcome and
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conception of illness and treatment is not something
stipulated but created between the participants.

This is a

functional view of the use of language and the role of the
participants, although language and meaning are not the
focus of the analysis.
Discourse analysts extend this focus on the
structural and constitutive elements of everyday activities
to examine an entire language event, discovering that the
conversation is not entirely produced by elements found
within the conversation.

Rather, as members of a culture,

participants bring with them a collection of values, beliefs
and accepted practices.

Through these "social facts", and

in the context of the conversation, a conceptualization of
appropriate outcomes and means is formed by the
participants.

More specifically, discourse analysts have

argued that such an event is constrained specifically by the
"institutional order" within which it is located.

The

mundane activity of medical treatment includes as part of
its structural and constitutive elements shared knowledge of
the institution of medicine ; i. e. , how patients and
physicians must act in order to facilitate treatment.

The

practical reasoning displayed in such interactions reveal
interactants' understanding of the "expected" or "proper"
structure of the discourse.

Such "structuring" also

facilitates the achievement of institutional goals.

For

example, the discourse in classroom lessons (Mehan, 1979)
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and in medical interviews (Fisher, 1979, 1982, 1983 ; Fisher
and Todd, 1983) are found to be arranged to facilitate the
accomplishment of institutional goals.
Shared knowledge of the need and method to
accomplish concrete tasks within social or institutional
settings is the locus of the relation between more abstract
norms and rules and concrete action.

Such a connection is

precisely where discourse analysts argue institutional roles
and authority come into play in the shaping of discourse and
subsequent concepts and outcomes.
The discourse analysts' awareness of institutional
goals and authority is part of their professional
familiarity with the relevant literature.

But postulation

of the presence and influence of such abstract concepts
depend for support on their power to explain the concrete
action of each interaction, and the common patterns across
interactions within particular. institutional settings.

Thus

the analysis of social action can be seen as having

different layers or levels of concreteness or abstractness
with respect to the analytic concepts.

Levels of Analysis
Some discourse analysts have analyzed interactions
as being constrained by and reflecting elements of the
social world which are shared either between the two
85

pa rticipants o r by a wider social group .
such an app roach follows .

The discussion of

My f ramewo rk is heavily dependent

upon the wo rk of Sue Fisher (1979, 1982, 1983, 1986: cf. ,
Knor r-Cetina and Cicourel, 1981).
Fisher (1983: 140-141) suggests that an
n ethnography

of speaking n (Hymes, 1962) ought to record and

analyze naturally occur ring talk , •displaying it as socially
produced. "

This places the interaction in a perspicuously

described context which p rovides the g rounds for its
understanding as well as for seeing its function.

Such

sociolinguistic studies have been done as complete studies
of language use (cf . � Labov, 1972: Schutz, 1973, Shuy,
1983). Labov and Fanshel (1977) found that therapeutic
discourse, as distinct from everyday conversation, displayed
an asymmetry in the discour se, which influenced the exchange
of information between the actors.

Fisher fu rther indicates

the simila rity between the asymmetry that Labov and Fanshel
discuss and the • competence gap" discussed by the social
critics Waitzkin and Waterman (1974). The latter claim that
this asymmet ry is the result of socioeconomic factors which
cause the participants to enter the medical . interview with

different needs and resources .

Eliot F reidson (1970a,

1970b) has also noted this· asymmetry, explain_ing it in terms

of an imbalance of k nowledge between p rofessional and
client.

Fisher refers to Shuy (1983) as demonstrating that

the difference between normal conversations and medical
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interviews affect the patients' participation and
understanding of the information and interview.

Cicourel

( 1 973, 1 975 ) , among others, has also claimed that the method
of information exchange affects how the information is
understood.

These apparently competing analyses of the

interactional asymmetry may be arranged into a complementary
framework.
Beginning with her earlier work ( 1979 ) , and
carried through her later analyses, Fisher suggests that
there are at least three levels of analysis which can be
distinguished.

As we shall see, there are the

interactional, organizational and structural levels of
analysis.

It is important to understand that none of these

levels of analysis is "experienced" or found as different
types of social factors in the social world.

Rather, they

are of varying degrees of generality; some may be unique to
one or a few particular interactions, others may be common
to most interactions of a certain type due to their being
placed in a particular setting ( i. e . , medical ) , and still
other factors may be common to an entire society or a
sector.
This type of approach may be a means to bridge
what some have called the "micro-macro" gap in sociology
( Habermas, 1 970, Cicourel, 1 975; Mehan and Wood, 1 975;
Fisher, 1 982; Fisher and Todd, 1 983 : 1 1 - 1 2 ) . At the " macro "
end of the spectrum are social theorists who construct
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theories of societies and how groups within them function,
examining such things as social norms and deviant behavior
(e. g. , Marx, 1964; Parsons, 1951; Waitzkin and Waterman,
1974; Krause, 1977; Conrad and Kern, 1981). Within medical
sociology, recommendations are large scale, such as Waitzkin
and Waterman's (1974) claim that injustices in the delivery
of health care can be addressed only by reconsidering the
capitalist structure of the medical system and the society
(cf. , Navarro, 1973). This roughly corresponds to Fisher's
structural level of analysis.

At the other end of the

spectrum are interactionists who set out to increase our
understanding of the everyday practice of medicine; how the
medical interviews occur and are understood by the
participants (e.g., Davis, 1963; Roth, 1963; Millman , 1977;
Bosk , 1981). More specifically , they are concerned to
produce a description of how the participants, say Davis'
(1963) disabled patients, produce a definition of the
situation and self (in the example, definitions that deny or
reject the disabilities).

An extension of this type of work

includes that of Garfinkel and Cicourel who encouraged
empirical study of how individuals within interactions
contribute to an .understanding of the action for both
participants (Garfinkel, 1967) or how language is used to
"create and sustain the social world " (Cicourel , 1973).
These analyses roughly correspond to Fisher's interactional
level of analysis.
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Situated between these two ends of the spectrum
are sociologists such as Freidson ( 1970a, 1970b, 1973) ,
Goffman, ( 196 1) , Mehan (1979) , and Bel lah (1970) .
Discussions at this level of ana lysis, cal led the
"organizational" level by Fisher, consider how the
organization of particular professions or settings influence
the interactions.

For example, Eliot Freidson ( 1970a)

describes the rise of the medical profession's autonomy in
terms of the influence of funding agencies, social and legal
action and educational requirements (cf. , Stevens, 1971;
Starr, 1982) . As a consequence of this organizationa l
development of the profession of medicine, and in particular
its autonomy, the practice of medicine is shaped in a
particular manner.

The specialized medical knowledge that

the professional possesses, and of which the patient is in
need, sets up an asymmetry.

Other professional choices also

influence the physicians' behavior toward patients.

If the

setting is a fee-for-service practice, the interaction is
more likely to be client-oriented than in a group practice,
where the setting is colleague-centered (Freidson, 1970a) .
Fisher labels her three levels of ana lysis
" interactional, " " organizational" and " structural" ( 1979,
1982, 1983; Fisher and Todd, 1983: 3-13) . She emphasizes
that the analysis is not that there are disparate levels of
influences, but that the different levels of analysis must
be seen to reflexively support one another in a manner that
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is indistinguishable in the interactions .

Together they

comprise the social facts of which the interactants are
either tacitly aware or to which they have access (see
discussion on page 101) . A complete analysis of paradigmatic
cases which illustrate a pattern common to medical practice
(in general or, more commonly, in particular types of
settings) will describe this reflexive relationship between
interactional, organizational and structural levels of
analysis .

The relationship is reflexive in that the

interactions are both constrained by and reflect or recreate
the organizational and structural factors .

This is, as it

were, a two-way street, where structural and organizational
factors guide, but do not determine in a strict sense, how
the interactions proceed ; what purposes they serve and what
treatment outcomes are likely .

But since these social

factors enter the interaction through the shared social
world of the interactants, they are not external constraints
as much as tacitly understood shared beliefs, or better,
practices.

As such, these factors are recreated in each

interaction by the participants, serving as a hermeneutic
context which enables the actors to engage in functional
communicational activity .

They are shared methodological

beliefs and activities which are learned common patterns of
behavior .
Sociologists lik e Fisher are concerned with
understanding communicative action within particular
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settings and how the setting differs from other activities
such as natural conversation in less institutionalized
contexts.

The non-deterministic reflexive relationship

among:
1. concrete actions, including recurring patterns
across different interactions (interactional level of
analysis);
2. factors described as unique to particular
professions or settings (organizational · level of analysis);
and
3. factors described as common to the society
(structural level of analysis), provides us with a model
within which a comprehensive analysis is possible.
It may be that we are not likely to be capable of
identifying or classifying all the factors, though in the
social analysis that Fisher suggests, it may be that we can
identify the more important ones.
Consider briefly how such an analysis would apply
to medical interactions.

The interactions observed and

recorded may be characterized at the interactional level in
terms of the recurring patterns of communication, including
control of topic, number of interruptions, contribution to
outcomes, etc • .

Paradigm cases may be chosen as

illustrations of the patterns, though no one element of the
pattern is intended to be construed as a necessary or
universal factor.

Some analysts, at this level of analysis,
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have found that the health-care provider shapes the
patient' s conceptualization of illness and its treatment
(Frankel, 1983: 45). Paget (1983) has argued that
practitioners emphasize and de-emphasize patients' fears and
conceptualizations through subtle interactional nuances.
Attempting to understand why the professional has a
preferential role in defining and clarifying even
non-medical concepts leads us to the organizational level of
analysis.

The unquestioning acceptance · of the physician's

authority is common to both physicians' and patients' life
experiences.

Though there is evidence of this acceptance of

professional authority in the interaction, it is construed
as an organizational factor because it is a general feature
of the organization of medical practice and the profession
(cf. , Fisher, 1979, 1982; Fisher and Todd, 1983; Fisher and
Groce, forthcoming).

Throughout her work, Fisher argues

that the institutional authority of the doctor structures
the discourse, shapes the flow of the information and
influences the process of medical decision-making.

Not only

do the professional and institutional affiliations of
professionals vest them with authority, but since
practitioner and patient share a common social world, the
view of the practitioner-patient relationship is shared.
Consequently patients are, in these instances where
persuasion is required, often easily persuaded that their
best interests are served by the physician's
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recommendations.

The emphasis on institutionally situated

events allows for the consideration of such non-local
factors on the production of meaningful discourse and
agreement on outcomes.
The institutionalization of medical practice did
not occur in a vacuum.

In fact the practice of medicine for

profit and its network of ties with other profit-oriented
organizations such as pharmaceutical companies, establishes
conflicts of interest with patients' best interest.
Knowledge of this is also common to both patients and
physicians, yet rarely does a suspicion of profit as a
motive find expression in a medical interaction.
Conspicuous in its absence from the content of the
discourse , such a well known structural factor is a
tak en-for-granted feature of the context of medical ( and
other) practices.

Perhaps there is also an assumption that

professionals' good intentions are a sufficient check on
this factor ( see discussion of profit-motive on pages 94
ff).

The �ispensing of drug samples and the typical use of

brand names rather than the generic ones are cues that point
to the influence of pharmaceutical companie� on medical
practice.

These are analyzed · as structural factors because

drug samples and prescription by brand name reflect a
monopolistic , profit-seeking enterprise which is common to a
society as a political and economic entity.
unique expression in medical interactions,
93

Though finding

structural factors could be expected to show up in any
interaction within that society.

Once again, it is

appropriate to refer to this as a "level of analysis"
because it is an attempt to describe the social factors
which serve to "ground" the communication and its meaning
for the participants .

The profit motive is not an element

of the interaction, but rather explains why practices or
actions in the interaction occur as they do.
Consider the example of the influence of
pharmaceutical companies' profit motive on the prescription
of a drug to a particular patient .

In the interaction, we

may find a physician prescribing by brand-name a drug which
she believes will help the patient.

Presumably the patient

will take the prescription and have it filled.

Both pat ient

and physician find this activity intelligible and consistent
with their mutually perceived goals of efficiently treating
the patient's ailment .

The patient within the context of

physician-patient encounters, does not typically question
why he needs the physician's authorization to purchase a
needed drug .

Both are familiar with the social arrangement

of prescribing controlled substances, and this seems to help
make the entire activity intelligible .

They also share a

conception of the physician's ability to competently
diagnose and prescribe.
exchange intelligible.

This also helps to make the
Pointing out these institutional

arrangements would likely seem trivial to the patient and
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physician.

Conversely, the patient may not fully accept the

legitimacy of this arrangement ; but, since he has no
recourse outside of the system, nevertheless considers the
observation moot.
This description of the institutional context
makes explicit some of the tacit understanding which enables
physician and patient to engage in intelligible and
effici ent communication.

It describes the institutional

conventions on which the communication depends for its
intelligibility.

As a social analysis of the

institutionally-located interacti on, these details help
account for the actors' ability to accomplish the apparent
goals of the exchange, as well as for why it was
accomplished in this manner rather than in another manner
(e.g., the physician could suggest that patient buy a drug,
but does not give a prescription, or suggests the drug by a
chemical or generic name).

Such details having been made

explicit, two questions guide further analysis.

First, a

social and empirical issue, is whether this particular
institutional arrangement currently exists (in the example,
whether and how much influence pharmaceutical companies have
on medical practice).

This leads us into further social and

historical exploration.

Note, however, that the "reasons "

or social factors which shape institut ional contexts (e. g.,
profit, efficiency, distribution of labor) may be quite
different from the goals which actors within the institution
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are pursuing (i. e. , health in general or particular health
needs).

The second issue arises from this social analysis

of the raison d'etre of the institution (i. e. , the delivery
of health care) in comparison to particular goals of
physicians and patients within it (e. g. , inexpensive
treatment, conservation of time).

The issue is whether the

social factors which shape the institutional context of
medical practice have a neutral, complementary or
antagonistic effect on the achievement of the particular
actors' goals.

This question directs further social

analysis to the examination of social factors which may
shape the context of the interaction in a manner that is
antagonistic or complementary to the goals of the physician
and patient.

Furthermore, the context so evolved may also

set physician and patient at cross purposes, though there is
still the common institutional g�al of patient health.

This

might be manifested by a patient's desire to receive
inexpensive and effective medical care, which a generic
prescription might most efficiently accomplish, and a
physician's desire to treat efficiently and safely, combined
with an incomplete knowledge of the drugs which are
alternatives for the brand-name drug.

The explicit

discussion of these details sets the stage for the analysis
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of normative issues (i. e. , informed consent, deception,
etc. ) •
The profit motive of pharmaceutical companies can
reasonably be said to stimulate a considerable amount of
advertising and educative activities.

Since it is

physicians, not patients, who prescribe drugs, they are
included in the companies' target population.

The goal of

these activities, including seminars, informal "education "
and dispensing free samples, is quite clearly to influence
general prescribing practices.

The larger companies

dispensing brand-name drugs, engage in the most aggressive
research and advertising endeavours.

Practicing physicians

who have severely limited time to read about new
pharmaceutical advances, will of course find it easiest to
depend on those drugs with which they are most familiar and
have had experience.

In this manner, the profit motive of

pharmaceutical companies results in promotional activity
which shapes the prescribing habits of physicians.

The

institutional context, as has been discussed, sets the stage
for physicians to prescribe as they see fit and for patients
to comply without considering those institutional
constraints on the options.

This influence on the context which constrains and
socially legitimates the interaction is antagonistic to the
patient's interest.

Patients could reasonably be assumed to

want the least expensive of identical treatments.
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Brand-name prescribing does not allow for this.

A patient

might also benefit from some difference in drugs which has
not been made a sales point of a brand-name drug.

Having

grown dependent on this source of information, a physician
may be unaware or inadequately informed of such a
therapeutic advantage.

Thus the indirect influence of the

pharmaceutical companies on particular therapeutic
interactions may actually be antagonistic to patients'
interests.
Methodologic al Assumptions
The assumptions which form the basis for this
analysis may be controversial.

The idea that understanding

communication must be done by means of a
contextual-sociological process rather than an
intentional-psychological one is widely debated.

It is not

my purpose to enter into this debate here, but rather to
briefly indicate the philosophical bases for my approach.
The role of intentions in ethics has a long history ; but, as
was discussed in Chapter I (pages 38-48), it presents us
with considerable difficulties.

Though seldom discussed,

there is good reason for a shift toward a social basis for
understanding ethics, primarily due to the increased
explanatory power and sensitivity vis-a-vis understanding
communication and social behavior.
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This was argued (in

Chapter I) to be relevant to both the analyses and
recommendations of applied ethics.

The crucial assumptions

of this analysis are as follows:
1. Communication and social action can best be
analyzed by specifying the actors' intersubjective
understanding of the context of the action (rather than
analyzing intentions, motives, beliefs etc.

on an

intentional-psychological model).

· 2. The effectiveness of such an analysis is due to

the fact that the performance of everyday activities is
based on common practices and tacit presuppositions (not on
cognitive structures or systems of rules, or even responses
to interactional stimuli).
3. These common practices and beliefs " structure"
discourse and action (in a non-necessary, non-determinative
predispositional manner).
4. From a sample of similar interactions we can
deduce the " structuring" elements, buttressing our
observations with literature review, information about the
setting, and the testimony of the interactants (rather than
searching for conscious or unconscious beliefs).
5. Some of these structuring elements serve to
promote class or institutional goals, in some instances
directing discourse or action contrary to one or more
actor's desires or interests (rather than such social
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factors being influential only when they are · k nown by the
actors).
I will discuss the philosophical bases for these
assumptions, drawing heavily from Jeff Coulter's book , �
Social:...Cons troctiQILQf- Mind ( 1979, esp.

Chapter Two).

Ai t ernative-Accoonts- of-Hnman-sehavior
There_ has been considerable effort devoted to
finding referents for mental ascriptions such as intention,
motive, and thought or for the processes of intending,
remembering, understanding, thinking , etc.

Mentalists,

including contemporary cognitivists, assume that there must
be such mental states or processes which can be typified and
provide insight into human behavior.

Behaviorists have

assumed that such efforts are in vain due to the "privacy"
or introspective nature of any access to such phenomena. ·
They have focused on operational definitions of such
ascriptions.

The analysis of intentional action ,

remembering , k nowing, etc.

is . then to be based on

observable patterns of behavior which justify these
ascriptions.

Conceptual analysts have tried to describe the

logical grammar of mental concepts.

This too has led to a

priori theorizing, resulting in general concepts, which are
frequently inapplicable to some mundane contexts of use.
is this de-contextualized characterizations of the .
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" psychological phenomena ", shared by these theorists, which
Wittgensteinian analysts have rejected.
As Wittgenstein endeavored to illustrate,
philosophical problems result when we consider mental
predicates out of their context of everyday use.

Rather

than looking for conceptual or referential "common ground "
of mental predicates, we are advised to observe their
non-problematic usage in mundane contexts and search for how
interactants make sense of them in context.

This, as

Coulter (1979: 36, 37) indicates, lays a foundation for a
social-organizational approach, rather than a
psychological-mentalistic one.
Consider Coulter' s discussion of the analysis of
the mental predicate " understanding. " Some cognitive
psychologists have characterized understanding as a mental
"click of comprehension" (Coulter, 1979; R. Brown, 1968;
Bransford and Mccarrell, 1974). Ryle (1973: 163) has
criticized this account.

He indicates that this is rarely

the case phenomenologically, and is defeated as a legitimate
claim should the claimant fail to provide evidence of
comprehension.

There are public criteria for the claim to

understand which are suppled by the context of use.

Each

context provides such practically "sufficient" criteria " and
no experiential or mental process can in itself fully
constitute understanding nor count as a determinate
criterion" (Coulter, 1979: 38). And, as Coulter indicates,
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Wittgenstein takes a similar approach; "but for us it is .th.e
circumstance� under which he had such an experience that
justify him in saying in such a case that he understands "
(Wittgenstein, 1958: paragraph 155).
What is rejected by this account, and what
behaviorists and cognitivists have in common, is the attempt
to fix a referent for "understanding " in general,
independent of any context of use.

As Coulter ( 1979: 39)

explains:
The criteria for understanding, for having
understood, cannot be private, inner men ta l or
experiential states or processes, but must be
scenic.
Coulter goes on to explain what he means by

insisting ·that the criteria for understanding must be

"scenic. " Most practical contexts do not al low or require
the continual checking and rechecking for fulfillment of the
criteria for understanding.

Rather, social interactions

typica l ly occur in such a manner that the context and flow
of communica t ion or act ion provides pract ically "suf f icient "
grounds for the assumption or questioning of actors'
understanding.

Decontextualized or abstract discussions of

understanding ( or any other mental predicates) omit this
context-specific element.

The resulting esoteric notion of

understanding bears little resemblance to the particular
contextual uses of the term.

For any mental-state
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description, there are likely to be contexts where
fulfillment of the abstract conditions for "understanding "
(if they can be formulated at all), will be rejected by
participants in the context as insufficient or irrelevant.
And any generalized behavioral description of
"understanding " will meet the same fate.

It is only through

a detailed examination of a particular context of use that
the relevant practical criteria for understanding can be
formulated.

And there is no a priori reason to assume these

contextual criteria to be generalizable to other contexts or
to be characteristic of any "essence " of understanding.
Fodor and Katz (197 1) have criticized such
Wittgensteinian approaches to language and meaning (cf. ,
Coulter, 1979: 46). They claim that the Wittgensteinian
focus on context-specific elucidations of meaning cannot
account for novel utterances.

The rejection of semantic

structures or generative rules, claim Fodor and Katz, makes
it impossible to account for the constr uction and
understanding of never-before-encountered sentences.

In

order to account for these, they claim that it is necessary
to posit recursive encoding and decoding rules which operate
unconsciously.

So any account of an actor' s novel

utterance, and its being understood by another, must have
reference to shared unconscious rules according to which the
utterance is constructed by one actor and understood by the
other.
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Hunter (1 973: Chapter Seven) responds to this line
of criticism by indicating the oddness of the abstract
question, "How do we produce and understand new
utterances?, " which is the basis of the Fodor-Katz critique
and their project (cf. , Coulter, 1 979: 47) . Either the
question lacks a context for its reasonable understanding,
or, in any particular context where it might be asked, it is
misleading.
The question of how we creat ively communicate in
general has the form of a request· for instruction for
communicating creatively.

But Fodor and Katz are not

seeking instruction, they are seeking a scientific
explanation.

Their analysis is based on the assumption that

we are capable of such communication.

They must be asking

for some account of our abil ity to communicate creatively.
The question can then be rephrased to read "how do we
construct utterances that express [ creatively ] what we have
to say?"

(Coulter, 1 979: 47) . Since they are positing a

generative system of rules, Fodor and Katz must argue for
actors' possession of tacit knowledge of a propositional
sort.

Another alternative is Ryle's "knowing-how , " a tacit

non-propositional sort of practical knowledge.

What basis

is there to prefer one alternative over another ?
Coulter (1 979: 48) suggests that the only evidence
for the Fodor-Katz account is that speakers can do what the
Fodor-Katz account explains.

But the tacit and
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· inarticulatable nature of this propositional knowledge is
suspect.

As Michael Polanyi's work has made clear, tacit

knowledge of how to perform tasks is very familiar to us as
the non-propositional and inexpressible awareness which is
possessed by people who are able to perform the practical
tasks.

Coulter draws on Polanyi (1958: Chapter Four)

earlier in his book to illustrate just this point:
it is clear that many people know how to ride
bicycles without in the least having formulable,
propositional knowledge of the geometric and
ergonomic alignments involved. Expressed as a
principle, a cyclist must keep his balance by
adjusting the curvature of his forward path in
proportion to the ratio of his unbalance over the
square of his speed. Clearly, knowledge of this
propositional form is not available to most people
who manage to keep their balance very well, just
as detailed knowledge of syntactical principles is
unavailable to speakers of English whose speech
can nonetheless be found to accord with them.
(Coulter, 1979: 21)
There is no reason to attribute unconscious
propositional knowledge to account for such abilities.

At

least, the only reason could be that there is no other way
to account for such ab il ities .

will now endeavor to show.

Tha t i s not the ca se, a s I

context-Bound. sociological Analysis of

Presupposition-Ascription

The alternative to unconscious propositional
knowledge and semantic structures is the tacit knowledge of
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"how to. "

Intersubjective familiarity with the context of

concrete communication enables actors to understand and
communicate.

It is shared conventions, knowledge of the

"how to" variety, which guides the communication in
particular contexts.

It is not a common set of

propositional rules, but a shared practical understanding of
the context, which enables actors to act and communicate
meaningfully.

The ascription of presuppositions which

describe this understanding of the context makes
intelligible how actors are able to perform and communicate,
even creat i vely.

The ascribed presuppositions make explicit

the contextual factors which limit possible interpretations
of the novel communication.

Nevertheless, these

presupposition-ascriptions are neither determinative nor
indefeasible.
Alfred Schutz (1973) maintained that any social
activity is founded on a "presupposed stock of common
knowledge. "

Everyday conversation frequently draws on

context and presupposition to understand, clarify and
communicate.

Pointing out that the store is closed to

someone who has just said "Let's go to the store."

draws on

the presupposition that the speaker would only want to go to
the store if it were open.

On the other hand, if the

speaker were the owner of the store, the fact that it was
closed could be irrelevant, and would not arise as a part of
the conversation.

Context, including location, identity of
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actors, current topic or activity, time or day, tone of
voice, bodily positioning, etc., furnishes "common sense
warrants " (Coulter, 1979: 51) for our ascribing certain
presuppositions to the speaker.

Of course, if their role is

to make evident the meaning of the utterance, the contextual
elements are unlikely to become part of the conversation.
As Wittgenstein's rules of a game, they are typically
discussed only when one fails to act in the conventionally
expected manner.

In learning to speak , we learn h.ml to

attend to the conventions of the relevant culture and
language.

Tolerances for different degrees of adherence to

these conventions are also learned.

Sociologists such as

Labov (1972) have noted this fact with respect to phonetic
and grammatical "rules. " Conver�ational and discourse
analysts note these tolerances, explained by the former in
terms of the role of the speaker in the interaction (cf.,
Frankel, 1983) and by the latter in terms of shared
presuppositions of social rules and conventions which may be
analyzed as a feature of the setting (eg., medical or
educational settings; cf., Mehan, 1979; Fisher, 1979, 1982,
1983, 1986).
Coulter (1979: 53) brings Ryle back into this
discussion to illustrate the common-sense priority sometimes
given to "assignable propositions: "
Ryle's (1973: 173-177) remarks on what he terms
"disclosure by unstudied talk " are pertinent here;
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we do not usually think of a person' s (or his
utterances') presuppositions as continually and
consciously self-monitered, [ sic ] and so tend to
think of them as less subject to deceptive
manipulation than the contents of avowals, and
thence as more likely to reveal his .r..e.al states of
mind.
Coulter (1979: 54) continues to explain that
our way of discovering what another "has in mind " is to be
found in common conventions or practices, not in the form of
propositional knowledge.

The "properly sociological focus

upon the psychological and subjective · phenomena must consist
in the technical specification " of such methods.

But

analysts must also be careful not to posit these
socially-organized methods as rules or structures somehow
located in the mind (Coulter, 1979: 61). The "attending to "
such features of communication constitutes tacit "knowing
how" and is no more known by actors than competent cyclists
know the mechanical description of their forward motion and
maintenance of balance.
For example, our linguistic activities can be
characterized in terms of a sequence of turn-taking, where
one utterance is expected to be tied to the previous.

This

provides a constraint on the ascription of presupposition.
If the conversation was not interrupted by a request for
clarification (i . e . , if it "went smoothly "), then any
presupposition-ascription must make the sequencing
practically reasonable .

That speakers are aware of this is

evident from the use of conventions by them to mark an
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utterance which might be confusing because it does not
follow the usual sequencing.

Schegloff and Sacks (1974)

call these "misplacement markers " (e.g., "by the way ",
"incidentally "). Of these, Schegloff and Sacks claim that
the "display of such orientation and recognition apparently
entitles the user to place an item outside its proper place "
(Schegloff and Sacks, 1974: 258).
Coulter (1979: 54) suggests that members'
presupposition�ascription of other members are defeasible in
that they may be contested or falsified.

This is not,

however, an obstacle on which communication falters, since
the context of any particular communicational activity
typically provides enough clarification for the members to
understand one another.

But the use of these methods,

however "technically specified " are similarly context-bound
and defeasible.

It is for this reason that the analysis of

particular communicational events needs to include a
description of the setting of the communication and as
accurate as possible a reproduction of the communication.
Review of this ethnographic and interactional data by other
analysts ought to lend credence to or challenge, the
analytic claims (i.e., presupposition-ascriptions) of the
analyst.

(See Chapter III for illustration . )
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organizational and structural Direction of communication
Fisher { 1979, 1982, 1983, 1986) has found it
useful to distinguish levels of analysis {see pages 85-98).
The presupposition-ascriptions which can be made on the
basis of physician-patient communication do more than
display the micro-processes of this communication.

Certain

activities and their ascribed presuppositions are typical,
though perhaps not universal, of communicational events of a
particular sort in a specified setting.

In Chapter I I I, the

communicational events examined are those of first-contact
female patients with third-year residents in one particular
family practice setting.

As Coulter has carefully argued,

the analysis by presupposition-ascription does not assert
that the interactants hold these presuppositions to be true
or have even consciously entertained them in the past.
Rather, the conventional practices which constitute, for
example, physician-patient interactions are learned as
methods of achieving practical goals ; and communication can
be a n alyzed in terms of the presuppos it ions which make more
intelligible or rational the action or communication.
Historical-sociological reflection and research may lead to
further understanding of why these presuppositions shaped
the conventions, as well as increasing credibility of the
analysis by supporting the claim that the presuppositions
have been, and are, influential.
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Th is analysis is st ill sociological, not
psycholog ical.

It is of the context or culture that

ascriptions are made, not of the m inds of indiv iduals.

The

analys is of mental-ascriptions in Coulter' s work i s scenic
in that it descr ibes a context wh ich enables concrete
individuals to intend, understand, remember, etc • •

The

psychological quest ion "How do ind iv iduals intend,
understand, remember, etc. ? "
manner.

can only be answered in th i s

To look for a psychological or mental process i s to

construe actors' knowledge of "how to " as requiring
individualistic explanation .

Thus it assumes the need for

some mental machinery or unconscious set of propositional
rules.

As has been argued, this is neither necessary nor

just ified.
S ince presupposition-ascriptions are made of
convent ions, practices and sett ings, they can be classified
in terms of the scope of the practi ce or contexts to which
they can reasonably and consistently be ascribed.

Some

practices, such as turn-taking or sequencing, seem relevant
to all conversat ional events.

Social commun ication which is

not conversat ional, such as lectures and sermons, obv iously
does not share the convention of turn-taking.

Some

practices may be unique to a context, or, i f they occur in
various contexts, the ir organ izat ion in a part icular setting
may be uni que.

An example of the first would be certa in

diagnost ic and treatment procedures: they are likely to
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occur only within a particular medical setting, and thus
some of the presupposition-ascriptions which explain how the
procedures are "accomplished" are relevant only to those
This would be an example of Fisher 's

settings .

organizational level of analysis, as would the
presupposition-ascriptions which distinguish casual
conversation from conversation in a physician-patient
interview.
Ther e are also presupposition-ascriptions which
are either ascribable to types of contexts (perhaps due to
similarities in the activities practiced in each), or which
are so common or "basic" that it is a strained analysis to
consider them as interactional or organizational.

Deference

to professional author ity on the assumption of superior
knowledge is an example of such a structural factor or
presupposition-ascription .

Fisher (among others), building

from an interactional analysis of physician-patient
communication, notes that participation is imbalanced, with
the asymmetry in terms of control of floor, topic, number of
interruptions, etc., distinguishing the conversation in
physician-patient interactions in general from that of
casual conversat ion .

An organizational feature or

presupposition of the context is that the physician is the
expert and needs such control to effectively diagnose and
treat the patient.

Other contextual features or

presuppositions also help to explain this particular social
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organization of the interview (e. g. , that physicians need to
be efficient and unencumbered by the usual conventions of
conversation in order to fulfill the heavy demands on their
time).

The acceptance of this asymmetry is not, however,

unique to physician-patient interactions.

It extends to

other professional-client relationships (e.g. lawyer-client,
teacher-student).

It may also be detected in less

institutionalized communication such as parent-child or
"experienced advisor-inexperienced listener " conversation.
Such a breadth of convention requires extra-organizational
presupposition-ascriptions in order to reasonably account
for the commonality of the activity.
Howard Waitzkin (1983: 142) suggests that
physicians' "relative dominance ", as manifested by their
special privilege in the physician-patient interaction and
ascribed as an organizational feature of the context, allows
them to "make ideologic statements. "

Waitzkin continues:

These messages reinforce the hegemonic ideology
that emanates from other institutions--the family,
educat ional system, mass media, and so forth--a.rui
that pervade a society. The same messages tend to
direct clients ' behavior into safe, acceptable,
and non-disruptive channels ; this is the essence
of social control in medicine. (Waitzkin, 1983:
142-143 ; My emphasis--M. B. )
Although this excerpt is from a chapter in
which Waitzkin engages in a "micro-analysis " of
physician�patient communication of the type that I have been
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discussing, I do not know whether he would agree with the
present discussion.

His political focus, however, is

helpful in identifying structural presuppositions.
"Emanating from other institutions " and "pervading a
society " are "messages " which shape behavior.

On the

present analysis, these "messages " are the
presupposition-ascriptions which analysts may make of a
society and its institutions.

Physicians are the

professionals in medical institutions, and are allowed the
dominant role in medical interactions.

Their role in

medical activities match broader cultutal conventions of how
to accomplish concrete tasks in the context of authority
found in institutionally situated interactions (e. g. ,
between physician-patient, professor-student, lawyer-client
and parent-child).

It is true that this presupposition of

authority "manifests " itself in, or can be ascribed to,
observed physician-patient relationships.

But to treat it

as an isolated interactional or even organizational factor
is inadequate, since those aspects of the communication
which justify the presupposition-ascription also occur in
other institutions.

As Waitzkin claims, such a widespread

pattern of activity across organizational or institutional
settings must be ascribed of the society rather than
uniquely to the organization of medical practice.

The

presupposition, if it is scenic in the sense of applying to
a context of action, applies to all contexts with
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authoritative agents whose authority has been more or less
institutionalized (i. e. , has gained wide cultural
acceptance).
This could be contrasted with the particular type
of authority which physicians have in medical interviews.
Theirs, for example, allows them to ask personal questions
which no other professional author ity would be as likely to
ask (or to receive a cooperative response if they did ask).
Were lawyers or parents to inquire about an adult's sexual,
dietary and drug use habits, they would not be likely to be
answered as frankly as physicians may reasonably expect.
This type of authority needs to be understood in terms of
the presuppositions ascribed to certain types of contexts
within medical care.

It is therefore an organizational

factor, while the pattern of institutionalized authority in
general is a structural factor.

But these are distinctions

in analysis, since their concrete manifestation will be
interactionally and practically indistinguishable.

The

analytic distinction helps us understand the cultural

breadth of the presupposition-ascription, and perhaps

enables a more detailed understanding of its history of
influence on the formation of the observed conventions.
In this manner, any concrete interaction exists
within a context of practices which actors know in Ryle's
"knowing how " sense, but which practices are expressive of
conventions.

The varying levels of analysis represent a
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recognition that some conventions are "accepted in practice "
more broadly than only in the particular context.
Historically , the conventions of a culture enable the
conventions of institutions to be adopted for practical
purposes , as the society-wide acceptance of professional
dominance and paternalism enables the particular type of
medical professional dominance to develop in practice.
These , of course , only "exist " in concrete interactions , but
the acceptance of authority in� institutional setting
(e.g. , parental or political) is a convention which is
likely to be manifested in similar practices in other
settings.

So the broader , more abstract levels of analysis

in dicate factors which have shaped the practices and
conventions in institutionally-situated interactions.

But

these organizational and structural "factors " are manifested
only in the concrete interactions.

They are ascribed to the

social context as a means of better understanding how the
actors are able to accomplish their tasks and
communication.
The more abstract presuppositions ascribed to
interactions are restricted by their explanatory usefulness
and by their being consistent with other practices and
conventions manifested in the interaction .

Certain

presupposition-ascriptions will be inconsistent with the
action or communication.

For example , we could assume that

physicians and patients interacted in a context in which
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conventional practices would justify ascribing the
presupposition that physicians practiced medicine primari ly
out of an effort to accumulate profit.

Practices which cut

into profits { e. g. , referring , preventive care , d iscouraging
unnecessary v isits , suggest ing less expensive treatments)
would require special explanat ion.

Furthermore , the degree

of pat ients' trust would be inexpl icable.

In a context of

sales , where th is presupposition is more justifiably
ascr ibed to the sett ing , the customer typically responds
very d ifferently than patients in medical interviews.
Though profit from illness and expensi ve treatments may well
influence some of the conventional practices in medical
sett ings , it is not a tacitly-accepted presuppos ition of the
interactional context for phys ician-pat ient interactions.
The preceding d iscussion has suggested a
sociological method for understanding commun icat ion.

The

m icro-analys is of particular interactions is to be conducted
by specifying presuppositions wh ich render understandable
the commun icat ion and action in the interaction.

The

crucial assumptions of a social-contextual analysis (see
pages 98-10 0) have been supported (see pages 10 0-117). The

super ior ity of accounting for social action by exam in ing

actors' intersubjective knowledge of "how to " over ascrib ing
unconscious propositional rules is supported by exam in ing
how actors accomplish practical and commun ication tasks.
Thus any account of how part icipants successfully
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communicate (especially creatively) must be context-bound
(page 99 ; assumption one).

This methodology is successful

in explicitly displaying why the action or communication
occurs as it does because that is an account of the
construciton of the action, not of intentional or mental
states or propositional rules postulated in order to explain
the action (page 99 ; assumption two).

Participants in

social action know how to do things, and that is what is
explained by the social-contextual account.

What is

explicitly accounted for by the analysis is how
intersubjective practical knowledge "structure " discourse
and action: They form the conventions which enable
participants to achieve communicational and practical
activities (page 99 ; assumption three).

The recurrence (or

absence) of certain social factors in different interactions
increases support for the claim that they are social
conventions.

Buttressing the observations is accord among

different analysts, as well as the factors' occurrence in
other sociological, political and philosophical
discussions.

Analysts' presupposition-ascriptions are

propositional descriptions of the social conventions and
their genesis, not to be confused with actors' "knowledge "
of them, which is constituted by their practical
understanding of how to accomplish practical activites and
communication (page 99 ; assumption four).

The explicit

description of these "social facts " also shows how these
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factors may serve to undermine, conflict with or support
actors' practical interests (pages 99-100 ; assumption
five).

These social factors may support individual, class,

or institutional interests which particular actors might
consciously oppose (or support).

This last claim will be

affirmed by the social-normative analysis of concrete cases
(Chapter IV and V). These presuppositions are not
propositional beliefs of the actors ; they are propositions
which describe the intersubjective under standing of the
context.

Therefore, some explanation must be given

regarding why the actors' practices seem to justify the
presupposition-ascriptions.

Historical-sociological

examination of the context of both the interaction and the
methods whereby actors accomplish their tasks supply social
factors which explain the formation and intersubjective
comprehension of the methods.

Many of these factors reflect

prevailing social and political norms and practices.

The

next two chapters provide a concrete application of this
methodology to recorded medical interactions.
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Chapter III
Paradigmatic Cases for Analysis of Informed Consent
The following two chapters are a practical
application of the preceding chapters' theoretical
discussion.

The present chapter (Chapter III) presents a

description of the setting in which physician-patient
interviews were recorded, three cases that illustrate the
ethical issue of informed consent (discussed in Chapter I)
and an expanded discussion of the three interviews,
highlighting the details of particular interest.

The next

chapter (Chapter IV) is a contextual social analysis.

The

analytic framework is derived from Fisher's work in
discourse analysis (discussed in Chapter II). These two
chapters roughly duplicate the presentational approach used
by discourse analysts who are concerned with showing the
influence of interactional, professional and
social-political factors on the communication and
negotiation of treatment in the delivery of health-care
(Fisher, 1979, 1982, 1983, 1986; Fisher and Todd, 1983).

cases
The cases presented are not ones in which common
medical practice would require explicit informed consent.
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Informed consent is usually an attempt to assure that the
patients themselves accept the risks involved in a
procedure .

When the risk is substantial, as in major

surgery, the need for informed consent is well recognized .
In routine medical procedures the degree or type of risk is
usually considered negligible or minimal; thus explicit
informed consent is not typically sought (cf . , U . S .
President's Commission, 1982: 108; Graber, Beasley, and
Eaddy, · 1985: 4 0 - 4 3 ) . I will argue that this is partly due to
the social fact that in physician-patient interactions,
patients typically allow the physicians to take
responsibility for the decision .

Whether or not the

information is given, patients usually simply take
physicians' advice .

That this is acceptable to both parties

is based on the "presupposition " that the nature of the
decision is routine as well as on the shared expectations of
the participants (this will be discussed later in more
detail ) .
The purpose of the empirical research is not to
evaluate either the individual physician or the profession
as a whole .

Rather, it is an attempt to illustrate how

varying levels of risk and influence are managed in everyday
medical practice by patients and physicians .

The cases are

not chosen because they are exceptions to the general
practice, but as illustrations of this practice whereby
medical practitioners and patients do not concern themselves
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with infor med consent for routine cases.

The issue came to

my attention as a pattern in the interactions only after
recording, transcribing and analyzing forty-th ree
doctor-patient interactions.1

Ethnographic Description
The data for this study were collected over a
th ree month per iod in a family medicine model practice in a
teaching hospital that serves a largely rural area.

I

par ticipated in the project from its inception through data
gathering and analysis.
The family practice model office is simultaneously
a setting for the training of residents and a facility
deliver ing health care.

First-, second-, and thir d-year

residents wo rk in an ar rangement that simulates a group
office practice.

Patients may request a particula r

physician when they first call or walk in for an

The medical information used was obtained as part
of a la rger study conducted by Sue Fisher in a family
practice residency. The research was partially funded by a
Research and Development Awa r d from the Univer sity of
Tennessee in Knoxville. The data and some of the analysis
originally appeared in my Master' s Thesis, "Informed Consent
in Routine Contexts" (the University of Tennessee ,
Knoxville, 1983). I also wish to thank Ablex Publishing
Corporation for per mission to use material published in "An
Empirically Grounded Approach to Ethical Analysis and Social
Change " in Fisher and Todd (eds.), The Structure of

Discourse and Institutional Authority: Law. Medicine.
Education , (1986).
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appointment.

Typically, however, an appointment is set with

a resident assigned by the receptionist, and that resident
is the patient's physician on subsequent visits.

Another

resident will substitute when the assigned physician is
absent, as would occur in a group practice.
Four full-time staff physicians and some members
of the local medical community are either in attendance or
on call to the practice for the residents to consult.
Nurses in the family practice model office are assigned to a
particular resident for a month at a time.
professional support personnel on staff.

There are also
A nutritionist, a

health psychologist and a social worker are available for
consultation with residents and patients.

These

inter-professional relationships further simulate the kind
of practice the residents will experience in private
practice.
The patient population is set by the National
Family Practice Charter and purports to represent a
population similar to that of a private practice.

The

charter is set up by the American Board of Family Practice
and requires, for example, that any accredited residency
have no more than one-half indigent pat ients (including
medicaid but not medicare).

The family practice model

office also simulates the fee-for-service billing character
of group practice, and pays physicians by salary.
On their first visit, new patients are given an
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appointment time half an hour prior to when they are
scheduled to see the physician.

In this half hour the

patients are individually called into an office off the
waiting room where a questionnaire is administered by a
clerical worker.

The questionnaire asks about social and

medical factors in patients' lives as well as means of
payment (rnedicare, medicaid, insurance, personal payment).
The patient information sheet is placed with a note
regarding the presenting complaint in a holder on the
examining room door.

Before meeting the patient, the

resident reads the note which lists the presenting complaint
and thus also has access to social and financial data.
Generally, the residents first interview patients
regarding presenting complaint and medical history and they
leave the room for the patients to change clothes if the
examination requires that the patient be undressed.

Nurses

are sent in ahead of the residents to prepare some patients
(such as women scheduled for pelvic exams) and to collect
samples for lab tests (drawing blood, urine tests, etc. ).
Follow ing the examination, patients are asked to dress
before the resident returns to close the interaction.
During these breaks the resident may consult with other
residents or with a staff physician.

Staff may also be

asked to examine the patient for a second opinion.

Sometime

during the day the residents dictate notes which are typed
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and placed in patients' files.

At a later date these are

reviewed by staff physicians.
The research project from which these examples are
drawn was conducted with new women patients corning to the
family practice center for the first time.

After bringing a

new woman patient to an examining room the nurse would
notify the primary researcher or myself.

One of us would

then approach the appropriate resident and ask for
permission to video- or audio-tape the medical interview.
Then we would approach the patient to explain the research
project and ask her to sign a written consent form
permitting the recording and observation (see Appendix).
When audio-tape was used one of us would sit in on the
interaction to take notes on non-verbal and impressionistic
aspects of the exchange.

In situations where the

interaction was video-taped one of us would monitor the
taping from a separate room.
The tapes were transcribed and served as a basis
for analysis.

These typed verbal accounts were augmented by

our knowledge of the setting, non-verbal elements of the
interviews, casual discussions between physicians or with
us, field notes and patient files.

It was in the process of

reviewing the transcripts that interactional patterns
regarding informed consent emerged as a topic of interest.
These routine medical interviews were found to involve both
patient risk and inconvenience and as such may be
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interactions which shoul d include an explicit informed
consent procedure.

The cases presented here are at tempts to

reconstruct for the reader typical interactions which
illustrate this pat tern and to empirically ground the
ethical claims.

They represent a variety of degrees of risk

or inconvenience, as well as different interactional
techniques.

What is typical about these interactions is

that the reasons for the particular treatments are not fully
explicit, the patients do not ask for reasons or
clarification, and the treatments are not obviously the only
available ones nor necessarily the best for the patients.
What is important about the interactions is the underlying
practices or beliefs, not the particular details of the
practice's expression in the interactions.

But positing a

ground or common practice underlying the interactions is a
part of the analysis and so will be left for the next
chapter.

We now turn to the descriptions of the three cases

and a summary of the relevant details for analysis.

Sheila
In the first case the patient, whom we will call
Sheila, is a young Anglo woman who is from out of town.
physician is a third-year male Anglo resident.

The

Sheila has

been staying in her husband's hospital room for three weeks
while he is being treated for injuries resulting from a
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motorcycle accident.
throat .

Her presenting complaint is a sore

The resident orders a strept screen and prescribes

penicillin for five days, to be increased if the screen is
positive.
On physical examination, the resident notes that
one of Sheila' s ears is "a little retracted but not red. "
After examining her throat he says:
D.
P.
D.
P.
D.

P.
D.
P.

D.

P.
D.
P.
D.
P.

Okay, you may have a little strept throat,
I, I' ll tell you what we will do . We' ll go
ahead and get a throat culture// (double
slash lines-- // --indicate an interruption)
//Uh huh.
and I' ll
go ahead and start you on some antibiotics.
If the culture, the culture could still be
(unintelligible to transcriber)//
//Uh
huh.
if it' s uh, if it is ______ then you
won' t need to take a full course of antibiotics
but if it' s strept well we' ll have you go ahead
and take a course. You' re not allergic to
penicillin are you?
No I' m not .
Take a deep breath . Okay. Again. Just a
couple more times. All right. I' ll be back
momentarily. The prescription, I' ll go have
the nurse come do a strept screen on you.
Okay.
At that po int what we' ll do is g ive you f ive
days worth of penicillin//
//Uh huh.
I want you to go
ahead and take that. If your strept screen
comes back negative then you can stop taking
it.
Uh huh. After what, five days, or after?
Five days, after five days, what I' ll do is
give you five days worth, one refill . If it' s
positive I want you to take it for a full ten
days//
//Uh huh.
You' ve taken penicillin before?
127

P.
D.

Yeah, uh huh. I've had to
I'd like to see you again in two weeks just to
make sure this is all cleared up. Hopefully
you'll be all cleared up.
In the interaction the physician tells Sheila that

he does not know whether her sore throat is due to
streptococcus (a common bacteria which can cause sore
throats and is usually treated with antibiotics), that he
will not know for two days, and he gives her a five day
prescription for penicillin.

Sheila is to take the

penicillin for two days and then call to see if she should
take the other three days and fill another prescription for
five more days.

So we can reasonably assume that Sheila is

informed regarding when the strept screen can be read
(forty-eight hours), that if it is negative she does not
need to continue the antibiotic, that she should be better
within two weeks.
The attending physic ian has attempted to cover two
aspects of this type of presenting complaint in his
treatment plan.

First of all, he starts the patient on

penicillin immediately.

The usual reason for this is to

prevent the somewhat rare occurrence of rheumatic fever and
reduce the risk of other possible complications.

Secondly,

he takes a culture and arranges for an opportunity to
terminate treatment if the screen is negative.

The

unnecessary use of antibiotics is discouraged due to the
slight chance of various allergic reactions, increasing
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sensit i zation to a valuable drug which reduces i ts later
efficacy, depressing the growth of normal bacter i a and
contributing to the development of resistant strains of
bacteri a in the population at large.

So this physici an has

treated Sheila in a manner that shows his sensitivity to the
attenda nt problems in the treatment of sore throats with
antibiotics.
Are there any factors of which Sheila is left
ignorant?

Clearly the medical cri teria specified above are

not di sclosed.

Consequently there is good reason to believe

that Sheila is not aware of why she has been given the
particular treatment pla n.

Maria
The next patient, whom we will call Maria, is a
24-year-old Mexican-Amer ican woman.

She is a heavy-set,

outgoing woman who during the interview discloses that she
came to this area with her boyfriend and is currently living
in his house.

Her presenting complaint is persistent pain

in her leg following a motorcycle accident.

The motorcycle

she was driving sl id on gravel and she fell off injuring her
leg.

The physician is a third-year male Anglo resident of

conservative religious persuasion. 2 During the medical

This resident' s conservative religious beliefs
were common knowledge in the clinic.
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history she reveals that she has had three abortions and one
miscarriage and thinks that she ma y be pregnant again.

If

she is pregnant, she states she plans to have an abortion
and asks the physician if they do abortions at the teaching
hospital or if he knows of anywhere she can get one without
having to pay in advance.

He tells her that hospital

abortions are very expensive and that he does not know about
other places in town :

He then has her leg x-rayed.

x-ray does not reveal any fractures or breaks.

The

The

following dialogue begins just as the resident re-enters the
examining room.

He is reading the package insert on the

pain medication he has brought for her:
D.
P.
D.
P.

Well, I'm real hesitant about medication// .
//Yeah.
You're
not sure, even though, you know, you think you
ma y want to have an abortion//
//Definitely. I could
make the mistake but it's not mine.

3

There is a practice in the univer sity hospital of
referring abortions to the only licensed clinic in town--a
women's reproductive health clinic. The center, in order to
be licensed, had two physicians on call. In casual
conversation in the family practice clinic I have heard the
reproductive clinic referred to as practicing "ethically ".
Furthermore, abortion was frequently d iscussed in the family
practice clinic conference room. In the discussions that we
were privy to, the general attitude toward abortion was
negative. This particular resident at one time said that no
doctor "worth his salt " would get "messed up " with
abortions.
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D.

P.
D.
P.
D.
P.
D.
P.
D.

P.
D.
P.
D.
P.

You may, it looks like uh, well the medication
I want to use it's not recommended during
pregnancy for treating nursing mothers or
during pregnancy, tell you what to do. What
kind of work do you do?
I'm a cook.
A cook. Uh, where do you work at?
I work at Hefty's Truck Plaza on Dixon Road.
(names have been changed)
Uh huh. Are they pretty good to you?
Yeah, but they won't pay me (laughs) .
They won't pay you//
II Except peach pie.
Okay, I bet within another
day or two you'll be able to get up and stand
on it without a whole lot of pain, and right
now I would just use extra-strength
Tylenol//
II Okay
and stay with that. The x- ray is
negative, if the pain persists you need to
get back in touch with me. //
//Okay .
but I don't see
anything there that//
//I just wanted
to make sure that it wasn't fractured.
After emphasizing that Maria ought to consider

birth control and denying knowledge of abortion clinics
around town, the resident closes the interview:
D.
P.
D.

P.
D.
P.
D.
P.

Alrighty, I'd like to see you back if you've
got time to come back in and _ see me//
//Okay .
otherwise
if you still haven't had a period in ten days
you probably ought to consider yourself
pregnant and probably come back in and get a
pregnancy test or//
//or start praying hard and
heavy.
Yeah, or start going to Mass two or three
times a day.
(laughs) For sure. I appreciate your time.
Yes maam, it was nice meeting you.
Same to you. I'll come back whenever I need
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D.
P.

to see a doctor cause I'll never have a doctor
here .
Hopefully 24-year-old ladies don't need many
doctors .
Yeah, okay . Thanks a lot, bye bye .
In this second interaction, the physician

recognizes Maria's need for pain medication, yet does not
provide it.

The pregnancy is considered to be a

contraindication for such medication, notwithstanding the
patient ' s declared intent to abort if she is pregnant and a
history of three earlier abortions .

Maria is informed of

the fact that her x-ray does not reveal any fractures, that
the physician decided not to give her a prescription for
pain medication because it is contraindicated for pregnant
women.

She knows that, in her doctor's opinion, the leg

should feel better in a few days and that she can take
extra-strength Tylenol (tm) for the pain.
The drug which the physician was going to
prescribe and dispense presents a threat to the health of
the fetus, not to Maria ' s health .

The physician has said

that the drug was contraindicated for pregnant and nursing
women .

The physician has not presented information

regarding abortion which Maria requested .

He has suggested

that Maria consider birth control and explained that if in
ten days she does not have her period she is probably
pregnant and could get a test done at the family practice
clinic .
So Maria is not informed on where to go for an
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abortion and that the pain medication is contraindicated for
the possible fetus' health, not her own (for further
discussion of this case, see Fisher and Groce,
forthcoming).

Vic k i
The third patient, whom we will call Vicki, is a
26-year-old Anglo woman.

Vicki works in a university

library while her husband attends graduate school as an art
student.

The physician is a third-year male Anglo resident

also in his late twenties.

Vicki has several presenting

complaints ; a cyst on her tailbone, a skin rash and several
moles.

The moles are brought into the discussion by Vicki

after the physician has examined her rash:
D.
P.
D.
P.
D.
P.
D.

P.
D.

What other problems or questions do you have?
Okay. Urn I was wondering if you could take some
moles off for me?
Okay. Where abouts?
(unintelligible) There' s one on my forehead.
Right there. _______ (unintelligible).
Any others?
Um, how many can you do at once?
Half dozen. Well, the problem is that, ah on
ah, young attractive females I don' t usually
take them off the face. But I can do it and
probably everything will go well, but those
are best done by either a dermatologist or
a plastic surgeon. But I' ll be glad to do it.
We can do one in another location and see how
it goes, and if you feel comfortable with it and
I feel comfortable with it we' ll do the one
on your forehead.
I would not be afraid to have you do it all.
First of all I can' t afford anybody else.
Okay.
133

P.
D.
P.
D.

But it' s like (unintelligible) I would not be
ashamed to have a scar.
Okay. Well it shouldn' t leave a scar//
II Okay.
unless
they infect or something like that. Okay?
So what else would you like?
After discussing Vicki' s presenting complaint,

taking a medical history and doing a physical, the physician
explains what he is going to do about the cyst:
D.

P.
D.
P.

Okay.
Uh, if it' s all right with you I want to
have one of our old doctors come look at this
mole on your forehead and get his opinion on
it. I was telling him about it, you know,
describing it and uh, you know, as I was saying
family practitioners normally don' t take moles
off faces, faces just because of, uh, mal, you
know, they have to go up on your malpractice
insurance and things like that, that we
normally handle by people who do it .all the
time, however, I have removed them off people' s
faces without any problems before . It' s just
that we are being conservative and protecting
ourselves when we do so.
But I wouldn' t
hesitate at all to take that one off.
Okay.
But I' ll get him to look at it and get his
opinion on it, okay?
Okay.
The staff physician enters the room, lists Vicki' s

three complaints and examines the moles:
SD. Okay, uh, if you remove it you' re gonna will
have a little scar but it probably won' t be
but about an inch or more, you' d have a scar
that' ll match this little line right here//
// (laughs)
P.
parallel,
SD.
that way it' d be easy to hide it. Now see what
you got here . Has that been there for a long
time you say?
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P.

Uh huh. Can you get rid o f that? But I was
never sure what it was • • • • (interval)
SD. We're reluctant to cut on women's faces.
P. Well I'm not very vain on my face.
SD. Well, we are (laughs)
The family practice resident works through his
lunch hour and a noon c onference to remove the mole on
Vicki's face.

After removing the one mole, he explains that

he would like to remove the others later:
D.
P.
D.
P.

You know what? It may be, uh, best if we d o
these others in a, at a dif ferent time?
Why is that?
Well, uhrn, we've already run way over this
morning, for one thing.
Okay.
A few minutes later the resident refers to the

dif ficulty the nurse had in getting the proper instruments
set up:
D.

Next time I'd like to use, make sure that I
have the exactly instruments I want, too.
Finally, as he closes the interaction, the

physician makes special arrangements t o check on the
incision and remove the stitches on his day o f f:
D.
P.
D.
P.
D.

But I'll tell you what. I may just, I may just
c ome in Monday since I'll be in town. What
appointment will be best f or you Monday ?
Anytime bef ore f our.
Why d on't we make it early in the morning.
I'm actually on vacation but I'll c ome in just
to make sure that this is okay.
All right.
And d on't be grossed out by the fact that the
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P.
D.
P.
D.
P.
D.

incision is l i ttle longer than you might have
expected but I opened it a bit like that so
that it would be, leave less of a scar.
I won't be.
You're not too part icular are you?
No I'm not. I was plann ing on tak ing the
stitches out myself. I//
//Well, on this one I'd
l ike to see it, on the others I might go
along w ith that i dea, okay?
Uh huh.
Th is one is on your face. I can't have that,
you know. Turn around.
(un intell igible).
V icki has come in for, among other th ings, the

removal of moles.

The resident has introduced h imself as a

doctor, indicated h is d iscomfort w ith remov ing moles from
women's faces and his preference to at least do a less
conspicuous one fi rst.

He has sai d that it is better to go

to a dermatologist or surgeon but that he is capable and
w illing to do it.

In fact he has taken moles off other

people',s faces at prior t imes.

He explains that fam ily

phys icians do not routinely do such removals because it
would increase the ir malpractice insurance.

He also informs

the pat ient that he would like to have an "old doctor "
(staff phys ician) give a second opinion before proceeding.
The surg ical room does not have the proper instruments, the
operation takes longer and the surg ical scar is longer than
the resident apparently thought it would be.

He makes

special arrangements to come in and remove the stitches and
examine the incision even though he is on vacation.
Vicki asked the fami ly practice resi dent to remove
136

her moles--all of them.

The reasons she gave were that she

could not afford to have anyone else ( a higher level
specialist is implied) do it and that she was not concerned
about having a scar.

She is told that this particular

physician has done such removals before and is not hesitant
to do hers, though he might prefer to do a les s conspicuous
one first.

She has been told by the resident that the

removal should not leave a scar and by the staff ( "older ")
physician that the scar will not be more than an inch long.
Vicki is also informed that the physician can do about six
removals at a time.

After the removal, she is told that the

physician has "run way over time, " that the instruments were
not exactly the ones he wanted, that she should return to
get the stitches removed and to have the other moles
removed.
This third-year resident expres sed hesitancy about
removing the mole from Vicki's face, consulted with a staff
phys ician and worked through lunch hour to remove it.

He

has, despite his suggestions to the contrary, removed the

most conspicuous mole first.

After noting that

dermatologists and plastic surgeons are best qualified to
remove facial moles, he explained to the patient that he was
capable and experienced if she really wanted him to perform
the removal.
What factors are there of which Vicki is not
informed?

She was never explicitly told that her attending
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physician was �esident and that the "older " physician was a
supervising staff physician .

She was incorrectly informed

that all of her moles could be removed on that day .

It

appears as if neither she nor the resident knew that the
equipment would be below the standards the resident
expected, nor that the removal would take as long as it
did .

She also apparently operated under the assumption that

the removal performed by a family physician is less
expensive than when performed by a dermatologist or a
4
plastic surgeon .

similarities and Differences
In all three cases treatment decisions are arrived
at by the physicians without giving the reasons for their
decisions and seeking the patients' agreement .

There is no

opportunity for the patients to question the sufficiency of
the reasons, or the choice of one among other possible
options (which may also be medically sound , as discussed in
the next chapter) .

I n the case of Shei la and Ma ria, the

decision is simply expressed in the form of a treatment , and
they accept the recommendation without comment or

The fee scale at the family practice would allow
for fees for the removal of three moles in two or three
visits to vary from $30 to $ 153 . Local dermatologists
claimed that they would complete the removals in one 30- to
45-minute appointment .
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clarification.

There does not appear to be any patient

choice or deliberation over options or reasons in these
cases .

In Vicki's case, the treatment is in harmony with

her presenting compla int and very specific request for a
particular treatment.

Though he expresses hesitancy, the

resident does eventually comply with Vicki's request.

What

is not expl icit in the interaction is why the res i dent does
comply desp ite what he expresses as the usual practice and
such adverse factors for h im as running through the lunch
hour, a noon conference, lack of desired surgical equipment
and the expressed desire to do a less conspicuous one
first.

So in all three instances, the residents have not

d isclosed the reasons for their actions in treating or not
treat ing the patients, consequently the women did not have
the opportun ity to agree or d isagree with the reasons or
choices.
In the cases of Sheila and Maria, there is not any
opportunity for the women to give their consent to the
treatment or non-treatment.

At no point are they asked if

they agree with the physician's cho ice.
expl icitly informed of any opt ions.
find this at all unusual.
different.

Nor are they

They do not seem to

Vicki's case seems to be

She specifically requests a certa in procedure,

among other th ings, and is given the requested treatment.
Furthermore, she is given the treatment that she requested
despite the resident's expression of hesitance.
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So she has

taken the opportunity to request specific treatment, and her
consent might more reasonably be implied.
It may be that this apparent difference is
mitigated by other features of the interaction.

Vicki

leaves the interview with more of a sense of why family
practice physicians might not remove facial moles than with
knowledge of why hers were removed.

This is similar to the

first two cases in that there is no communication of the
reasons why the physician chooses to treat Vicki instead of
referring her or removing a less conspicuous mole first.
Discussion of why the physicians' expressed hesitancy and
yet proceeded will have to be delayed until the analysis,
since it is not an explicit part of the interaction.
Another difference between Vicki's case and that
of Sheila and Maria is that Vicki was obviously aware of
options and her physician explicitly mentioned them.

Vicki

had apparently deliberated, or at least knew of the option
of going to a dermatologist or plastic surgeon to get her
moles removed.

The resident expressed that the usual

practice was to refer such cases to these specialists.

In

contrast, Sheila was not told that she could go untreated or
wait on the screen.

Maria was not told that she could take

pain medication and risk her fetus.

Of course, it is so

rare as to seem odd for a physician to append to
recommendations " or you can get another opinion or do
nothing at all. "

Nevertheless, the explicit discussion of
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the possibility in Vicki's interaction is a difference
between hers and that of Sheila and Maria. It is more
reasonable to say of Vicki that she consented to the
treatment than it is of Sheila and Maria.
The next task is to examine the particular cases
to see what consequences the treatment decisions have for
the patients.

This discussion will have relevance for both

the sort of questions asked in a contextual analysis as well
as for the normative analysis.

141

Chapter IV
Social Analysis

Consequences of outcome to Patients
Each interaction resulted in the treatment of the
woman.

Most traditional normative analyses of cases involve

a consideration of the outcome of the case, whether for the
purposes of a consequentialist evaluation or to aid in
deliberating whether there was any infringement on the
patient's "rights" or "person." As will be evident, a social
analysis examines the outcome for different reasons, such as
to consider how the outcome was arrived at and what social
and interactional processes were involved in shaping the
treatment outcome for each woman.

Note that even at this

level of analysis, we need to draw heavily on our knowledge
of practical effects on patients' everyday routines of
advice given by the physicians.

Each case will be

considered individually, then they will be compared in
Tables I, II, and III (pages 158-162) .

Sheila
Sheila presents with a sore throat.

She receives

treatment that is quite routine and probably as effective as
any she would receive elsewhere.
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The treatment pla� also

shows that the resident is sensitive to the problems
attending the use of antibiotic treatment.

She is given a

five day prescription of antibiotics, with another five
days' worth to be filled if the strept screen is positive.
She is to call the physician in two days to check on the
strept screen.

There are medical and practical consequences

of this treatment outcome.
Medically, Sheila is immediately placed on
antibiotic treatment, an effective method of combatting
strept infection.

She is likely to be less contagious and

less likely to be subject to rheumatic fever, a rare
side-effect of strept infections.

It is possible that

Sheila may recover from her sore throat earlier and with
fewer complications because the resident did not wait to
read the screen before prescribing the antibiotic.
If the screen is positive, Sheila will have
benefitted from earlier treatment without any additional
medical risks to later treatment.

Since the only difference

waiting for the screen would have made, if it is positive,
would be a delay in starting the treatment, there is no
difference in the risks of treatment itself.

Treatment with

wide-range antibiotics has the accompanying risks of an
infrequent occurrence of allergic reaction, a possible
reduction of the drug's later efficacy due to sensitization,
depression of normal bacterial growth { sometimes related to
yeast infections) and a societal impact of contributing to
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the development of resistant strains of bacteria.

The

medical issue of whether or not the risks of such treatments
are worth the usefulness of treatment prior to reading the
screen is controversial (Lasagna, 1980 ) .
If the screen is negative, Sheila will have been
exposed to these possible negative side effects
unnecessarily.

The antibiotic would prove inefficacious,

unless by the coincidence of another bacteria being present
which the antibiotic is effective in treating.

Sheila would

have been exposed to all the attendant risks of the
treatment.
Practically, the treatment has several
consequences for Sheila which are evident only if we first
understand that there were alternatives to tpe chosen
treatment plan.

The physician could have given Sheila the

entire prescription to be filled at the same time, or he
could have had her wait until the screen was read before
beginning the ten days of antibiotics.

Alternatively, he

could have withheld dispensing of the prescription until he
knew that she had strept.

Medically, the only relevant

difference between these options rests on the issue of
treatment with antibiotics prior to or after reading the
screen.

The physician had clearly made up his mind to treat

prior to the screen's being read , so this alone could not
have been the only reason for the particular choice among
the different means of achieving that medical goal.
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On the treatment plan the physician chose, Sheila
will need to call him to check on the screen in two days,
and may have to return to the pharmacy to fill the second
half of the prescription.

If the screen is negative, Sheila

will have spent money and time on the treatment plan that
was unnecessary, though not as much as if he had given her a
full ten day prescription.

These are practical consequences

for Sheila of the physician's treatment plan.

The trips to

the pharmacy could have been reduced to one or eliminated by
dispensing one prescription, or having Sheila wait until the
screen was read before filling the prescription.

The extra

expense and effort of taking unnecessary medication could be
avoided either by not prescribing before the screen is read
or by having Sheila wait two days.

If the medical

indications were of minimal concern to the physician, then
i t would probably be most convenient for Sheila if, at the
time of the in terview, a ten day prescription were given.
It could then be filled if the screen is positive.

If the

medical indications were strong, so that the resident
thought it important for Sheila to be treated immediately,
the choice between two five day or one ten day prescription
seems arbitrary, with neither obviously more convenient.
The medical indications for antibiotic treatment
are controversial, though it is possible that here were some
clinical indications in this particular case that might
reduce the controversy for this instance.
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Barring this

event, unexpressed in the interaction or pat ient records,
the treatment decis ion is not fully d ictated by the med ical
factors.

The decision to accept the med ical r isks, expenses

and practical inconven iences is made for Sheila by the
phys ician.

She is ne ither asked for her preference, nor are

the options (of non-treatment or alternative d ispens ing
arrangements ) mentioned.

She ila is un informed regard ing the

fact that there are options and regard ing the reasons for
the phys ici an's particular cho ice.
In th is case the d ifferences in treatment plans
and the ir consequences seem to be more or less tr iv ial.
She ila rece ived adequate med ical care and th is care was not
prescr ibed in the most inconven ient manner (Wh i c h would
requ i re that She ila return to get the second prescr iption
after the screen was read ) .

But the controvers ial and

uncerta in nature of the med ical ind ications reduces the
strictness with wh ich the treatment decision �an be said to
be determined by the med ical factors involved in th is case.
Consequently, it is more reasonable to weigh the practical
factors in determin ing the treatment plan.

But such factors

are not ever expl icitly mentioned in the interaction.

It is

interesting to note that She ila never ra ises these factors.
The practical consequences of the treatment plan are
effectively removed from She ila's control or negotiation by
their implic it treatment.

Th is will later be d iscussed in

terms of the med icalization of non-med ical factors
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(Waitzkin, 1983: 141-142), which effectively removes from
patients ' control aspects of their everyday life .
The fact of there being options to the treatment
plan, together with the lack of clearly or strictly
indicated medical treatment and the practical consequences
of the treatment plan, raises the question of Sheila ' s
silence regarding her inconvenience and expenses .

Why is it

that she never asks if the complicated treatment plan is
necessary, if she could just fill the ten days of
antibiotics at once, or if she could just wait until the
screen was read?

This question is one which also arises in

the next two cases .

Maria
Maria presents with a sore leg from a motorcycle
accident and is probably pregnant .
has had three previous abortions .

She plans to abort and
The resident re-enters

the examination room with pain medication but does not give
it to Mar ia, tel l ing her that it is contra ind icated for
pregnant and nursing mothers.

Instead the resident tells

Maria to take an over-the-counter medication, and to return
if the pain persists (and later, "if she has time " } .

It is

likely that Maria could have received better pain medication
from a different physician who would have followed one of
the options to be discussed below .
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This non-treatment,

referred to from here forth as her treatment-plan, has
medical and practical consequences for Maria .
Medically, if pain management is a medical matter,
Maria has not been given any better pain management than she
could have received by self-treatment.

It is possible that

she really came to the physician for information on where to
procure an abortion, and that her leg pain was just an
excuse.

If such was the case, she did not get any aid on

this issue either.

The resident did have Maria's leg

x-rayed, so she does know that it is not fractured.

If she

has benefitted medically from the encounter, it is in the
assurance that there is nothing seriously wrong with her
leg.

Even this assurance, however, may be mitigated by the

resident's request that Maria return if the pain does not
cease.
If the over-the-counter medication is effective in
treating Maria's pain, she has received some assurance that
such is all she can do and the health and life of her fetus
is not at risk due to pain medication.

It is possible that

Maria will be less likely to do further damage to her leg by
overuse since she is on a weaker pain medication and would
likely feel pain . sooner than if she were on something

stronger.

If the over-the-counter medication is ineffective
or only partially effective in relieving Maria's pain, she
has only benefitted in that she now knows that her leg is
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not fractured .

( it would not be unreasonable to think that

she may already have tried the over-the-counter
medication . )

The pain medication that the physician decided

not to give her due to the contraindications probably would
have been more effective pain relief.

Had he dispensed the

medication, he would have endangered the life or health of
the fetus .

This was not a concern of Maria's since she

planned to have an abortion .
Practically, Maria may be more inconvenienced by
the over-the-counter medication than if she had received the
stronger prescription.

She indicated that her leg hurt at

work and that she would not be paid if she had to take time
off work while her leg healed.

So a " practical" consequence

of the treatment plan is possible continued pain, possible
loss of income, and perhaps the inconvenience of having to
return to the clinic for further medical attention .

The

fetus she is carrying, and planning to abort, is protected
from possible side effects of the stronger pain medication .
She may possibly be protected from further injury to her leg
due to over-medication of her pain.
As in Sheila's case, there are options to the
treatment plan Maria received .

Most obviously, the

physician could have given her the medication, even though
it was contraindicated for pregnant women .

The

contraindication is due to fetal health and in this case
Maria intends to abort, and informs him of this fact .
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This

treatment plan would relieve her of pain more than the one
chosen and would bear only the possible medical risks of
threat to the fetus and further damage by overuse of the leg
since she would be less sensitive to the pain.

Of course,

the latter is a risk she may bear anyway since she may
choose to work regardless of the pain.

Another means of

approaching this risk would be to warn her not to overuse
it, perhaps with concrete descriptions of what might be
damaging.

The risk to the fetus seems immaterial since

Maria plans to abort.
The resident came in carrying the medication he
decided not to give Maria. There are other pain medications
which do not present a threat to fetal health.
did the resident mention this as an option.

At no point

It may be that

the clinic did not have any samples of such a medication,
but since Maria was to buy the over-the-counter medication
anyway, it is reasonable to wonder if she would not have
been just as willing to purchase a more effective
prescription.
In light of the fact that Maria intends to abort
the fetus and that she has carried through with this
intention on three previous occasions, the protection of
fetal health does not seem to be a valid reason for the
treatment option chosen by the resident.

If the decision is

based on protection from further damage to the leg, it is
never explicitly stated in the interview and there may be
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better ways of dealing with this possibility.

The

contraindication is stated in an ambiguous fashion which
leaves open the possiblity of interpreting it to mean that
the pain medication is dangerous to Maria because she is
pregnant.

The options of alternative pain medication,

stronger than the over-the-counter medication and not
threatening to fetal health, or of taking the other
medication despite its threat to fetal health, are never
explicitly discussed in the interview.
ever raise them.

Neither does Maria

Why does Maria not ask if there is

anything that her physician can do for her more than simply
advise her to take the over-the-counter medication, and call
him if there is any problem?

Once again, there seems to be

good reason for the patient to question the physician's
choice of treatment plan, or at least ask for clarification,
but no such attempt is made.

Vicki
Vick i has presented w ith a var iety o f complaint s,
among them the removal of moles, one on her face.
not a medically indicated treatment.

This is

It is one for which

the medical profession is consulted due to its technical
expertise and the possiblity of complications which are
medical in nature (i. e. , infection).

It is a little out of

the ordinary for a patient to consult a family practitioner
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for the removal of facial moles, due to the fact that
plastic surgeons and dermatologists have more experience
with such procedures (an exception to this may be rural

family practices, where specialists are not as accessible) .
Informed of this fact, as well as the fact that the problem
is not considered formidable by her physician, Vicki is
"treated " for her facial mole.
Medically, this procedure has several risks .

Some

of the risks are difficult to categorize as strictly medical
since the whole procedure is more "cosmetic " than medically
indicated.

Since the procedure is treated under the rubric

of a medical treatment, and its success is the removal of a
mole with a minimum of scarring, I will treat all
consequences besides financial and practical inconvenience
as "medical " consequences.

With this clarification, the

risks of this procedure are present regardless of who does
the cutting and suturing.

Varying levels of experience and

quality of equipment are the only factors which affect the
probability of the risks.

The only benefit is removal of

the moles, which would be the probable result of any
clinical encounter around this presenting complaint (unless
of course there were some sort of medical contraindications
around the removal of the moles) .
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So the only deliberation

over risks that is relevant is that of degree of
likelihood.
There are several factors which seem to increase
the risks for scarring and disfiguring in Vicki's case.
First of all, she has come to the lowest level of
experience, generally speaking, in terms of those medical
practitioners who are qualified to remove moles.

As the

resident points out, usually dermatologists or plastic
surgeons are the best qualified to remove facial moles.
Secondly, she has come to the family practice model office.
So within the lowest level of experience of the medical
specializations, she has elected to come to the setting
where she is likely to get a physician who is in training,
rather than an experienced practitioner.

Finally, as is

revealed through the interaction, the clinical setting is
not very well equipped to perform the procedure that Vicki
has requested.
It is possible to argue against this evaluation of
the risks.

It could be claimed that family practitioners

are better equipped to deal with cosmetic surgery because of
their concern with the whole person.

One result of such a

concern would be to avoid unnecessary or ill-advised
cosmetic surgery.

This is not explicitly discussed in

Vicki's case, and since the surgery was performed, Vicki's
attendance at a family practice did not have a different
result · than would be likely from the more
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surgically-oriented specialists.

Another advantage might be

that family practitioners are more likely to pick up on
later infection and avoid unnecessary disfiguring.
Furthermore, it could be argued that those training for
medical practice are more careful, more recently schooled in
new techniques.

Though possible, this does not seem as

likely for a family practice resident.

Residents have been

said to be more attentive to patient's desires and needs and
under the careful scrutiny of experienced staff physicians.
The supervision, however, is by a family practitioner who is
not likely to have much experience in facial surgery.

I

cannot imagine any counter-argument to the lack of suitable
equipment.
Practically, time and expense are highly variable
considerations.

Second to the removal of her moles, Vicki's

concern seems to be expense.

She gives as her reason for

not going to a specialist that she cannot afford one.

She

also asked how many moles the physician could do at one
time.

This may be an expression of a concern with the

inconvenience of needing to make return trips, or of having
to pay for each visit.

The actual effect · is that she will

have to make return trips for the removal of stitches, as
well as to have the other moles removed.

This is despite

the resident's original expression of the intent or ability
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to remove six at one appointment, and to reduce risks by
doing an inconspicuous mole prior to the one on Vicki's
face .
The options to the treatment plan are many.

None

of them would have removed the medical risks or had a long
term effect different than the option taken.

The moles

would all be eventually removed and there would always be
some risk of infection or disfiguring.

The practical

consequences and the probability of the medical consequences
could all have been improved on by many optional treatment
plans.

Vicki could have been encouraged to reconsider

whether the expense would not be any or much greater if she
had gone to a specialist (cf. , page 138, footnote 4) .
Another option would have been to do one or more removals at
different sites to see if she were really comfortable with
the family practice resident operating on her face.

Or she

could have him do all but the facial mole, going to a
specialist for that one alone.

Simply verifying that the

proper or desired equipment was available in the clinic, and
then postponing the surgery until it was, would have reduced
the risk .

Or another appointment could have been set for a

time when the resident would have adequate equipment, time
and supervision to do a larger number of moles under optimal
conditions.
None of these options, except the original
intention of doing a less conspicuous one first and a rather
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cursory discussion of the higher level specialist , were
mentioned to V icki. Perhaps she could reasonably be expected
to have thought of the latter possibility herself , prior to
presenting at the clinic .

The Treatment Decisions
The question of whether or not the treatments were
in the patients' interests , when compared to the obvious
alternatives , is difficult to answer .

This is due to two

factors: First , there are different means of achieving the
medical goals , and these different means have efficacies and
side effects which result in controversial cost-benefit
ratios.

Secondly , the non-medical advantages and

disadvantages , such as cost and time , are dependent on
non-medical factors (income , work schedules , etc . ) , and are
so mundane that it is not at all obvious how the women would
have chosen , had they been given the opportunity .
The medical treatments which the physicians chose
were more or les s effective means of ach iev ing certa in
medical goals for the�e patients.

Presumably patients come

to physicians to have their medical interests looked after
and physicians' treatment of patients serve these
interests .

An examination of the alternative treatments

which might serve the same medical interests gives us a
basis to consider whether the treatment decision made was so
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clearly the "best" that there was no need for the physician
to consult the patient nor for the patient to ask for
reasons or clarification.

If there are other courses of

treatment which might be preferred by the patient, then it
is reasonable to consider why the physicians did not consult
the patients regarding their preferences on the non-medical
concerns, or why the patients did not inquire about these
options.
If the medical cost-benefit ratio of a particular
treatment is controversial in comparison to the others, then
it is also reasonable to consider why the patients' opinions
were not sought.

In order to see the relevance of such

questions, it is helpful to get a clear picture of the
medical risks and potential benefits, as well as the
non-medical practical advantages and disadvantages, of the
different treatment options which are suggested by the
medical concerns expressed in the physicians' treatment
decisions.

Tables I, II and III describe for each patient a

few available treatment options, together with the medical
and non-medical advantages and d isadvantages.
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Table I .

.....

V'I
00

SHEILI\ - Sore throat ; suspected st rept inieccion.
DISJ\DVJ\Nl'l\GES

TRF.AT!-tEm' OP1'IONS

POI'i:NJ'.I.AL Bl:l'JEFITS

A. No Screen,
.Imnediace full
c.."Ourse of
ancibiocic

l . /\void rheumatic fever
2. Reduce chance of
contagiousness
3. F.arlier recovery chan
waiting for screen

1 . No recurn trip co or .
2. No return trip to
pha r:necy
3. No need co call Dr .

1 . Allergic reaction
2. Reduction of later
efficacy
3 . Sl!c)pression of
nornal baccer ial
growth
4. Contribute to
developrent of
resiscant st rains
5 . Treatment may be
ineffective

B. Strepc Screen,
Inmediate iull
course of
a'ltibiotic, to
be stopped if
screen negative

l. Avoid rheumacic fever
2. Reduce chance of
contagiousness
3 . E3rlier recovery than
waiting for screen

1 . No return trip to Dr .
2. No return trip co
pharmacy

1 . Allergic reaccion
1 . NeecJ to call or .
atout screen
2. Reduction of later
efficacy
3 . Suppression of nornnl
i:>3cterial growch
4 . Contribute to
developnent of
resistant strains
5. 'l' reatrnent may be
in-effective

AJN/\flmGF,S

NID'\TIVE SCREEN

4. None of the above
benefits apply
S . Cease tmneeded
treatment, reduce
risks

tb additional
advantages

MEDICAL RISKS

6 . Risks borne without
need for treac.<nent

l . Possibly unnecessary
Expense
2 . Possillly wmecessary
trip co txiarrnacy

2. lbnecessary expense
of ten days •
antibiotics
3. lllmecessary t r ip to
pharmacy

tmITIVE SCREEl�
6. Known effective
treatment

3 . EXf>ellSe for needed
drug
4. Avoid second (needed)
trip to IX)annacy

No additional
risks

No additional
risks

Table I (Continued)
TRFA'.l'Mllll' OPI'IOHS

c. .Scrept Screen,
'.lw-five day
prescriptions,
one to be iilled
and started
Jnmediately,
second to be
filled and taken
if screen is
positive

ror1::t-1rIAL BENEFITS

1 . Avoid rneumatic fever
2. Red•.1ce t:hance of
contagiousness
3 . F.arlier recovery chan
waiting for screen

Mill!C:I\L RISKS

AfNANrAGFS

DISJ\INAflfAQ;S

1. No return trip co Dr .
for prescription

1. Allergic react ion
1 . N-?ed to cal! Dr .
2. Reduction of later
about screen
efficacy
2. 'l\.lo trips to piannacy
3. Suppression of nornal 3 . Need to keep track of
bacterial growth
prescription
4. Contribute to
developneit of
resiscant strains
5 . Treatment may be
ineffective

2. Avoid expense of

5 days of drug

6. Risks borne without
need for creatnent

3 . Expense for needed
drug

No additional
ris!ts

N!;Xil\TIVE SCP.EEN

4 . None of the above
benefits apply
5 . Cease wmeedecl
treatment , r�uce
risks

,-a
\JI
\0

4 . U'Ulecessary expense
of first
prescription
S. U'Ulecessary trip co
phamacy

POOITIVE OCREEN

6. Known effective
treatrnenc
D.Strepc screen,
dispense
antibiocic only
if screen
positive

1.
2.
3.
4.

1. No wmecessary risks

Delay in treatment
Rheumatic fever
Contagiousness
Delayed recovery

4. Second trip to
p,armacy
1 . Need to call !le .
about screen

IF TRE.I\TED

2. Known effective
treatment
3 . (Delayed) protection
fcom rhewnatic tever
4. (Delayed) protect ion
from contagiousness

1. Expense is for drug
that is known to be
effective
2. One (needed} trip to
phaanacy

5 . Allergic reaction
2. Trip to phannacy
6 . Reduction of later
efficacy
7. Suppression of nornal 3 . Recurn crip to Dr.
if he cannot phone in
bacterial growth
prescription
8. Contribute to·
develq:menc of
resistant strains

Table I (OXltinued)
TIU::ATMENl' OPl'IONS

£. Strept screen,
dispense
antibiotic
:inmediately
co be cak.en if
screen is
posicive

°'

�

0

POI'I::NfIAL BE."IBFITS

AfNI\NrAGES

1 . th mnecessary risks

1.
2.
3.
4.

IF TRFATID
2. Known effective
treatment
3. (Delayed) protection
fran rhewnatic fever
4. (Delayed) protection
fran contagiousness

MEDICJ\I. RISKS

1 . Expense is for drug
known co be
efiective
2. Ole (needed) crip co
(Xlaanacy
3 . Prescription already
in possession of
patient

Delay in treatnent
Rheumatic fever
Contagiousness
Later recovery

5 . Allergic reaction
6. Reduccion of later
efiicacy
7. Suppression of
normal bacterial
growth
a. Contribute co
developnent of
resistant strains

DIS/'.DVANr/\G'.S

1 . Need to call Dr .
about screen

2. Trip to pharmacy
3 . Need to keep track oi
prescription

Table II . HI\RIA - PrL>gnanc (intending to aborc) , with leg pain from injury.
'rRf:A'IMENr OPTIONS

PCTl'ENrIAL BEl-lEFITS

A. Give pain
1. Effective pain relief
medication sauple
though it is
contr.:!indicated
for fetal health

......
0\
.....

AfJVl\Nr/\GF,S

1 . Less or no time off
wor,c ; income
maintained
2. Less inpairment of
other life
activities
3. Save room�y (sample
not purchased)

MEDICAL IUSKS
1 . Risk to fetus
2 . Possible iurther leg
da!Mge due to
de3e0sicizacion

DI SNJVN:lr/\.GES

1 . Risk to fecal health
or liie

B. Suggest. less use
of leg and overthe-counter
medication

1. May be less eY.f)eflsive 1. Less effective pain
1. No risk to ietus
chan filling a
2. Less chance of
relief
prescription
further damage to leg
due to desensicization

1. nay need to take
time oii work and
reduce income
2 . Cost oi mediec1tion
3 . May be greater
L'lp!irmenc of life
activities

C. Prescribe a
medication to
be purchased
which· gives
better relief
than over-the
counter
rnedicacion and
does noc
threacen t.ne
fetus

1 . lb risk. co fetus
2. Effective pain relief

1 . Cose oi IDl..'Ci icat ion
2. 'l'rip to pharnucy

D. Refer Maria to
a physician in
the clinic who
has no rooral
concern over her
fecus ' health
and her intention
to abort . This
physician gives
Maria the drug
sanple of
treatment A.

1 . Less or no time off
t10rk ; income
11\3.intained
2. Less impairment of
life activities

1 . Possible furcher leg
damage due to
desensitization

(Tile sarne as for treatment A, above, except that
a diiferent physician is re�-ponsible for the
decision. )

Table III . VICXI - Facial and bodily rooles ; patient requesting rerooval .
TRFA'..l."MElll' OPI'IONS

PO.l'ENl.'IAL BDIBFI'l'S

A. Renova! of facial 1 . tbles removed
roole by a famil}'
practice resident
with sub-standard
equip11e11t

NJVANf/\GES

MmlC.1\L RISKS

1 . Facial roles reooved 1. Disfiguremenc and
irrmediately
infection
2. May be less expensive 2. Non-specialise care
tnan some other
3 . Resident, not an
experienced Dr .
specialists
4 . Sub-standard
equipnenc

01 SI\IJVANl'ArnS

1 . Nt..>ed co return for
rer,ioval of stitches
and ocher rooles
2. C.Ost approximacely
$30 - $150 for all
noles

B . Renova! oi less
conspicuous
body roole (s)
first, return to
have facial
1wles renoved

1 . Risk of
disiigurement and
iniection to less
conspicuous
location
2. l'bles renoved
3 . Increase in
experience on part
of resident prior to
rerroval of facial
roole

1. Some reuovals
i.nmediate
2. Less expensive than
plastic surgeon;
perhaps than
dernatologist

1. Disfigurement a'ld
1. Need co return for
removal of stitches
infection
and other nol�s
2. Non-specialist care
2. C.Ost, $30 - $ 150
3. Resident, not an
for all rooles
experienced Dr .
4 . Sub-standard equiprent

c. Do bodily rooles
and suggest thac
Vicki call and
check prices for
dearatologists

1. Bodily ooled rerooved
inmediately
2. Facial roole nay
receive higher level
of expercise

1. Bodily rooles rerooved
inmediately
2. May not need to
return for stitches
3. If Family Practice
clinic is less
expensive, save rooney
for reuoval of bodily
moles

1. Disfigurement and
infection
2. Non-specialist care
3. Resident, not an
experienced Dr .
4. Most conspicuous
(facial) nole has
reduced t isks if
deDIBtologist
�riorms

D. Refer Vick i to
a dernacologist,
suggesting that
they are better
prepared to do
the surgery and
not as expensive
as she thinks

1. More experienced
surgeon, reducing
chance of risks
2. r-t>les all rerroved
inmediately

1 . Removals all done in 1 . Disfigurement and
infe,;tion
one visit to
der:macologisc
2. May save uoney:
deanatologists in
oormunity charge $25$175 for three
reroovals

°'

......

N

1. May need to return ,
for stitch renoval
2. Inconvenience of
pnone calls to
check prices
3 . •rrip to
dernatologist
4 . TWo fees : Family
Practice, $30 - $150
Deaetologist, $25$175, so may or may
not save
1 . �bne rerroved at
fi rst visit
2. Inconvenience of
second appointmenc
at a different
ott'ice
3 . Probably need to
· return to have
stitches rerroveJ
4. C.Ost of both Family
Practice clinic bill
and dennatologists

Each t reatment dec i s ion had med i ca l ly sound
a lternat ives.

In each c a s e, though med i c a l ly sound

t reatment wa s given, ther e w a s at l ea s t one a l ternat ive fo r
wh i c h i t cou l d oe a rgued t h at med i c a l and p r act i c a l concerns
wou l d be bet ter served.

Yet the women pa s s ively accepted

the phy s i c i ans ' dec i s ion s.

Cons i de r ing eacn c a se

i n d i v i du a l ly, cwo quest ions a re relevan t to th i s ana ly s i s :
1.

Was the t r eati�ent dec i s ion obvious ly t he best

pos s i ole, o r wa s tn e r e some a l t e rnat ive tnat was a r g uably
a s, o r mo r e, med i c a l ly sound and p ra c t i c a l ?
2.

Were the women con s u l ted r ega r d ing the r i s� s,

oenef i t s, a dvdn t a g e s and d i s a dvan t ages of t h e c reatment
dec i s ion?
I n She i l a's c a se, t h e phy s i c i an

chose a t rea tment

p l a a c h a t showe d n i s Knowl edge of tne cont rove r sy over t ne
p resc r ipt ion of ant i b iot i c s p r io r to read ing che st rept
s c reen .

In t n 1 s sense he s howed concern no c to expo s e

S ne i l a unnec es sa r i ly to tne r i sk s o f ant i b iot i c s a s wel l a s
ove r t ne de lay i n t r eatment i f t1e h a d w a i t e d fo r t he s t r ept
s c reen.

H e nad a l so g i ven She i l a some " cont rol" ove r her

hea l c h c a re oy g iv i ng h e r · t h e respons i b i l i ty to c a l l a bout
t ne s c reen an d e i t ner to s top t a � ing t he ant i b ioc i c i o r to
i i l l a p r es c r ipt ion wn i ch sne a l ready nad in he r pos ses s ion.
At that po i n t, Shei l a nad a s ea sy an a cces s to the
ant i b iot i c s as ii t h ey were ove r -t he-counter med i cat ion .
Wha t i f the phys i c i an had
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g iven Shei l a the ent i re

ten day prescript ion e i t ner to be start ed immed iately
( treatment A) or to be neld unt il the screen had been read
( treatment D ) ?

I f he was conc erned to avo id the

cont inuat ion of the treatment i f the screen was posit i ve,
treatment B, wh ich includes a screen and c essat ion of the
regimen if the scre en was negat ive, coul d nave been used.
In treatment

c,

the only d i t f erence was the inconvenience of

a ret urn c rip to the pnarmacy if the scre en was pos ic i ve
( under treatment C ) . Treatment B

had the d isadvantage of

added cost of six to e ight days ' wortn of unneeded

medicat ion i f the screen is negat ive.

She i la was not ask e d

wnether she woul d pre fer the extra cost or the extra trip.
I t is at l east arguabl e that She i la m ignt have found
treatment A or B

pre ferabl e to treatment

c.

Treatments D and E woul d have She i la wai t unt il the
screen is read before taK ing the ant i b iot i c.

These

alt ernat ives el iminat e any unneeded trips co tne pnarmacy as
wel l as any unnec essary cost.

They also woul d have

avo ided unnecessary treatment and its at t endant med i cal
risks ( and tne pot ent ial bene f i ts ) .

Wh i l e these are med ical

factors , t ney are also controversial within � h e prof ession
and it is possible that She i la had a strong pre f erenc e for
one set of · risks and bene f its.

For exampl e, i t may be that

She i la nad a recurring probl em with yeast inf ect ions wh i c h
tne suppression of normal bac t eria by ant i biot ics would
exacerbat e.

I t is reasonabl e to t h ink t hat t h is might mak e
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so@e d i f f eren c e to t n e det erm i nat ion o f wn ich treatmen t
She i la

wo u l d nav e c n o sen.

I t m i gnc nave be en her

pre f eren c e, f or good reasons, t o avo i d ant i b i o t i c s un l es s
t h ey were � nown t o o e needed i n ord er c o recov er her h ealth.
The only d i f f eren c e betwe en treatmen ts D and E was t h e t ime
at wn i cn Sne i la is g iven t n e pre s cript i o n.

Tne pnys i c ian

had already demon scraced a wi l l ingn e s s t o d i spen s e

a

poss i bly unn e e ded pres cri�c i on, and tu i s was cert a i n l y a
more conven i en c treatmen t f or S n e i la.
trea traenc E s e e1ns c o nave oe en

Con s equen t l y,

t n e more

v iabl e and

� rac t i c a l al c ernat ive wn i cn Sh e i la m i gn t nave c ho s en Det t er
over treatment D o r C.
So treatmen t B an d treat1�ent E are arguably net t er
t han

che crea tinent C wh i ch was s e l ec t ed by the phy s i c ian.

Of co urs e ac t u a l d e t erm inat i on o f wha t S h e i la wo u l d pre f er
cannoc oe raade w i t n o u t consu l t ing h e r.

Fu r t nermore, t he

pnys i c ian J� ighc not have agreed w i th Sne i la ' s e s t imat i on o f
n er interest s.

On c n e o t n er nand, ne m ig nt have agreed or

She i l a m i g h t nave been so det ermined as to s e e� o t n er neal t n
c are.

Th i s i n c eract i o n, t n e pny s i c ian ' s f ir s t e xposure t o

Sne i la, naa no re f erenc e t o sne i la ' s prac t i cal and med i cal
pre i erenc es.

Nor d i d Sne i la inqu ire whetner tnere w ere more

conven i en c ways, or l ess expensiv e, tnan tne opt i on tnat was
g iven by t h e phy s i c ian.

sn e i l a was ask ed whetner sne was

al l erg i c t o t n e drug, an d re sponded tnat she was n o c.
Beyond th i s, she was n o t consu l t ed aoo u c any o i t n e med i cal
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risKs an d po t en t i a l ben efits o i t r e a t i n g befo r e o r a i t e r t n e
s c r e en was r ea d.
In Ma r i a's c as e, t a e phy s i c i an cnos e a t r eatmenc
plan that s nows con c e r n f o r i e t a l hea l t h wn i c� r es u l ts i n a
comp r ora is e i n pa i n rnedic a cion f o r Ma r i a .

Any o f tne othe r

t n r ee t r eac1aent opt i ons s u g g es c e d i n Ta�l e I I appea r to have
oeen mo r e p r a c tic a l ly and med i c a l ly s o und. This is not to
s u g 9 e s t tnat t a e t r eacraen c caos en i s d i sas t r o u s or med i ca l ly
in adeq uac e.

I t i s gu i c e poss i ol e chat Ma r i a r ec eived

acteyua c e paiD r e l i e f f r ora tn� o v � r-c n e-coun c e r med i c a t i on.
On ·c. h e o t n e r n and, it ll1 ay be t11at s 11e nad been us i n g s uch
hled i c a t i o n s w itnout s uc c e ss and came co g e e s ometn i n g
s t r ong e r.

T�e p r o t e c t ion whicn til e pny s i c i an g a v e t n e f e t u s

s e ems i n e t i ec c i v e s in c e Ma r i a pl anned to abo r t a n d nad a
h is c o ry o i b e i n g aol e to c a r r y tn r o ugh w i t h s u cn pl ans.
W i t n t n is co11s i de r ac i on in mind, it s e ems t hac c he physician
wo u l d nave oe s t s e r v ed Ma r i a's i n t e r e s ts oy g iv i ng ne r t h e
s amp l e med ication �e b r o ught inco t n e r o om t o d ispens e
( T r e at1nent A ) .

This wo u l d nave s aved he r tne expense and

inconven i ence o f buying ano t n e r p r es c r ipt i on or ov e r-t h e 
count e r .meaic at i on.
Tne @o r a l v a l u e o f c n e f e t us is a con t r ov e rsia l
iss u e .

I c is a l so on e about wn i ch t n is phy s i cian had ve ry

s tron g convic t i on s.

It raay oe tnat ne simply c o u l d not

c o un t en an c e any invol vement w i cn th r ea t enin g f e c a l w e l l
being.

As a mo r a l ag ent, not s imply a t echnic i an ( c f. ,
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Ve atch, 19 7 2, 19 7 8 ) , n i s conv i c t i on snoul d not oe
d i s r eg a r ded, r equ i r ing tue pny s i c i an to a c t a g a i n s t n i s
mo r a l con sc i en c e .

T r eatrnen c s C and D p rov i de a l t e r n a t i v e s

tha t woul d n o t invo lve c n e pnys i c i aD w i th a n a c t i on tnat
woul d pos e a th r e a t to f e c a l D ea i ch .
T r e a tmenc C p r ov i d e s an a l c e r n a t i v e t n a c r es u l t ed
in no t h r eat t o the i e tus but p r ov i d e s st r ong e r pa i n
med i c a t i on f o r Ma r i a .

I c had the d i s advan c a g e ove r

t r ea tment A o i co s t i n g ,�o r e than a f r e e s ampl e an d o f
r equ i r in g c n a t Ma r i a g o c o a pha rwacy t o pu r c n a s e the
med i c at i on .

It wo uld, noweve r, avo i d involv i n g tne

pny s i c i an i n whac he m1gnt con s i d e r an immo r a l a c e and
p £ ov i a e s �a r i a w i th s t r on g e r pa in med i c a t i on wni cn may a l l ow
n e r c o con t iD ue a c w o r � and n o c s u f f e r a l o s s o i i ncome .
T r ea tmen t D i s a r ef e r r a l to a phy s i c i an who do es
n o t sna r e tn i s r e s 1 den � 1 s

�o r a l conv i c c i on .

Ic i s po s s i ol e

c n a t t n e r e s i d eD c w i l l s t i l l con s i de r t n i s t o b e p e r s o n a l
involvemen t, a l oe 1 t i 11d i r ecc, w i cn an immo r a l a c t ion .

Th i s

a lone may ma� e t r eatmen t C mo r e de s i r a o l e t o t n e r e s i dent .
As s um i n g that t n e r e i e r r a l c o u l d have been t o anothe r
pnys i c i an i n tne c l in ic a c the moment, t h i s c r eatment woul d
nave �ad t h e same a dvan t a g e s a s A .

Th e s e a r e c l ea r ly t h e

ones wh i cn a r e mo s t t o Ma r i a's advant a g e, s av i n g he r t h e
c o s t a n d t r ip t o t h e pna rma cy and g i v i ng n e r the s c r ong e r
pain med i c a t i on .
Ma r i a ' s p r ef e r en c e s r eg a r d i n g tne f a c t o r s wh i ch
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were mat er i a l to t h e trea tment aec ision we r e not so ught .
Tn e physi c i an do ubl e-cn ec� ed to mak e sure she is cons i dering
an abort i on, and that she wo u l d not be pa i d f or any t ime she
n eeded to tak e o f i .

These f a cts not w i t nscand ing, ne c hose

t n e l east e f f e c t iv e creatment wh i ch m i g h t w e l l have nad the
gre a t est d i sadvan t a g e s .

Ma r i a a c c epted th€: t reatment

dec ision w in c o u t aay req u est s f or c l ari i i c a t i on or opt i o ns .
I n Vi ck i ' s c ase, t n � physi c i an ag r e e d t o remove
Vi c k i ' s mo l es .

Cons i de r ing c n e opt i ons l ist e d in Tab l e I I I

t h e dec is i on t o f u l f i l l Vi c K i ' s requesc s e emed to oe tne
l ease advan t a g e o u s and t o e on e w i th c h e h i ghest degree of
risK and f ewesc. po t en t i a l oene f i t s ( Treatmen c A ) .

Vick i

seemed to be most conc erned w i t n e xpen s e and l east con c ern e d
w i cn the med i c a l risK s o f d isf i g ureraen c .

T h e pnysi c i ans

s e eri1 e ct t o a c c e p·c Vi c k i ' s assessm enc o :t t n e

f in an c i a 1

conc e r n as a c c ura c e and as o ut w e i g h i n g c n e med i c a l risks
over wh i ch c ney 11ad e xp r esse d con c e r n .

Two oi the cre a tment

a l t e rna c iv e s se eined imp l i e d in tne conc erns
tne pnys i c i an s .
mo l e f irs c

WdS

T r e atment B,

e xpre ssed oy

remo v a l o f a l ess consp i c u o u s

a c t u a l l y sug g es t ed by c n e res i dent, never co

en t er into c.ne d isc uss i on a g a i n .

Tre a tment D, re f erra l to a

de rma t o l og i s t ( o r a p l a s t i c surg eon ) , w as e xpressed as t h e
usua l prac t i c e .

Ic may be c h a t treatment C, wn i c h impl i ed

tha t Vi cK i m ignt g o c o t n e more spec i a l i z ed pny s i c i an f o r
t h e f a c i a l mo l e, i s impl i c i t ly a c k nowl edged as a n opt i o n i n
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the physicians' expressions o f concern over the facial mole
in particular.
The treatment ch osen was not medical ly disastrous,
th ough it did present the poorest sum of med ical and
practical advantages and disadvantages.

Vicki had chosen

this treatment, if her request is taken at face value.

It

was, however, based on inf ormation about costs that did not
seem accurate.

The physicians did not seem to share Vicki ' s

lack o f concern over scarring, but certainly - �hey were aware
of her attitude.

The only discussion of the inconvenience

o f return visits cl osed with the physician estimating that
he coul d do about hal f a dozen at one time.

There was no

discussion of the fact that the physician was a resident,
therefore, less experienced than woul d have been a more
experience d physician.

With the reference to " ol der" rather

than "staf f" doctor, Vicki

certainly was not of fered any

clarification on this issue.

The " less than desirable"

quality o f available equipment only arose in the process of
the actual facial surgery, so it was not a part of either
the physicians ' agreement to do the surgery, nor part o f
Vicki's request.

It is reasonable to suggest that the

treatment actual ly given (A) , when compared to the
alternatives, was not the one most serving of the relevant
medical and practical issues even th ough Vicki requested it.
She was consulted about the option o f referral, but her

possibly inaccurate cost evaluation and rej ection was not
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challenged.

Many of the factors wh i ch made th i s a treatment

les s serv ing of the pat ient ' s concern s were not part of the
expl i c i t d i sc u s s ion nor among the ascr i bable
pres uppo s i t ion s. The treatment cho sen d i d event ually f ulf ill
V i cki's request, though the phy s i c ians d i d not check to
ascerta in her agreement to accept the part i c ular r i sks and .
d i sadvantages wh i ch were immed iately apparent or arose a s
the s urgery wa s proceeding.
All three women rece ived treatment that met their
They . al so received treatment s whose

med i cal need s.

alternat ives e i ther pos s ibly or act ually were bet ter serv ing
of their and their caregivers ' concern s.
i f she was allergi c to med i cat ion.

She ila wa s asked

Beyond that quest ion,

she was not informed - of the reasons for the treatment
dec i s ion, nor a sked for her preference regard ing a
controvers ial med i cal cho i ce or non-med i cal convenience and
cos t factors.

Mar ia was a sked whether she would get pa i d

t ime of f work and
abort ion.

had ind i cated that she intended t o get an

The treatment dec i s ion was one wh i ch confl icted

w i th serv ing her concern about work and respect ing her
intent to abort.

She was told that the sample of medi cat ion

that the phy s i c ian contemplated giv ing her was
contraind i cated for pregnant and nur s i ng mothers.

She was

not told that it was fetal health that wa s protected.

Any

of the alternat ives ment ioned would have been bet ter cho i ces
if fetal health was di scounted,
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but Mar ia was not a sked for

her preference nor given reasons for the treatment decision .
Vicki ' s treatment fulf illed her request though it is at
ieast questionable whether to do so was in her interest, or
whether her request was based on accurate information. , She
was given reasons why the usual practice was not to treat as
she was requesting ; malpractice insurance, risk of
disfigur ing and the availabil ity of special ists who are
better equipped and more exper ienced.

She was not told why

her case was treated d i f ferently, though she might
reasonably have concluded that it was due to her request.
As the treatment developed, it became more inconvenient for
both Vicki and the physician. · The physicians clearly knew
that Vicki wanted treatment by them for financial reasons.
They d i d not question the accuracy of her j udgment, though
they explained their hesitancy in terms of professional
liablili ty .

They treated her in a . manner which she might

not have chosen if she were better informed.

Vick i d i d not

compla in or ask for clar i fication when the mole removals
were clearly going to be more inconvenient than she had
thought a�d the resident had initially indicated.
In all three treatments, the women were treated
w ithout reasons given as to why the treatments were
preferred by the physicians.

The treatments were product ive

of inconvenience and costs for the women.

The women did not

take initiative to request such informat ion or to suggest
alternatives.

The fact that the women came with compla ints
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wh ich were treated in a medically adequate manner, together
w ith the interact ional observat ion that they d i d not · express
hesitancy to follow the treatment, may be taken to imply
consent.

The absence of information about the treatment

decision and alternatives is a good reason to question
whether the consent was informed.

Another · approach would be

to argue that the consent to th is sort of routi ne treatment
is consent to med ical paternalism for routine treatments of
minor a i lments. Rather than

mov ing

i nto

th is normative

analysis at th is point, I w ill ask two d ifferent questions
in continuation of the social analysis:
1. Why d i d the women passively accept the
treatment decisions?
2.

How

d i d the physicians make the treatment

dec isions without inquir ing into the patients ' preferences?

�� Docto�tient Relationshi� .
Note that as th is social analysi s progresses, the
que stions and is sue s under cons ideration are more a bstract
or general.

The issues of what patients were told and how

they were treated are answered w ith d irect reference to the
content of the interact ions.

Though th is part of the ,

analysis takes a particular perspective on the interaction
in the sense of being d irected by the type of questi ons
asked and the analytic goals, the questions are raised by an
attempt to understand the communication and action in the
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interact ion. Considerat ion of the consequences of the
treatments and their alternat ives is a l ittle f urther
removed from the interact ion.

Though these discuss ions are

directed by the informat ion gleaned from the interact ion,
the consequences and alternat ives are drawn from a broader
understanding of the pat ients ' and physicians ' soc ial worl d
wh ich w e may reasonably ascr i be t o the interact i oq� l context
as presupposed.
Our abi l ity to understand the interact ions and the
consequences and alternat ives to the treatments is an
impl icit understanding of the " groundi ng " of these isolated
interact ions in the larger social world of the part icipants,
wh ich we share.

The analysis is an expl icit discussion of

th is impl icit understanding.

But i t is also an exp l icit

discussion of elements of our l ived- in social world.

The se

elements are, as was discussed in Chapter I I , part of our
methodology.

Expl icit discussion and conceptual ization of

these elements gives them a sense of concreteness that they
do not have in our communicationa l act iv ities.

The

descr iption of how the presupposit ions play a role i n the
interactions make them sound l ike necessary and suf f icient
condit ions or causal explanat ions.
necessity intended in th is analysis.

But there is not any
Rather, th is analysis

is a depict ion of a shared social world ; more a l iterary
sociological than a scienti f ic�normological account.

As

such, it can of course be quest ioned, but the chal lenger
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m ust prov ide an al ternat ive acco unt of tne interact i on wh ich
si t uates the behav i or in

the larger social world wh ich we

share w i th the pat ients and phys ician�.
Th is is not a d i f ferent sense from Glaser ' s (Glaser
and S trauss � 196 7 ) use of " grounded " in " grounded theory. "
Glaser uses the term t o refer t o the use of background
readings in the relevant soc i o l ogical l i terat ure as
preparat i on f or observat i on.
Chapter II

As was br ief ly ment i oned in

(page 7 6) , the issues and concept ualizat i ons

ga ined from th is fam i l iar i ty w i th the l i terat ure serve as
" sensi t iz ing concepts " wh ich can be checked and conf irmed or
ref lected as the observer gathers data and engages in
analysis o f the inf ormat i on.

Th is l i terat ure prov ides

character izat i ons of social pat terns and mor� abstract
theories of social struct ures and behav i ors.

As such they

are more or less acc urate (or inaccurate) depict i ons o f what
is observed in the interact i ons.

They are open t o rej ect i on

or mod i f icat i on t o increase the ir abi l i ty t o show h ow the
concrete interact i onal behav i or ref lects and val idates the
social norms , inst i tu t i ons and social struct ure of society.
These lat ter ent i t ies are not " f o und " i n th e social w orld ,
but are descript i ons o f h ow layers of habits , pract ices and
communicat i on
considerat i on.

shape the concrete i nteract i ons under
The only "real i ty " wh ich these descript i ons

have is that of being represented in the concrete
interact i ons between members o f the social world.
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They do

not "exist" independent of these man i festat ions.

As

character i zations they are expressions of how people have
come to interact.

As general i zat ions or theories, they

typi fy rather than present determ i nistic causal p ictures.
Al l three interact ions are communicat ions between
pat ients and physicians in a particular setting.

They have

been chosen as typ i f icat ions of a pattern of behav iour
observed in the interact ions recorded.

The f irst focus of

the analysis was to descri be the patients ' lack of input
into the decision-making process.

Discuss ion of the

alternat ive treatments and the consequences of each were to
establ ish that the context is one with in wh ich it is
adv isable for the pat ients to be involved in the decisions
. and to ask quest ions in order to decide on the most
ef fect ive and pract ical treatment.

The fol low ing discuss ion

attempts to account for the lack of participation of the
pat ients.

These are of interest because the interact ions

are be ing exam ined for the normat ive purpo�e of evaluating
the qual ity of the consent i n such rout i ne care.
The interact ions have been typi f ied as doctor
pat ient communicat ion.

Th is is recogn ition o f the physica l

locat ion o f the interact ion in a medica l sett ing and of the
"goal " of the exchange as the dispensi ng of medica l care .
The analysis

now focuses on descri bing the social context

in a manner that makes understandable
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the women ' s passive

acceptance of the treatment decisions and the particular
treatments which the physicians chose.
The women asked no questions and the physicians did
not seem to think this strange.

This is a typical pattern

in recordings of physician-patient interactions.

Fisher

(1979 , 1982 , 1983 , 1986) has characterized the social
presupposition ·behind this pattern as a reciprocal belief
that "doctor knows best and is acting in the patient ' s best
interest. "

Others have suggested that the passive

ac ceptance of this authority of the ��dical role is
descriptive of most physician-patient encounters (S cully ,
1980; Fisher , 1979 , 1982 , 1983 , 1986; Todd , 1982 , 1983;
Fisher and Todd , 1983; Shuy , 1983; Ehrenreich and English ,
197 8; Rothman , 1982; Starr , 1982; Waitzkin , 1983) �

These

various accounts are based on empirical , historical and
theoretical evidence.
It is fruitful to unpack what is implicit in
Fisher • s · characterization.

"Doctor knows best" implies an

asymmetry of know ledge , with the physician knowing much more
about heal th care , treatments and consequences.

Physicians

are trained for years an� patients are quite aware of that
fact.

There has also been a significant increase in the

ef fectiveness of medical treatment over the last century ,
which has added to the cultural authority of the medical
profession (Starr , 1982 :

3-21).

The trust implied in the

second part of the characterization "
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and is acting in

the patient ' s best interest" shows the widespread acceptance
of this knowledge and the trust that patients have come
have

in

the

medical

care

dispensed

by

to

physicians in

medical institutions {cf., Friedson, 1970 b).

I t may also be

that the assumption includes the expectation that the
physician will also take care of the patient ' s general
health by providing medically adequate care (Fisher and
Groce, forthcoming).

This is why it makes sense to speak of ·

"agendas" which depict why the patient really came to the
clinic.

If, for example, we heard Maria complaining that

the physician did not give her information on the abortion
or birth control, her disappointment would be
understandable.

Physicians are expected to address all

health issues that are mentioned in the interview.
The patients in the three interactions are not told
the reasons for the physicians ' choice of treatment.

They

do not seem to take exception to this lack of explanation.
If they are seen to operate from within a context which
presupposes the view that doctor knows best and is acting in
their interest, this becomes quite reasonable.

The

physicians do not expect otherwise, and this is also
reasonable from the perspective of the reciprocal assumption
{ Fisher), or presupposition-ascription (Coulter, 1979).
the patients recognize personal inconvenience, they may
assume that the treatment suggested simply inevitably
entails such inconvenience for medical reasons or be
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If

unw i l l ing. to break w ith the practice of m inimiz ing demands
on physicians ' time.

Not knowing the reasons for, or

alternatives to, the treatment chosen, they may assume that
there must . be good medical reasons.

I t is the

presupposit ion of physicians • expertise and author ity wh ich
makes such an assumption reasonable.

If

pat ients assume

that the particular treatment plan is unambi guously in the ir
med ical interest, then there is l ittle reason for them to
consi der whether there are less inconvenient or more
ef fective treatments.

Nor is there any reason to assume

that otner factors besides their interests �ight influence
the physician ' s choice of treatment.

The patient simply

does not have .the knowledge necessary to ask questions about
ai ternatives and consequences of treatments (Fr iedson,
1970a).
Starr ( 1982) has di scussed in great deta i l the
development of the cultural authority of the med ical
profession in Ameri ca (cf., Stevens, 1971).

Starr describes

how th is author i ty is social in that physicians regulate
behav ior through med ical def initions wh ich only they have
the "expertise" to make, classi fying the problem as one
wh ich is appropr iately treated under the med ical model.
But prior to making any recommendations, physicians
have to def ine and evaluate the ir patients '
condi t ion. Patients consult physicians not just
for adv ice, but f irst of all to f ind out whether
they are "really" sick and what the ir symptoms
mean. "What have I got, doc?" they ask. " I s it
serious?" Cultural author ity, in th is context, is
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antecedent to ac tion. The ·a uthority to interpret
signs and symptoms, t o diagnose heal th or il lness,
to name diseases � and to of fer prognoses is the
f oundation of any social authority the physician
can assume. By shaping the patients ' understanding
o f their own experience, physicians create the
�onditi6ns under which their advice seems
appropriate. ( Starr, 1 9 82: 14)
The patients sough t medical advice in a cul ture where the
cultural author i ty of the medical prof ession is s�rong.
They passively ac cepted the treatments prescribed within the
traditional medical set ting where the physicians ' cultural
authority is strongest.

The treatments were f or problems

which the physicians label led f or the patients, or confirmed
that they were appropriate problems f or medical care .
Sheila is t o l d "you may have a lit t le strept
throat" and that the physician is going t o start her on
antibiotics bef ore read ing the strept screen.

If the screen

is negative, she "won ' t have to take a ful l c ourse of
antibiot i cs but . . • [if ] it ' s strept wel l we ' l l have you
go ahead and take a c ourse."

Sheila has c ome to the

physician with a sore throat and he has defined it as
potential strept infec tion.

The discussion is ambiguous

enough that Sheila may not realize from it that the
antibiotic ' s ef fec tiveness is expected t o be conditional
upon her having this infec tion, which can only be determined
through the cul ture.

Nevertheless, there does seem to be

enough evidence present t o make it reasonable t o wonder why
she did not ask if the purchase o f pencil lin coul d wait
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unt i l the screen was read.

Momen ts later, when the

physician wr ites two prescript ions to be f i lled at differen t
t imes if necessary, Shei la st i ll does not ask why t h is i s
necessary or i f there is an�ther more conven ien t procedure.
To most of us, th is may not seem except ional.

Both Sheila's

lack of concern and our acceptance of i t as " normal" is
reasonable in l ight of the cultural author i ty of the
physician and the reciprocal assumpt ion that physicians are
best placed to deci de our medical i nterests.

Or,

alternat ively , we may consider such concerns too triv ial to
· raise , based on the concept ion of the physician as be i ng
" too busy. "
Mar ia ' s physician enters the examinat ion room w i th
pa i n medicat ion in hand, asks if she w i ll get pai d for t ime
off, and expresses doubt over her abort ion; "Well, I ' m real
hesi tant about medi cat ion. • . .

You ' re not sure , even

though , you k now, you th ink you may wan t to have an
abort ion. "

Mar ia conf irms that she wi ll def i n i tely pursue

an abort ion, but does not ask why her abort ion is relevant
to t he contra indicat ion of the pa in medication, or if there
are any other medi cat ions that would not be �ontra i ndi cated.
The assumpt ion that the physician i s look ing after b.ei:
medical concerns makes t h i s a reasonable omission.

Were her

employer lay ing her off after expressi ng doubt about her
abort ion, she m igh t . be more argumentative.

The cultural

author i ty of the physician together wit h the assumpt ion of
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taking care of her medical interests descr i bes a social
context in wh ich th is feature of the interact ion is not
except ional.
Vicki. i s told that the physi cian can remove half a

dozen moles at one t ime.

She is also told that he might do

a less conspicuous one first to make sure they are both
comfortable w i th h is performance.

But she does not ask any

quest ions when he prepares to remove t he mole on her face,
nor when he sends the nurse to look for better equipment.
When he comple�es the · removal of the facial · mole and
expresses a preference to do the rest later , Vicki asks "Why
is that?"

He says that tney have already gone over t ime and

she simply accepts that as a reason.

We might ask what t ime

l im i ts he was referring to or why he does not honor h is
cla im earl ier that he could do six at a t ime.
however, does not ask.

Vicki ,

She cont inues in the apparent trust

that she had on enter ing the cl inic and ma inta ined even w i th ·
the resident ' s and staff physician ' s expressions - of
hesitancy to remove her facial mole.

Wh ile i t may appear

that Vicki negot iated for her treatment, the very
willingness to trust a family pract ice resi dent , or
physician , to do the removal reflects once again the
cultural author i ty and pat ient ' s fa i th in the good will and
expert ise of the physician.
All three pat ients have not sought clar ificat i on of
reasons or alternat ives to treatment decisions wh ich
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presented them with iome degree of inconvenience and
expense.

This common interactional pattern was seen

throughout many of the recorded interactions.

I t is a

reasonable omission within a social context of the cult ural
authority of the physician and the shared assumption that
the phy sician is well qualified to take care of the
. patient ' s medical interests.

Earlier consideration of the

alternative treatments cast some doubt on whether the
physicians in fact selected the treatment which most
convenient ly or practically served patients • interests.

It

may even be true that the best medical care, as opposed to
adequate medical care, may not have been provided.

Having

briefly characterized the social context which makes
reasonable the patients ' behavior, we now turn to consider
the social context within which the physicians made their
treatment decisions.
analysis intended.

Once again, there is not any causal
Rather the description of social factors

present in medical practice and the larger social context
wil l be explored to see if they make more reasonable the
treatment decisions.

The S.Qtili_context of Medical Practice
Starting at the interactional level of analysis,
there are several factors which make reasonable the
physicians ' treatment decisions.

Most obviously, the

patient ' s presenting complaints and relevant medical factors
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influence physicians ' treatment decisions.

All three

patients received medical dare that probably fit well within
community s tandards and which they would stand a good chance
of receiving if they went to another medical office, or t o a
different phy sician.

Sheila presented with a sore throat

and apparent ly had clinical signs of s trept infection.
Antibiotics would be effective for treating s trept, so the
physician set out to verify - whether or not it was a s t rept
infection and treated Sheila in manner that would most
likely be effective if it was.
was allergic to penicillin.

He also asked Sheila if she .

Presumably he would have

dispensed a different antibiotic is she had turned out to be
allergic to the penicillin.
Maria ' s leg pain and pregnancy were among the
formative interactional factors which shaped the treatment
The phy sician first had the leg x-rayed to check

decision.

for a fracture.

He then deliberated over dispensing a

sample pain medication, deciding against it because Maria
was pregnant.

He checked to see if she would be paid sick

leave, likely either to see if he should write a let ter to
her employer and/or as part of his deliberations over the
medication.
Vic ki requested that the phy sician remove her

moles, including the facial mole.
was removal of the facial mole.
Vicki ' s request.

The phy sician ' s treatment
Clearly he was guided by

He checked to see if she would rather go
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to a specialist, accepting her econom ic reason for settling
for h is treatment.

After explaining that he could do a mole

removal from " another locat ion" besides Vicki' s face, Vicki
says, "But i t ' s like (unintelligible) I would not be ashamed
to have a scar."

The resident removes Vicki' s facial mole.

It seem reasonable to assume that Vicke ' s assurance had some
affect on th is decision.
So there are interactional factors wh ich help to
produce the treatment outcomes.

Predominant are the

presenting complaints, allergies and conditions wh ich are
contra indications for particular treatments.

Of course, the

pat ients have already conceptualized their problems as
medical problems and present themselves to the physicians to
be treated.

Their complaints are ones wh ich are seen as

routine medical problems with in the larger social context.
It would be unusual for any of them to go to a n�n-medicai
person for treatment of these problems.

Thus the

interact ional influence of the presenti ng complai nts and
contra indicating conditions are def ined as legitimate
medical complaints prior to the patients ' presenting to the
clinic.

Even th is interactional factor reflects a broader

cultural acceptance of the authority of the medical
profession over these aspects of peoples ' lives.
These interactional factors do not explain, or even
make reasonable the particular choice that the physicians
made.

Since they did not consult with the patients about
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their preferences, and the alternatives are reasonable,
there may be other factors wh ich make the behavior more
understandable.

Th is part icular fam ily pract i ce uni t

contains social or med ical factors wh i ch influence the
treatment deci sions.

For example, the part icular drug that

the physician consi dered d ispensing to Mar ia may have been
influenced by the availabil i ty of samples i n the ql inic.
That

Perhaps th i s was the only ava ilable pa in med i ca t ion.

m igh t make it more reasonable that he would consi der giv ing
a drug wh ich he shortly thereafter dec i des i s
contraind icated.
Vick i 1 s med ical r i sks are i ncreased by the shortage
of medical tools for the mole removal.

Th is is a factor

wh ich does not become apparent unt il the resi dent has
already started the removal.

I t migh t typi cally d i ctate

aga inst the removal unt il the proper equipment is avai lable.
In th is case, however, the late d iscovery of the fact does
not seem to influence the decision to treat, though i t
affects · the r isks entailed.
Sheila ' s case does not seem to have any influences
unique to t h is part i cular set t ing.

Her treatment does not

involve any free samples nor any unique equipment.

She does

have a throat culture done, but there i s good reason to
th ink that th is would have been the case regardless of the
med ical set t ing; even if she needed to go to an independent
laboratory.

As a mat ter of fact,
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suspected strept infected

throats are fairly routinely treated with a screen and
immediate initiation of antibiotics (Lasagna, 1980 : 2 3 3 ).
This pattern of medical practice may wel l have inf luenced
the treatment deci sion in Sheila ' s case.

But why woul d th i s

routine practice form when there is controversy over the use
of ant i b iotics before they are known to be needed ?

This

question sh i fts the focus of our di scus sion to the formation
of profess ional practices and the inf luences other social
contextual factor s m ight have on them.
Are there any advantages to the chosen treatment
options for the phy s icians ?

Therapeutic medical

interactions are typical ly presented as free from conf l ict
w ith patients' intere sts:

What is in

patient s ' interest i s

in the phy sician ' s, since the phy sician ' s reputation and the
patient ' s continued trus t in the physician are both sa i d to
depend on the ef fectivenes s of the treatment.

The

phy sician ' s good wil l is a l so sometimes used to buttres s
th i s pos ition.

The phy sician has trained long years to be

able to treat the patient and spends most of hi s waking
hours doing just thi s.

There seem s to be little reason for

the patients to suspect that the phy sician has anything but
patients ' interests at heart.
Somewhere between benevolence and maliciousne s s
there exists
concern.

a more realistic state of disinterested

The delivery of medical care is, among other

things, a j ob for physicians with the mundane aspects and ·
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recurring tasks of most j obs.

It is reasonable to assume

that routine treatments and procedures become automatic
responses to certain presenting complaints and cl inical
signs.

Routinization carries w ith it the advantages for the

physician of m inim iz ing the del i beration required for the
most frequently occurring rout ine compla ints.

Th is economy

of attent ion may result in the physician not noticing some
medical ly relevant . fact unique to the patient.

The

rout inization of behav ior always occurs in a complex social
context with a constei lat ion of inf luences, only one of
wh ich is concern for patients ' medical interests.

I � order

to understand the treatment decisions made by the
physicians, the content of the treatment decisions requ ire
caref ul attention.

Since a sicker patient is more di f f icult to treat,
i t seems that the therapeutic goal of preventing
compl icat ions and treat ing as soon as pos s i ble coul d not
prov i de a conf l ict of interests.

I n th is manner, it may be

argued that the immediate treatment of Shei la with
ant i b iotics served both her physician ' s and her interests.
She w i l l l ikely recover earl ier and he w i l l not have a more
di f f icult medical problem to deal w ith, such as a
spread of the infection, fever, or a more distressed
patient.

But Shei la ' � immediate . treatment may also be seen ·
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as an instance of _ a wider pro f �ssional tendency to initiate
antibiotic treatment prior to testi�g for specific
appropriateness of the drug.

The ordering of _the screen

even though treatment has begun may also be an instance of
the profession's heavy emphasis on diagnostic testing.

The

information about the prescription of antibiotics dispensed
by pharmaceutical companies and duplicated in the

.fb�cian ' s D.e.sk �f.eu�� is heavily regulated by the Food
and Drug Administration.

This literature recommends that

antibiotics only be given af ter the presence of the
particular bacteria and its sensitivity to the drug has been
verified (�hysician ' s �k R.eu�� , 197 9 : 1 874). This

precaution is designed to avoid the sort of side effects

that have been noted.
Though far from universal, there does exist a
pattern of practice within the profession which qoe s not
follow this recommendation (Lasagna, 1980) . The possibility
that Sheila might have particular obj ections to this
practice, . perhaps due to a predisposition to yeast
infections , has already been discussed.

The issue here is

not the formation of the particular treatment decision, but
of a professional practice
treatment .

which is ref l ected by Sheila ' s

There are less obvious advantages to this

pattern of prescription practice whose pursuit may not be
the goals of any particular interaction . This routine
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pract ice is formed w i thin a larger social context whose
elements aid in understanding the format ion of the pract ice.
One of the concerns regardi ng treatment w i th
ant ibiot ics is pat ient compliance. Pat ients may not fill a
prescript ion immediately, result ing in a delay in in i t iat ing
the treatment.

Further, they may cease the regimen

prematurely because they are feeling bet ter.

Dispensing the

ant ibiot ic prescript ion to be f illed immediately stands a
better chance of get t ing the pat ient onto medicat i on
If the pat ient wa its for two days, calls to see if

earlier.

the prescript ion is needed, and then f ills the prescript ion,
there is a better chance of further delay before the regimen
is begun.

Tne medical authori ty of the physician is most

obv ious and influent ial in the context of a medical
encounter, so the immediate prescr ipt i on may be more likely
to be filled w i thout delay than would be the case if i t was
cont ingent on hearing over the phone from the doctor or a
nurse that the screen was posi t ive.

This recommends the

immediate prescript ion of ant ibiot i cs, whether due to
explici t professional observat ion or a habi t formed- in
pract ice.

Note too that if the physician had given Sheila

two- and eigh t-day prescr ipt ions, that there could have been
a delay in fill ing the second prescript ion.

As i t happened,

the regimen prescri bed gives Sheila three days to f ill the
second prescript ion if the screen is posi t ive.
The medical profession has also come under public
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. cri t icism for not treat ing pat ients ' present ing complaints.
In react ion to th is cri t icism, i t is at least possi ble that
there is a pred isposi t ion to treat when in doubt and the
si de ef fects of treatment are unlikely or minor.

In th is

manner, the public have pressured the med ical profession to
treat them w i th drugs where such treatment may not be
needed, w i th ser ious risks (cf. , Silverman and Lee, 1974:
xiv).
S ilverman and Lee (1974) have wri t ten a cri t ical
assessment of the current situat ion of drug use, descri bing
the role of pharmaceut ical companies in promot ing the use of
drugs.

Notwit hstand ing the tremendous benef i ts that have

come about through pharmaceut ical research and market ing,
typically at the ini t ial expense of the pharmaceut ical
companies, the advert ising campaigns and inter-relat i ons
among med ical professional organizat ions and pharmaceut ical
companies reas�nably cast . suspicion on the ef fects such
pract ices have on pat ient care.

Much of the drug trials on

ef f icacy, proper prescribing pract i ces and dosages are
formed as a result of pharmaceut ical industry sponsored
research and promot ion.

As the struggle for patents and

control of market is fought by t he companies, the
prol i ferat ion of brand names and modi f icat i ons make i t qui te
d i f f icult for the pract icing physician to keep up w i th new
innovat ions.

Th is combines w i th other factors of medi cal

pract ice, such as severe r�strict ion of t ime for read ing, to

create a situation where the physician is dependent on the
phar maceutical companies ' literature and representatives for
inform�tion.

Combined with the industry ' s considerable

support of the profession ' s j ournals, conferences and
clinical research, such factors foster a (perhaps
inappropriate) degree of trust and dependence of the
profession on the industry. The current situation ris one of
widespread overuse of medication, not ably antimicrobials
(Silverman and Lee, 1974: 282-292).

The ability of

individual practitioners to make appropriate therapeutic
recommendations in such a confusing social context has not
gone unchallenged (U. S. DHEW Task Force on Prescription

Drugs, Final �tl, 1969 : 22).

As early as 1968, AMA

president Dwight Wilbur though t this situation serious
enough to comment that medical students should be educated
to consult pharmacologic experts rather than the advertising
of pharmaceutical manufacturers (Wilbur, 1968).
Note that such an analysis is a direct criticism of
the defense that a medical treatment is acceptable if i t is ·
in keeping with the community standard of practice.

Since

professional prescribing practices are formed in a context
which casts doubt on whether t he routines are in patients'
medical interests, this appeal carries no weigh t.
fact an appeal to misplaced authority.

It is in

The research and

actual authority behind some prescribing practices is that
of the pharmaceut ical companies.
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But it is clearly in their

interest to form pract ices which - sell their products and
establish prom ise of fut ure prof i ts.

So the rout ine

prescr ipt ion of ant ibiot ics pr ior to read i ng the screen is
not just if ied by an appeal to profession-wi de pract ice,
since the context w i thin which such pract ices are formed
contain significant conflicts of interest with that of
pat ients.

The treatment that She ila receiyed, immed iate

prescript ion of ant ibiot ics, may have been influenced by the
physician ' s concerris about medical factors.

But the

part icular responses in the form of rout ine pract i ces may
also have ind irectly been shaped by research and market ing
pract ices of those w i th major concern for such market values
as sales and capturing a market.

Thi s is a fact that

pat ients could reasonably want to know about, or perhaps
should know about.

Yet i t is not obv ious what a pat ient

could do w i th such informat ion.
This latter fact is further elaborated by
consi dering what Eliot Frei dson has descri bed as
professional dominance (Frei dson, 197 0a). Frei dson has
described the profession's abil i ty to regulate the pract ice
of i ts members as uniquely well establ i shed by the medical
profession.

Once a pract ice is well established in the

profession, the professi on's authori ty within a culture i s
strong enough t o prevent any other group from hav ing
sufficient authority to challenge the pract ice.

This

cultural authori ty has h istorically been fought for by the
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profession (Starr, 1982 ; Stevens, 1971 ) .

It also has

� deological f orce, as Howard Waitz kin (1983 ) has discussed
at length, which is derived in part from scienti fic ideology
(Waitz kin, 1983 : 140-143 ; Habermas, 1971 ) . The cultural�
authority o f the profession is based on its ability to claim
that its expertise uniquely qualifies its members to j udge
patients ' medical interests and h ow they are best served.
This is also extended to include the claim that

they ' ought

to be able to control the f orm that their practice will
take ; whether fee-f or-service, socialized, group practice,
etc. , (Freidson, 1970a :

91-1 0 0 ) .

This claim is buttressed

by the appeal to a scientific basis f or medical treatment.
Such a claim is based on the idea that scienti fic issues and
methods are objective and value-free, c onsequently above any
political or personal bias.

As Habermas has argued o f

scientific ideology that it is expansionisti c in its
definition o f problems w hich are amenable to scientific
solutions { Habermas, 1971 : 83-84 ) , so Waitzkin argues that
scientific medicine, using scientific ideology as its
legitimating device, "medicalizes " social and other
non-medical problems (Waitz kin, 1983 : 1 4 2 ) . This is a
manifestation of the cultural authority of the medical
profession which makes it quite ef fective as an enf orcer of
social norms since the pro fession is not as accountable to .
the public as are other institutions (Freidson , 1970a : 2 0 530 1 ) . The cultural authority is also the basis f or the
193

interactional asymmetry that has been discussed earlier.

In

the interaction, the cultural authority tends to prevent
patients from questioning
recommendations.

physicians' judgments and

Even those factors which are not obviously

medical are considered to be within the purveyance of
physicians ' authority.

But this medicalization of

non-medical needs is a reflection of the larger cul tural
pattern of defining more problems as solvable through
technology, . a process which serves to legitimate and
reinforce current patterns of technological . rather than
personal or political change.

In turn, this furthers the

interests of the "advantaged " in society who own and profit
from technology as wel l as from maintenance of the current
socio-economic systems.

Technological responses also

depoliticize the social difficulties of the disadvantaged.
This social-control function of the medicalization of social
distress and removal from patients' control of controversial
medical judgments is neither the design nor intent of the
medical professionals.

As Waitz kin comments:

Social control in medicine is often an unintended
process, dimly perceived by the participants in
doctor-patient encounters. With the holistic
purpose of caring for the totality of a
client ' s needs, health professionals assume
control over wide facets of social and personal
life. (Waitzkin, 1983: 142 )
So the choice to treat before reading the screen is
typical of a professional practice, but this alone d�es not
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justify, though it does help to explain, the physician's
presuming to make the decision for She ila.

The two-part

- p�escription is not in anyway med ically necessary.

It is

accepted by Sheila as part o f the med ical treatment o f her
illness w ithout challenging the inconvenience.

Th is is a

concrete instance of the extension of med ical authority to
factors of treatment wh ich are not med i cal, and a consequent.
extension of med ical authority into the patient ' s li fe
activities.
It is reasonable to assume that the resi dent's
choice of treatment for Sheila was motivated by a concern to
meet her needs.

Consi dering what those med ical rieeds were-

a sore throat w ith �he possi b ility that it is due to a
strept infection--there are several treatment regime�s that
are reasonable alternatives.

The resi dent ' s choice among

the alternatives is not strictly determined by Sheila' s
presenting compla ints nor by universal med ical practice.
The choice to treat She ila with anti b i otics prior to readi ng
the screen is a common but controversi al practice w ith in the
medical profession.

I t may well be a means of reducing the

risks that Sheila will bear due to the immediate initiation
of the treatment.

But since Sheila is not aware of the

controversy surround ing . anti biotic treatment prior to
reading the screen, th is concern over the unintended and
undesirable ef fects of the drug does not raise any
questions.

Both of these common practi ces in medi ci ne are
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formed as routines with in a context wh ich presents factors
that are e ither potential or actual conflicts with pat ients '
med ical and practical concerns.

As a reflection of routine

practices, Sheila ' s treatment has ind irectly been influenced
by these factors.
The decision was not simply a reflection of these
routine practices.

I t was a decision to combine two

alternatives ; immed iate treatment and avoi dance of
unnecessary treatment.

In case the strept screen is

negative, · the resi dent has d i v i ded Sheila' s prescr iption
into two five day prescriptions, sav ing her the expense of
the second one if the screen is negative.
have the med ical benefit of assuring

Th is may also

that Sheila calls to

check _ the screen before taking the full ten days ' worth.

As

such, th is represents a d irect decision to regulate a non
medical aspect of Sheila' s l ife ; time and money.

But th i s

i s an expected_ consequence of med ical t reatment, as i s
illustrated by the fact that Sheila does not ask for
explanation of the
alternatives.

odd prescription's rationale, or for

The choices involved in the treatment

decision include . the exposure of Sheila to the s i de effects
of antibi ot ic treatment whose need i s yet to be established,
the running of the strept screen to verify need, the
possi ble _saving · of money for the second half of the

prescr iption and the inconvenience of an extra trip if the
second half is needed.·

Sheila accepts the treatment wh i ch
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includes these r isks, benef i ts and inconveniences wi thout
comment (other than seeking clarificat ion of the confusing
d irect ions } .

At no point i s consent expl ici t ly sought, nor

are these consequences of treatment, or their alternat ives,
ever discussed, alt�ough She i la may refuse treatment by not
fi l l ing the prescr ipt ion or taking the p i l ls .
. r

I t also appears that there i s no appirent confl ict
of interests for Mar ia and her physician .

The physician' s

cont inued reputat ion and accumulat i on of pat ients depends on
his t reat ing his pat ients to their sat isfact ion .

· If Mar ia

is dissat isfied w i th her treatment by him, she coul d go to
another physician for this or future problems .

Of course,

i t woul d only make sense for Mar ia to go to the extra
inconvenience and possi ble expense of get t ing another
opinion on her leg pain if she thinks that she i s l ikely to
get more sat isfactory treatment .
As has been d i scussed, i t may wel l be the case that
Mar ia woul d have received pain rel ief med icat ion from
another physician .

And she may not be pleased that she can

only get whatever rel ief from her pain t hat acetam inophen
offers .

The resi dent' s rel igious conv i ct i ons seem to be a

key factor in the treatment decision .

The lack of

expressi on of these conv ict ions which d irect Maria's
treatment, Maria' s unquest ion ing acceptance of his
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withholding of the medication, and the failure of the
medical context to guarantee Maria the care she desires and
avoid conf licts of value are al l factors which deserve
attention .
There are interactional cues as to why the
interaction does not serve Maria' s interests nor that of her
physician (i. e . # assuring the physician of her f uture return
and promoting his reputation as a competent physician) .
· These cues wil l lead to a consideration of the particular
institutional context.
P.
D.
P.

Note the close of the interview:

Same to you . I' l l come back whenever I need
to see a doctor cause I ' l l never have a doctor
here .
Hopeful ly 24-year-old ladies don' t need many
doctors �
Yeah ; okay . Thanks a lot, bye bye .
What is not apparent from the interactional script

as presented earlier is the tone of the interaction .

The

resident, and a medical student accompanying him, were
clearly quite entertained by this woman who was so dif ferent
from most they encountered in this set ting.

The detail with

which they pursued how she injured her leg was not required
for medical diagnosis or t reatment .

When Maria comments

that if she does not have a period she should "start praying
hard and heavy " this conservative protestant physician
responds by suggesting that she could also go to Mass "two
or three times a day . "

This is a clear recognition of the

cul tural dif ference between himself and the patient.
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The

above quoted close of the interv iew suggests that he is not
anxious to deal w i th Maria aga in.

All of t h is suggests that

the physician is not influenced by the consi derat i on that
for .further income and reputat ion he needs to culture a
certain relat ionsh ip wi th the pat ient.
Th is "at t i tude of wi th drawal, " if i t can be so
characterized, ·is subtly expressed throughout the interv iew.
The only t ime that the resi dent suggests that Mar ia ought to
get back in touch w i th h im is if the pain in the leg
persists.

When talking about the pregnancy test, he

suggests that she should "come back in" w i th no personal
reference (i. e. ,

rather than

"come back to see me " } .

When

Maria had asked about abort ions, he simply denied knowledge
of the ava ilable places, and d i d not offer to look further
into th is aspect of her med ical concern.

Despi te h is easy

and casual style, i t seems that the physician is
uncomfortable w i th Mar ia.
El iot Frei dson has d iscussed how the medical
profession has gained control over the condi t ions of the ir
pract ice, as well as over the content.

He has ind icated

that the organi zat ion of a med i cal pract i ce ·influences t he
type of med ical care that the pat ients receive.

Fee-for

serv ice organ izat ions tend to be more pat ient or iented,
wh ile .group pract ices tend to be more colleague oriented
( Frei dson, 1970b} .

The university fam i ly pract ice uni t is

organized to simulate the group pract ice form of
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organization (cf., ethnographic description in Chapter I I I ).
Maria ' s physician is salaried and his income would not be
affected by her failure to return to him for future medical
care.

Combined with Maria ' s request for abortion

information and cultural dif ferences which may set the
physician ill at ease, it is not hard to understand why he
might feel this way.
So the interactional cues give reason to construe
the resident as taki�g full responsibility for treating
Maria ' s leg, but less or no responsibility for her pregnancy
and desire for an abortion.

His knowledge of Maria ' s

possible pregnancy influences his treatment decision for her
pain relief.

Though it is belied by the subtle

interactional cues, an apparent concern for Maria ' s general
health ("the medication I want to use, it ' s not recommended
during pregnancy • • • • ") combines with the physician ' s
cultural authority to give a superficial rationale for his
rej ection of the pain medication for medical reasons.
Without explicit expression of his religious convictions, or
an awareness of the discomfort he has with Maria ' s previous
abortions and general lifestyle, Maria has no reason to
question his treatment decision.

The organization of the

setting has failed to establish an order within which
patient and physician concerns are communicated to result in
mutually accepted treatment.
The cultural authority of the medical profession
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has already been discussed in connection with Sheila' s case.
In · Maria ' s case this cultural authority helps to explain why
the physician' s convictions are able to influence the
treatment decision without ever becoming an explicit part of
the interaction.

The cultural authority and the scientific

ideology upon which medicine has established its author ity
make reasonable the presupposition that the physician is
withholding the pain medication for medical reasons-
scientifically based concerns for Maria' s health.

Maria

does not expect an education in scientific medicine from her
physician, just appropriate care.

This presupposition of

scientific appropriateness enables the physician to decide
how to treat Maria, complete with moral judgment, affecting
her everyday life in a manner that is not necessary and
protecting the fetus which Maria intends to abort.

This

authority extends to controlling access to the pain
medication, the . x-ray and abortion.

As a member of the

medical profession, and particularly as a family
practitioner, these medical concerns are controlled by the
physician.

His ordering the x-ray was a necessary condition

of Maria receiving the x-ray and the subsequent assurance
that her leg was not fractured.

His denial of the pain

medication leaves her with only the weaker over-the-counter
medication.

His denial of knowledge as to where or how to

procure an abortion leaves Maria with the need to search for
further medical advice.
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The physician ' s unintended but effective role as an
agent of social control is now obvious.

The physician is

able to prevent Maria's threatening the fetus ' health by
denying her access to the medication, and less effectively
by denying knowledge of how to get an abortion.

Thus the

influence of this medical encounter extends to some degree
of control over Maria's sexuality, work and leisure.

The

only concern that the physician explicitly raises over not
treating Maria's pain is over her ability to continue to
work.

This may be intended by him to be a concern over her

loss of income, but it is also a manifestation of the
tendency to define health in terms o� ability to be
productively employed (Waitzkin, 1983: 141-142, 149).

That

this concern is the only one which appears to qualify the
physician's protection of the fetus seems to be an
indication of either the importance he at taches to it or his
acceptance of a work-per�ormance oriented definition of
health and illness (cf. , Waitzkin, 1983: 141-145, 147161 � E. Brown, 1979: 112-134).
The physician did not offer a prescription drug
which would not threaten the health of t he fetus.

Given his

concern over the _fetus and Maria ' s ability to continue t o
work, it seems reasonable t hat he would consider t his
alternative.

There are at least a couple of factors which

might have influenced this ommission, since they are common
to the organization of medical practice within capitalist
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societies.

The first is that there may . not have been any

other appropriate pain medications available in the unit as
free samples.

The family practice unit , as in

most clinics

and medical offices , : are sto�ked with samples that
pharmaceutical representatives leave in an effort to get the
practitioners to try new drugs or to establish a habit of
using their drug over their competitors.

The drug choice
.

i'

then is not simply a choice of effective treatment , but also
a reflection of what is available due to the generosity and
profit motives of pharmaceutical . companies and their agents
(cf. ,

Silverman and Lee , 1974: 4 8 - 8 4 ) .

So the choice of

drug for Maria may have been influenced by the choices of
the pharmaceutical companies and what happened to be left in
the unit ' s pharmacy.
As was the case for Sheila , there is also indirect
influence.

The physician could have prescribed · a drug for

pain relief that would not have presented a threat to the
fetus.

Maria may well have been willing to spend money for

relief of her leg pain.

In fact there might be a riet gain

if she spends money on a prescription that allows her to
wor k, rather than having to take time off. wor k until the

pain eases.

If the resident simply did not think .of this

alternative , then it seems that Maria received less than
optimum care.

That she did not ask for it may be evidence

that she assumed that if there was an option , he would have
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thought of it.

But there may be further contextual evidence

which h�lps explain this event.
First, Maria has asked for an abortion where she
will not have to pay _ prior to receiving the service.

She

works as a cook at a truck stop where she will not be paid
sick time.

The resident may perceive Maria' a economic

status as one which is quite precarious.

Perhaps he

initially brought the medication in as an effort to save
Maria the expense of a prescription.

It may even be that he

considered setting aside his concern for the fetus, thoug�
he did not in fact do so.

Yet the economic factor is not

explicitly discussed in the interaction.

Consequently ,

Maria ' s financial status, if it influences his decision,
serves to limit her treatment options without ever being
communicated to her or allowing her to express her opinion.
That this is unchallenged by Maria is partially explained by ·
cultural authority, including control of access to

prescription drugs.

If Maria had been a wealthier client,

it may be that she would have received a prescription for
pain relief.
This practice may be an instance of the pattern
noted by many critical medical sociologists. · conrad �nd
Kern ( 198 1) argue that the poor need more medical attention
and have less access to it that do higher socio-economic
classes whose need is less.

In the analysis of a doctor

patient interview, Waitzkin has discussed how
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physicians

may use their 9iscretion regarding whether and how financial
concerns may af fect treatment, and thi s
in turn may af fect

patients ' leisure and work activit ie s

{Waitzkin, 1983 : 16 3 ) .

These interactional patterns ref lect

what has been characterized as a "two-cla s s system"

of

health care--one for the poor �nd one for the wealthier
(Waitzkin and Waterman, 197 4 : 66 -6 7 ) ; Ehrenreich and
Ehren;eich, 197 0 ; Fisher, 1 � 79, Navarro, 197 3 ) .

While some

analy st s are critical primarily of the organization of the
health care delivery sy stem (Waitzkin and Waterman, 1974 ;
Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, · 197 0 ; Navarro, . 197 3 ) , others
include the interactional element in their critique.

So the

institutional context (Fi sher, 1979, 1983 ; Cicourel, 1983 ;
Robil lard, White and Maretzki, 1983 ) combines with the
cultural authority of the phy sician to make more
understandable th� resident ' s behaviour and Maria'a
acceptance .

Through the probably wel l -meaning actions of a

resident trying �o be sensitive to a patient' s financial
status, the two-cla s s sy stem of health care i s ref lected .
Rather that a sking if Maria would pref er a sample, a
prescription, or to take less expensive analgesic, the
phy sician simply acts in a manner that decides the is sue in
Maria' s behal f without her even being aware that there was
any option .
Second, Maria is a woman w hose pain may be
interpreted as being les s serious than it i s .
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There is some

con troversy over the actual extent of sexist practices in
the delivery of medical care (Verbrugge and Steiner, 198 1;
Mccranie, Horowitz and Martin, 197 8; Verbrugge, 19 80;
Cooperstock, 197 8).

Some hold that physicians do have

presumptions about women patients which affects their health
care (Armitage, Schneiderman and - Bass, 1979; Wallen,
Waitz kin and Stoekle, 1979; Milliren, 197 7).

Others

maintain that the sex roles and at titudes are either
irrelevan t (Verbrugge, 1980; Mccranie, Horowit z and Martin,
197 8) or insufficient factors to explain differences in
diagnosis and treatment of illness (Bernstein and Kane,
19 8 1; Cooperstock, 197 8; Verbrugge and Steiner, 198 1).
Nevertheless, there is some indication of a pat tern of
differential treatment of women due to conceptions of their
"proper " role and of their responses to pain and emotional
problems (cf. , Waitz kin, 19 83: 161; Fisher, · 1979, 1983; Fee,
1973).

Such accounts are supported by discussions of the

literature used to train physicians (Paulshock, 1976;
Scully, 1980; Scully and Bart, 1973).

Feminist accounts on

a more theoretical and historical level also make such
claims (Chesler, 197 2; Daly, 197 8; Gordon, 19 7 4 : 1-91;
Fisher, 1979; Fisher and Todd, 19 83: 9-1 1 ; Barker-Benfield,
1976; Henley and Thorn, 197 5; Ehrenrei6h and English, 191 8).
Since it seems from the interaction that the one thing that
almost overruled the physician ' s concern for fetal health
was Maria's ability to work, which apparently was not
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sufficient reason, it is at least plausible to think that
she migh t have been trea ted with the sample drug if she were
a man.

Of course, if she were a man, she would not be

pregn,ant and so tha t could not be considered a
contraindication for the medica tion.

But she is neither

given the choice of protecting the fet us or receiving the
pain medica tion nor is it an explicit element of the
interaction tha t she might be over-reacting to t he pain.
Tha t this may be an influence though not expressed in the
interview is feasible if we consider the educa tion of
physicians as described by those who critically �nalyze the
. overt and covert messages about women (Scully and Bart,
1973; Scully, 198 0).

As discussed in Chapter I I, many of

the ascribable-presuppositions of our actions are learned
not as explicit beliefs or propositions, but ra ther as
methodological assumptions.

As any of the factors which

form the larger context within which these interactions
occur, these posited assumptions only arise as part of an
analysis of routine behavior.
A

third factor may help explain the withholding of

pain medication, whether in t he form of a sample or a
prescription.

To a �onservatively religious physician in

the culture within which the family pra ctice unit is found,
Maria presents as a very liberal and perhaps promiscuous
woman.

The hi�tory of three abortions

and a miscarriage,

apparent non- or misuse of contraception resulting in yet
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another pregnancy, living with her boyfriend, corning from
California and driving a motorcycle (as opposed to being a
passenger)

combine to make Maria an oddity in this

physician' s experience.

It is possible that the physician

is concerned to keep from putting Maria into the position of
being able to abuse the pain medication.

This might serve

to reinforce his conviction about protecting the fetus ; or
may simply affect his judgement as to whether to prescribe
medication.

All of the literature cited to this point

supports the contention that social criteria are used in the
dispensing of medical care (cf. , Fisher, 1979, 1983 ; Todd,
1983 ; Fisher and Todd, 1983: 9-1 1 ; Ehrenreich and English,
1978).

Once again, the implicit nature of the medical

decision and the cultural authority of the physician prevent
any explicit mention of these factors which Maria might then
question, or seek alternative help.

Vicki
Vicki ' s physician, despite expressed hesitancy, the

usual referral practices , a suggestion to remove a bodily

mole first, insufficient time to complete the job and a lack
of " desirable " tools, follows her request and removes her
facial mole.

There are a variety of contextual factors

which make this action more reasonable.

The hesitancy and

the practice of referral are similar in that they are
concretely expressed in the interaction and always occur
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accompanied by rea s s u rance of the resident ' s ability to
pe r f o rm.

Whereas r o utine practice s which f o rm part of

Sheila ' s t reatment were une xpressed and yet in fluential,
they are expres sed and non-di rective in Vicki's .
In te ractionally, both o f. these patter n s

may be

manifestation s o f communication patte r n s which
sociolinguistic studies have noted in medical interview
s
,··
(Sh uy, 1983 ; Fisher and Gr oce, f orthcoming ; Fishe r, 1983 ) .
But s uch interview s are str uctu red in a manner which serves
pa rticular f unction s (Fisher, 1979, 1983 ; Fisher and Todd,
1983, 1986 ) .

Caref ul examinatiqn o f the o r ganization o f the

setting and the pr o fes sion, as well as the histo ry of it s
development, reveals s ome o f the social facto r s which help
to direct the str uctu ring o f the interaction and the
f unction which this st r uctu ring serves .
The fir st expres sion o f hesitancy and refer ral
practice i s intertwined with rea s s u rance o f the resident ' s
ability � o per fo rm :
D•

• • • Well, the pr oblem is that, ah, on ah,
young attractive females I don't u s ually take
them o f f the face . But I can do it and
pr obably every thing will go well, but tho se
are best done by either a dermatologi st o r a
plastic s urgeon . But I ' ll be glad to do it .
We can do one in another location and see how
it goes, and if y o u feel com f o rtable with it
and I feel comf o rtable with it we ' ll do the
one oi y o u r f o rehead .

Note the patte� n o f " No, ye�, n o, yes, maybe . "
n ot inte r r upted this piece o f disco u r se .
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Vicki has

It is as if the

resi dent is str uggl ing w ith h i s lack o f conf idence an d
desi re to remove the mole f or V i c k i. Then he str uggles w ith
the pract i ce of refer ral an d h is desi re to do the su rgery.
F i nal ly, he comes up w ith a compr om ise. The reasons f o r
refer ral an d the resi dent's hesitancy is techn i cal
exper t ise ; but, at n o po i nt does th is enter expl i c itly into
the d iscussi on.

As noted by Wa itz k i n (1 983 : 138-1 5 9, th is

avo i dance o f pr ov i d ing techn i cal i n fo r mati on af f i rms med i cal
auth o r ity an d contr o l o f techn i cal abi l ity.

Th i s prevents

the patient f r om actively pa r t i c ipati ng i n the del i be ration
over who is i n fact best o r adequately prepared to do the
pr ocedure, inc reasing the asymmetry of the inte ract i on and
asserting med ical auth o r ity, wh i ch i s based on what has been .
cal led med i cal i deol ogy (Wa itzk i n, 1 983, 1 5 7-1 5 9 ) .

As

Freidson (1 9 7 0 b ) has noted, the o rgan izati on o f the pract i ce
o f med i c i ne has a considerable ef fect on patient ca re .

In

h is case, the pr ofess i on ' s con cen w ith issues of how to
divide pr ofessional care, th us income and e xpe r ience,
affects the physi c ian's del i be rat ions on V i c k i's appr opr iate
t reatment .
In the second p iece o f the i nterv iew, the resident
raises the questi on o f refer ral and expresses h is hesitancy,
sti l l i ntertw i ned w ith assu rance o f h is abi l ity to per f o r m ,
a patter n o f "Maybe, n o, maybe, yes" is man i fested :
D. Okay. Uh, i f it's a l l r ight w ith you I want to
have one o f o u r o l d docto r s come l oo k at th is mole
on your f orehead and get h is opi n i on on it. I
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was telling him about it, you know, describing it
and, uh, you know, as I was saying family
practioners normally don' t take moles off faces,
faces j ust because of, uh, mal, you know they have
to go up on your malpractice insurance and things
like that, that we normally handle by people who do
it all the time, however, I have removed them off
peoples' faces without any problems before. I t' s
j ust that we are being conservative and protecting
ourselves when we do so. But I wouldn't hesitate
at all to take that one off.
The physician is a third year resident who is not required
to consult with staff unless he feels he needs to do so.

So

his talking to the staff physician is a further expression
of his anxiety. I t sounds as if he needs approval to do the
surgery, but then he qualifies that it is not for Vicki' s
sake that he is hesitant, but for his own, since the primary
concern discussed is malpractice insurance premiums.

Of

course the reason that malpractice might be increased is due
to increased risk of successful suits.

Minor facial

surgery, such as mole removal, is actually covered by the
unit' s malpractice insurance .

I t is, of course, possible

that the resident was not aware of the coverage .

But the

discussion of this practical concern of the physician' s
masks the technical point that he may not be well qualified .
to perform the surgery.
Historically, there . has been a struggle between
family practioners and surgeons over who is qualified to
perform surgical procedures.

As early as the turn of the

century, there was an obvious need to consider how the
medical profe�sion ought to regulate specialization of
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medical practice, with a significant c on cern being the
f uture of general practice _ (Steven s, 1971 : 78-97 ) .

The

early 1900's saw an increase in the number pf general
practitioner referral s to s urgeon s (Steven s, 1971 : 8 2 ) .

In

191 2, Franklin Martin began campaigning f or the f ounding o f
an American College o f Surgeon s who se primary purposes
inclu ded the standardization of s urgical pro cedures and a
medical degree s upplement to qualify a phy sician to do
s urgery.

Despite the then influential American Medical

As sociation ' s (AMA ' s ) c urrent . policy again st distinguish ing
mark s f or specialists, they were silent when the American
College o f S urgeon s was f ormed in 1913 (Steven s, 1971 : 8789) .

As specialization developed, the general practiti oner

was seen aa one who had stopped short o f specialization ; as
les s ed ucated than the specialist .

Phy sician s were fir st to

be generalist s, and then specialists.

Practicing general

practitioners simply had not specialize d.

In 1940, the

general practitioners were n otable in their unique postion
of n ot having any certifying machinery or even a section
within the AMA.

By 1 9 4 7, they had and active section within

the AMA and had begun w orking towar d a mechanism f or f ormal
specialization through board examination s (Steven s, 197 1 :
297-305 ) .

The rise o f the role o f the h o spital in medi cal

practice raised f urther problem s f or the general
practitioner which were partially alleviated in 1947 by the
establishment o f general practice residen cies (Steven s,
212

197 1: 305-310) .

In 1959 a f inal report of a w idely

represen tat ive comm i t tee to s t udy general prac t i ce
preparat ion d i d not include s urgery, a point w h i ch rai sed
con s i derable d i sc u s s ion ( Stevens, 197 1: 31 1) .

Follow ing

th i s report, twenty graduate tra ining programs were set up,
but becau se they included some s urgi cal tra ining, they were
called general pract i ce ins tead of fam ily prac t i ce ( Stevens,
197 1: 31 2) .

In 196 5, the Amer i can Academy of General

Pract i ce dec i ded to promote the mot ion of a cer t i fy ing boar d
exam inat ion for family med i c ine, wh i c h was approved in 1969
( Stevens, 1971: 313) .

Stevens po int s out that the th irty

year s s tr uggle to ga in spec ialty recogn i t ion and s tatu s,
based on �ducat iona1 · equal i ty, was a har d won bat tle perhaps
result ing in fam ily pract ioner s who were overed u cated for
the ir respon s i b il i t ies ;
But s u ch a comment ignores the compelling pres s ures
of profes s ional izat ion, towar d h igher edu ca t ional
s tandar d s and peer recogni t ion .
( Stevens, 197 1:
314) •
The relevance o f th i s h i st or i ca l development to
Vic ki ' s case i s that her con s ult ing the fam i ly pract i t ioner
for fac ial s urgery i s a borderl ine i s s ue for profes s ional
boundar ies .

Fam ily pract i t ioner s as profes s ional group have

fought har d to ma intain the - right to perform some types of
s urgery .

They have al so struggled h ar d to w in the

reputat ion o f educat ional and technical equals of
spec ial i s t s in other areas .
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It i s reasonable to a s s ume that

some of these values and their strategic value have been
passed onto Vicki's physician .

Furthermore, the residents

are evaluated on their perf ormance in their residencies , and
attention is paid to the variety and type o f procedures in
which they show pro ficiency and gain experience .

All of

these professional concerns are served by the ch oice to
proceed with the removal o f Vicki ' s facial mole .

It is

unlikely that the resident w ould proceed if he was conv inced
that he could not perf orm the procedure, but in the face o f
hesitancy and a borderline case which might norma l ly be
referred, it is understandable that he w ould choose to
operate, to w ork through noon, to use tools which he
considers less than d�sirable , and to come in on his day o f f
t o check o n Vicki .

The context o f the delivery o f health

care within which Vicki receives her care is a complex one
which provides some reason to think that there are conflicts
with simply serving her interest .
There may be another factor which makes more
reasonable the resident's decision to do the surgery .

After

his first expression o f hesitancy, the patient expresses
her comf ort with his perf orming the surgery : ·
P.
D.
P.
D.

I w ould not be afraid t o have y ou d o it all .
First o f all I can't af f ord anybody else .
Okay .
But it's like (unintelligible ) I w oul d not be
ashamed to have a scar .
Okay . Well it shoul dn's leav� a scar • • • •
Perhaps a l l that the resident heard was that Vic ki
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was not afraid to have him do the faciai surgery.

I t is

al so po s sible .t hat ne accepted her finan cial reason.

But

since tne financial reason is respon sible f or directing
Vic Ki t o t he unit f or the mo le removal, it is inf luent �al in
snaping t he treatment she receives regardles s o f whetner or
n o t t he resident was in f luenced by it.

This is ano ther

manifes tation o f what was earlier dis cus sed as a two-c las s
sys tem o f health care which yield s l ower quality nealth care
f or t ne poorer members o f t ne society ( c f. , page 2 1 2 ) .

As

ho spital s . devel oped. and medical care increasingly depended
on no spital s, poorer communities attracted fewer physicians
and inves tment in ho spital s due t o the inabiltiy t o
generate fun d s •.

I n 1946, t ne Hil l -Burt on program attempted

to redistribute the construction of ho spitai s and t o bririg
t ne number o f available hospital bed s in l ower-income
neighbornoods up t o t hat o f mid dle-c las s neighborhoo d s
( Starr, 1982: 347-35 1 ) .

Though tne program seems t o have

been respo n sible for this redis tribution, it failed t o
attract doc t ors t o l ow-income s tates , o r t o l ower-income
reg i o ns w i t h i n states ( Cl a r k e, 1980 : 532-5 5 0 ; Ru s h i ng, 197 5 :
2 0 0-203 ) .

I t nas bec ome a common feature o f ho spital care

in l ow-income and public no spital s that much o f t he care ,
especial ly t hat o f c linic s such as t hi s family practice
unit , is preferred by physician s-in-training.

The two-c las s

sys tem o f health care is thus reinf orced by an
organizational tendency to use t ho se wno cannot af f ord
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private care as a means o f educating the physicians.
Ehrenre ich and Ehrenreich (1 9 70 : 2 2, 23, a�d Chapter One )
have argued that the poor have. been our society's research
and educational material since t he pro fession began
apprenticing, internships and research.

Vicki's explanation

that she cannot af f ord to go to a specialist, or perhaps
even to a private family practitioner ' s of fice, fits into
this pattern.

Her presence in the unit f or a facial mole

removal is a direct result of her financial status, whether
or not the resident takes it as suf ficient reason to operate
on her rather than refer her, which, as he describes, is the
usual practice.
Another interesting feature o f the interaction is
the number o f times that Vicki asserts that she is not
concerned about facial appearance or scarring.

As quoted

above, she initial ly expresses it as part of the reason that
she is not concerned to have t he family physician do the
removal.

Later she laughs when the staf f physician explains

that the scar shoul d match a line on her f orehead.

When he

expressed hesitancy t o do the surgery, she again asserts
that she does not care about her facial appearance :
SD. We ' re reluctant t o cut on w omen ' s faces.
P. Wel l I ' m not very_ vain on my face.
SD. Wel l, we are (laughs) .
When the resident explains that the incision may be l onger
than Vicki might expect, Vicki again af firms that she is no
2 16

concerned about her face and that she had planned to take
out the stitches herself:
D.
P.
D.
P.
D.
P.
D.

And don't be gros sed out by the fact that the
incision is a lit tle longer than you might have
expected, but I opened it a bit like that so that
it would · be, leave les s · of a scar.
I won't be.
You ' re not too particular are you?
No I ' m not. I was planning on taking the stitches
out myself. Ill
II Well, on this one I ' d like to
see it, on the others I might go along with the
idea, okay ?
Uh huh.
This one is on your face. I can ' t have that,
you know. Turn around • •
I t seems a lit tle odd that if Vicki is so

unconcerned about her facial appearance and cannot afford a
dermatologist to have it removed that she is concerned to

have it removed at all.

Once this feature is noted, what

becomes striking is the lack of reason for the removal,
unles s it is for cosmetic reasons, which seems belied by
Vicki ' s claims that she is not concerned with her facial
appearance.

If she is acting out of fear of malignancy or

other medically relevant detail, she neve r mentions it and
the resident never · asks for her reason s.

Rather, both the

s taff physician and the resident reinforce that Vicki ough t
to be concerned with her facial appearance more than she
appears to be �

Yet if they think that her lack of concern

is s trange, especially in light of the fact that she is
willing to undergo facial surgery to remove the mole, they
never raise the issue.
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As Waitzkin ( 19 8 3: 151-163) has pointed out in
analyz ing doctor-patient interviews, the technical
orientat ion of the procedure is what gives the physicians
the "right " to discuss Vicki ' s facial appearance, and their
response to her desire to have her mole removed is not to
explore whether there is some fear or social situation to
which this is a response, but · rather to use their technical
ability and medical . ideology to direct at tention to the
medical response and away from the inconsistent attitudes of
their patient.

They are able to make this response, which

Vicki has solicited by coming to the unit for mole removals,
due to their culutral authority and the widespread
acceptance of medical ideology.

Thus both Vicki' s presence

in the unit for facial mole removals and their acting in
support of her request, rather than referring or raising the
issue of why she wants this medicalized cosmetic surgery,
are manifestations of the control that the profession has
over non-medical aspects of patients ' lives.

Rather than

suggest that V icki resist the · notion that her mole is
dangerous or unbecoming and therefore worthy of the risk,
discomfort, inconvenienc�e and expense of removal, the
physicians act in a manner that reflects their attitude that
the technical-medical response is appropriate.

This of

course also feeds into the notion that a woman in our
society is required to be attractive.
One further aspect of the interaction seems a
21 8

lit tle odd.

When the resident admits to Vicki that he did

not have the proper tools, or at least the one� he though t
would be best, she is not at all express�ve of
disappointment or fear which might be appropriate.

Combined

with his earlier hesitancy to remove the mole at all and the
expressed intent to do a bodily one first to make sure they
are both comfortable with his proficiency, this seems to be
a strange lack of response.
is too late now.

Perhaps this is so because it

On the other hand it may be that Vicki is

operating on the assumption that the physician is the
technical expert, and as her physician, has no reason to
have operated on her if he thought there was any unnecessary
risk or pain involved.

The same cultural authority and

medical ideology which helped to direct Vicki to the unit
for the facial mole removal and gave authority to
expressions of ability in the face of hesitancy and common
practice may have justified even this expression of
increased risk.
Though Vicki has requested the removal that she
receives, it is not clear why . she wants her mole removed.
Nor do the physicians pursue t his issue.

There are good

reasons why the physicians might want to have the
opportunity to do the surgery.

Though they indirectly refer

to reasons why they perhaps should not do the removal, their
willingness to do so prevails and carries the decison,
without any overt expression of their reasons for doing so.
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Vicki has come for the removal because she does not believe
that she can afford a higher level specialist while it is
possible that a specialist in the immediate community could
have cost the same or less.

But there is neither incentive

nor encouragement for patients to verify such information.
She has come for reasons that are either not expressed (fear
of malignancy, cosmetic concern } , contradictory to her
expressed attitude about her face (unconcern } , or erroneous
(cost } .

The removal is done without any explanation as to

why her case is different from usual practice.

In all three interactions there are elements of the
interview which on close examination are puzzling.
Consideration of the social context within which the
patients and physicians live and th emore speicalized
setting of the delivery of healthe care results in a more
reasonable explanation of these otherwise puzzling
interactional elements.

The descriptions of the historical

and social patterns of medical practice have been observed
by others and are not explanations unique to the particular
analyses.

What emerges from this analysis is support for

the claim that there is a basic asymmetry in the doctor
patient relationship which both supports and reflects the
social norms of the society and sub-culture within which
health care is delivered.

As Waitzkin has commented:

medicine ultimately is inseparable from the wider
society. Problems in medical care derive from and
reinforce social contradictions. Distorted
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commun icati on in medical encounters both ref lects
and supp·orts the instituti onal context i n wh ich
doctors and patients participate . The study o f
i deol ogic reproducti on a n d social control i n .
med icine must l i nk c oncrete medica l encounters w ith
th is w i der context.
(Wa itz k i n, 1983 : 1 4 4 )
F isher, among others, has argued that th is "top
down" approach must be accompan ied by a "bottom-up" whalys is
wh ich l i nks the analysis of med i cal ianteracti ons ·,··w ith the
w i der social context (F isher, 1979, 1 9 8 3, 198 6 ; F i sher and
Todd, 1983 ; Habermas, 197 0 ; Knorr-Centi na and C icourel,
198 1 ) .

Theoretical accounts such as Habermas ' are

notor i ously weak in the ir lack of presentati on o f concrete
instances of the phenomena c la imed to be so i n f l uential
(Wati z k in, 1983 : 1 4 1 ) .

Such accounts ga i n plausib i l ity as

the asymmetry is placed i n its h istor i cal and larger social
context .

Behav i or wh ich i s d i f f icult t o understand w ith i n a

trusti ng therapeutic relationsh ip becomes comprehensi ble i f
we recogn i ze the complex social context o f such
relationsh ips .

The fa i lure o f i nstituti ons and social

arrangements to prov i de as they were expected or designed to
must be examined w ith in the social cl imate and pol itical
l im itati ons wh ich constra i n the f orm an d content of the
relationsh ips f ormed therei n (Wa itz k in and Stoekle, 197 6 ;
Stevens, 197 1 ; Starr, 198 2 ; Waitz k in, 198 3 ; Navarro, 197 3 ;
F isher, 1979, 1983, 198 6 ; F isher and Todd, 198 3 ; Waitz k in
and Waterman, 1 974 ) .
The need f or suc h a c counts is wel l documented and th is
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type of social analysis has much to recommend it.
is that such

a

My thesis

social analysis is a profitable addition to

deliberation over ethical issues in medicine.

The next

chapter is an application of the previous social analysis to
the ethical issue of informed consent as well established
doctrine in support of patient autonomy.

The line of

argumentation, as established in Chapter I, is that · informed
consent, as protection of patient autonomy, must consider
the asymmetry of the doctor-patient relationship.

As we

have seen, this leads us far beyond the usual boundaries of
discussions of informed consent.
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Chapter V
Normative Analysis
I have argued that in the interviews with Sheila,
Maria and Vicki there has been a lack of information shared
with the patients, that they have not been involved in the
deliberations over the treatment decisions and that the
context of the delivery of their health care is responsive
to social factors which conflict with their interests.

I do

not think that any of these claims are obvious on a
superficial examination of the interactions but are only
arguable upon close scrutiny of both the interactions and
the social context of the delivery of health care.

No

explicit normative claims have been made in Chapter IV. The
task of this final chapter is to consider the social
analysis and apply the normative considerations which are
based on the analysis of the doctrine of informed consent
(cf. , Chapter I, pages 48-73). This discussion will lead to
considerations of the necessity of a social component for
all applied ethical analyses.

Three Goals of the Doctrine of Informed Consent
As was concluded in Chapter I, a helpful technique
for applying a socially-sensitive normative critique is to
specify the social picture which is desired in fulfillment
2 23

of the ethical concerns.

I have specified three such

practica l social goals (agreement with phy sician, shared
respon sibility, reduction of asymmetry) .

The interactions

which have been subjected to a social analysis may be
readily compared to these normative models in an effort to
analyze their normative adequacy .

The comparisons, in turn,

show both 1) the empirical fact that these interactions fail
to fulfill the ethical requirements and, 2) the normative
inadequacy of the first two models .
The most conservative of these goals for ethically
valid consent is assuring that the patient understand s the
physician's reasons for the treatment chosen, and agrees to

the treatment on that basis. 1 This is the most conservative

goal because it preserves the medical paternalism
1

It may be that the legal doctrine of informed
consent is even more conservative, requiring only disclosure
of risks . This may be due to the influence of litigation on
legal doctrines, since such suits typicaly involve injury
which the patient may have been able to avoid if he or she
had been warned of the risk (U . S. President's Comis sion
Report, 1982: 23-26) . As the President's Commis sion Report
(1982: 16 ) querie s " To what degree doe s this legal
requirement of informed consent advance the ability of
patients to maintain control of and be responsible for
decisions regarding their lives and their health?" I a s sume
that simple disclosure of ris k s of the prescribed treatment
is so obviously insufficient that the ethical discu s sion may
reasonably commence with a standard which provide s reasons
for, as well as risks of, the prescribed treatment .
(The
President's Commis sion Report recognized this as well ; cf . ,
U. S . President's Commis sion Report, 1982: 29-31).
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of the trad itional phys ician-pat ient re lat ionsh ip.

The only

d ifference between th is model and the author itar ian
prescrib ing of treatment by the phys ic ian is that pat ients
are to be told the reasons which presumably may have the
prudent ial effect of increas ing the chance of accurate
compliance.

If we assume the consent is opt ional, th is goal

may also be giv ing the pat' i ent a cho ice between being
treated or not being treated.

This model is not concerned

with present ing to pat ients a cho ice between alternative
treatments, since it i s not requ ired that pat ients be told
these.

Th is model may be eth ically suff icient in a consent

to research w ith no therapeutic effects, s ince the cho ice
fo r non-therapeutic research is whether or not to undergo
the procedure and refusa l has no therapeutic implicat ions.
Perhaps the h istory of this model is t ied to responses to
research-related abuses revea led in the Nuremburg tr ials
( U.S. Defense Department, 1 9 4 8 , 1 9 7 4 ) . Therapeutical ly, th is
model can be interpreted as an effort to serve pat ients'
� interests, since the medical experts are undoubted ly
better prepared than the average patient to deliberate
between treatments.

This model of informed consent has the

advantage over the simple consent-to-treatment in that
pat ients may not be treated s imply as a means to the ir own
health, as those in the Kantian trad ition are l ikely to
emphas ize.

It may also represent an attempt to ba lance

promoting pat ients' we lfare (benef icence) wh i le preserv ing
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their autonomy.

A final ethical justification for this

model might be a utilitarian argument that this form of
informed consen t is likely to maximize good consequences in
that patien ts are likely to accept what is probably the best
treatment, while preserving a degree of control over their
treatment and establishing a less authoritarian
physician-patien t relationship.

I t might be more practical

in its implicit recogn i tion that physicians are bet ter
acquainted with medical knowledge than are patien ts.
Before critiquing this model and discussing the
others, note that even this minimal model of informed
consent is not met in any of the cases discussed.

According

to this model, the physicians must share the reasons for
their treatmen t.

In both Sheila ' s and Maria ' s cases there

are few, if any, reasons given for the treatments.

In

Vicki ' s case, i t seems that the reasons for the physician
treatmen t may have been iden tical with Vicki ' s for coming to
the unit.

She came because she could not afford a higher

level specialist and did not mind risking facial scarring.
When the physicians expressed their hesitancy, she responded
with these reasons, and they seemed to accept them.
However, on closer scrutiny, it is not interactionally
obvious why the physician proceeded, despite expressions of
concern over malpractice and the intent to do a less
conspicuous mole first, as well as problems of time and
equipmen t.
226

It is also clear that the three patients either
did not receive the best medical treatment option, or that
the best treatment was not medically obvious.

Sheila

commenced treatment with a wide-range antibiotic prior to
the screen being read.

Starting the treatment after

verifying the infection (or omitting the screen if treatment
is initiated) is arguably a better option and a narrow range
antibiotic would then be possible, since sensitivity could
be checked.
problem.

Maria was simply not treated for her medical

Any of the alternative treatment options would

have been better.

She was given reasons for non-treatment,

but since she neither knew her options nor understood the
reasons, this information did not help.

Vicki was treated

as requested, but not in the most medical risk-minimizing
manner.
Since there are different modes of treatment,
different prescribing practices and practical and financial
consequences of these, simply informing patient of the
reason s for the chosen treatment fails to guarantee the
" best treatment" .

If physicians are taken to be the

authorities of what treatment is the best for a certain
ailment in the case of each particular patient, then the
"best" must be interpreted as " best medical" interest.

As

has been argued, it does not appear that the physicians,
unencumbered by even the minimal requirement of informing
their patients, chose the "best medical treatment for this
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patient".

Neither does it seem likely that the medical

judgment will be greatly improved upon by patient
involvement.

Good, experienced physicians probably are the

most likely sources of good medical judgment, though there
may be some limited exceptions (e. g. , midwives, herbalists,
chiropractors, nutritionists, physical therapists, health
psychologists).
Rather than simply trying to maximize the medical
quality of care, the second goal or model of informed
consent focuses on increasing patient control.

Since some

medical judgments are controversial, carrying different
medical consequences (e. g. , side effects of drugs, impact on
society, etc. )

as well as practical and financial

consequences, patients who will bear these consequences
ought to be in volved in the deliberations over which option
to choose.

As discussed in the U. S. President's Commission

Report (1982: 85-89) medical diagnosis and treatment is
fraught with uncertainty in terms of incompleteness of
medical knowledge, its application to particular cases,
practitioners' personal knowledge limits and practitioners' ,
lack of familiarity with the very broad range of patients'
life circumstances.

Placing a heavier emphasis on autonomy,

recognizing the controversy and uncertainty in medical
treatment and the effect of medical definitions of illness
and treatments on non-medical components of patients' lives,
the second goal for informed consent emphasizes that
228

patients ought to choose from a knowledge of the
alternatives and their consequences (cf., Burgess, 1 985).
This is in fact the type of informed consent insisted upon
by consumer- or patient-rights oriented groups (e . g.,
women's health groups who emphasize the choice of birth
control rather than agreement to a physician ' s
recommendation).
That this goal is unfulfilled in the interactions
is obv ious.

But there is evidenc e in the interactions that

the goal of promoting patient control would not be fulfilled
by further disclosure.

First, there is the widely

recognized problem of patient comprehension of disclosed
information (see disc ussion in Chapter I). This is
demonstrated in the cases.

Sheila did not ask why she

should start a drug which she might need to discontinue in a
few days.

Maria probably did not understand why the

physician considered her pain medication to be
contraindicated .

Vicki apparently failed to understand the

physicians' hesitancy and their concern about malpractice .
Second, it is not unreasonable to suggest that, even if they
were informed regarding the alternatives and effects of
their treatments, She ila and Vicki, and perhaps Maria, would
choose the options favored by their physicians.

They are

consulting these physicians by choice and thus have some
degree of trust in the physicians' medical j udgments .
Third, the patients are also consulting the physicians
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because they believe themselves to be in need of medical
care.

The practical and financial differences for the

patients are reasonably small, so the deciding factor may
well be medical efficacy.

Any expression of preference on

the part of the physicians in such a context of ambiguity is
at least possibly, if not likely, to be grasped as a medical
reason to prefer that option.

Finally, for such minor

treatments, with these sorts of differences in effects of
treatment, it is likely that most patients will generally be
hesitant to request lengthy clarification.
If the second goal of informed consent does not
frequently res�lt in a practical difference, it may be a
wasted effort.

Perhaps only patients who are assertive

enough to request the more detailed disclosure ought to be
given it.

For those who will predictably choose as the

physician would suggest, perhaps the action is not
unjustifiably paternalistic (cf. , Ackerman, 1982). If
physicians are willing to take the responsibility for such
decisions, and patients are willing to accept this
arrangement, this could be construed as an implied
"contract " whereby the patient consents to any treatment the
physician believes is appropriate (cf. _, Veatch, 1972: 7;
U. S. President' s Commission Report, 1982: 50-51). Such an
arrangement would allow for the expedient delivery of
medical care in such routine and minor cases as the three
here considered.

Certainly in these cases the physicians
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intended only to dispense good medical care and the patients
received medical care.
It is not the purpose of this analysis to claim
that the patients should have received different medical
treatments.

Nor are the consequences of the treatments

enough to merit much ethical concern.

Whether the reason

patients agreed to treatment was based on trust of their
physician and knowledge of the reasons for the recommended
treatment (the first . social-normative goal), or knowledge of
the alternatives and their consequences (the second
social-normative goal) is not the crucial normative
feature.

Rather, the important feature is that perhaps

surprisingly, even informed patients are likely . to accept
uncritically physici ans' medical recommendations as
authoritative and as completely constituted by medical
considerations.

In as much as this is an accurate depiction

of physician-patient encounters, the basis of information
which the patients possess is practically and ethically
irrelevant.

This is because the goal of informed consent,

whether it is personal evaluation of physici an's reasons for
treatment or to promote pat ient choice is, generally
speaking, undercut by patients' continued trust and respect
of physicians.

This dependence on physicians as authorities

about what is in patients' interests is ill-founded because,
as the social analysis of the three interactions
demonstrated, the trusted medical practices are shaped by
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social factors which may conflict with patien ts' in terests,
resulting in treatments which are probably no� even the best
medical treatmen t, let alone most serving of patien ts'
general in terest s.

Thus there is lit tle reason, in defense

of patien t choice, to prefer full disclosure over simple
disclosure of reasons for treatmen t or, for that mat ter,
non-disclosure.
There is, however, good reason to prefer full
disclosure over partial or none, though it is not because it
is likely to immediately increase patients' autonomy or
con trol over their health.

Rather, the third

social-normative goal proposes that full disclosure of
treatmen t options and consequences is important as part of
an overall proj ect to reduce the asymmetry of con trol in
physician-patien t encounters and to establish a more equal
dis tribution of the responsibility for health.

As the

social analysis has shown, the professional practices of
physicians are developed in a manner that is responsive to,
and consequently supports, social factors which conflict
with patients' medical or non-medical in terests.

What is

learned are methods, "how to " diagnose and treat, or to seek
medical care as an appropriate response to certain
problems.

The con text of both the learning and the practice

affects what methods are learned and used.

The practices

are not ethically problematic because of their intended
purpose (i. e. , medical treatmen t).
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Nor is the issue that

medical practices uniquely reflect and reinforce social
factors which do not explicitly enter into the encounters.
The ethical objection is that due to medical authority,
patien ts accept and participate in such practices and
reinforce social factors both of which they might reasonably
find objectionable.
More specifically, the three women patien ts do not
simply accept uncritically personal inconvenience, expense
and the risks implied by the treatmen ts.

They also accept

treatmen ts which promote the pharmaceutical industry's
manipulation of medical treatmen t (Sheila, Maria), the
overuse of wide-range antibiotics (Sheila), the protection
of fetal over maternal health (Maria), the use of
financially disadvan taged patien ts for educational purposes
(Vicki), the definition of illness in terms of
work-performance (Maria), the con trol of access to
specialists by medical professionals, and personal or
professional values (Maria and Vicki). The last three of
these factors in turn contribute to a double-standard in
health care.

Th is un in ten tional and uncritical

participation in these social values is ethically
problematic for two reasons.
consented to chosen.

First, it is not explicitly

Patien ts accept medical care.

They

rarely consider the sorts of social practices and pat terns
they support by doing so.

Physicians also are usually

unwit ting supporters of this social order.
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That they

benefit considerably by doing so does not establish moral
blame .

But their ability to more directly influence the

practices which support these social values and effects does
imply a degree of responsibility to work for change, once
they are aware of the problem.
Secondly, the formation of medical practice in
response to these social factors constitutes a conflict of
interest with that of patients .

This conflict of interest

is one to which patients have not consented, since they ar�
unaware of it.

The reason patients accept practices so

influenced is that they have come to trust the authority of
the medical profession.

Members of the medical profession,

of course, believe that they deserve this trust, though they
do occasionally recognize that some of their professional
interest and social connections conflict with that of
patients or society (e.g., opposition to socialized health
care, policy proposals regarding malpractice suits,
increases in charges).

But medical treatments are typically

recommended by physicians because they believe them to be
required, and accepted by patients because they trust
physicians' judgments.

The influence of the non-medical

social factors on these practices is neither intended nor
consented to .

As such, these factors are not likely to

become a part of the medical interaction even in the form of
a disclosure in an informed consent procedure.
It would be ludicrous to claim that prior to
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medical treatment every patient must be given a
Wittgensteinian analysis of the practices they are likely to
participate in and then to ask if they still consent to the
treatment.

Not only would such an explanation be quite

meaningles s, it does not increase the patients' (or
practitioners') alternatives within the interaction.

There

typically does not exist an interactional course of action
�he physician or patient can engage in to avoid the
influence and reinforcement of most of these social
factors.

Furthermore, they might not want a different

treatment, and/or they may even support some of the social
factors (e. g. , the influence of profit through
pharmaceutical companies' efforts, justified on an
"invisible hand" theory of economics).

Informed consent is

helpful in promoting personal responsibility, self-control
of one's health and autonomy only when there are options.
The most serious ethical problem is the unwitting, and
" unconsented-to" participation in social forms which may be
objectionable and/or conflict with patients' needs or
interests.

This problem exists due to the organization of

medical practice within the structural constraints of
society, and participation in ·it is accepted by patients
(and propogated by physicians) due to the asymmetrical
relations between physicians and patients, as well as
between public and profes sional groups.

This asymmetry, as

has been discussed, is one of pos ses sion, by the
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professional, of knowledge, access to diagnostic and
treatment facilities or substances and the subsequent
control of d efinition of illness, conditions of medical
practice and even the structure of physician-patient
encounter.

Organizational/Structural Normative Analysis
It might, of course, be objected that th is
analysis is drawing some very broad conclus ions based on
three isolated cases.

It is certainly accurate to claim

that the analysis is most obviously applicable to the three
cases, and perhaps to the typical practices of the thre e
resid ents at that point in their careers � or perhaps to the

particular unit during the few months the interactions were
record ed.

But there are good reasons to extend the

analysis.
First of all, the interactions are selected as
parad igm cases of varying consequences.

There are examples

of this sort of paternalism in most, if not a l l, of the
interactions in the study from which these exampl es were
taken (cf., Fisher, 1 983, 1 986; Fisher and Groce,
forthcoming) .
exemplary.

These cases are not unique, they are

But their relevance does not stop at being

depictions of patterns expressed in the recorded interviews,
nor only of the clinic at that time.
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The interactional patterns are similar to those
found in other analyses of medical interviews (Fisher, 1 979,
1983, 1986: Fisher and Groce, forthcoming: Todd, 1983:
Robillard, White and Maretzki, 1983: Frank el, 1983: Paget,
1983: Waitzkin, 1983) as well as of other institutionally
situated, non-medical, communicational events (Mehan, 1979: .
Mehan, Fisher, �aroules, in press: cf. , Fisher and Todd,
1986). The intelligibility and explanatory power of the
presupposition-ascriptions which form the basis of the
analysis depends in part on readers' �amiliarity with the
practice of " making sense " of utterances and with the
practices described.

So the ·familiarity of the analysis of

the social organization of medical practice throughout at
least North American society lends credence to �ts accuracy
as an account of routine medical p ractice in general.
Finally, in as much as the analysis is " grounded " (cf. ,
" grounded theory, " Glaser and Strauss, 1 9 6 7 ) in other social
analyses of medical (Freidson, 1970a, 1970b, 1973: Mechanic,
1974: Parsons, 19 51: Navarro, 1973: Conrad and Kern, 1978:
Wa it zk in, 1 9 8 3: Wai t zk in and Waterman, 1 9 7 4 : Eh renreich and
Ehrenreich, 1 970: Ehrenreich and English, 1 ,1 s),
institutional (Mehan, 1 979: Labov, 1972), and societal
(Habermas, 1970: Parsons, 1 9 51: Marx, 1 964) accounts and
theories, further credence is lent the analysis.
Of course there are variations in organization of
medical practice which may alter how or to what degree
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specific social factors influence medical practices.

For

example, it is unlikely that reimbursement by an insurance
company that is higher for one procedure than for another
equally effective one would influence a salaried physician
(cf. , Freidson's discussion of fee-for-service and
group-practice settings, 1970a: 91-100). Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO' s) are responses to the rising cost of
health-care for consumers and employers.

A standard fee is

paid in exchange for whatever medical attention an enrollee
might require.

Rather than any professional or group

profiting from a more expensive procedure or group of tests,
the HMO's profits are diminished by such practices.
Although this is not always a social arrangement which
ser ves patients' interests (cf. , Waitzkin and Waterman,
1974: 92), it does affect the social analysis, requiring
context-specific accounts of communication events and
practices.

Even patient assertiveness is an

interaction-specific factor which qualifies the specific
manifestations of particular practices (such as
psychosomatic labelling of women' s complaints, cf. ,
Bernstein and Kane, 198 1 ; cf. , Verbrugge and Steiner, 198 1).
The ethical claim is that the concern with the
doctrine of informed consent as a means to promote and
protect patient autonomy or participation and shared
responsibility for health leads to a critique of routine
medical practice.

The pattern of routine medical practice
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that is of concern is the complacency of physician s and
patients in allowing social facto rs which conflict with
patient interests to shape medical treatment, without
patients' (or physicians' ) knowledge due to the asymmetry in
physician-patient relations and communication.

The

ethically germane social factors in this pattern are:
1. lack of informed consent to treatment, analyzed
as due to-2. the asymmetry of the physician -patient
relationship, in which physicians may prescribe without
patients' objecting or knowing that the medical practices
are shaped by-3. social facto r s which conflict with patien ts'
medical need or practical and financial preferences.
An ethical "program " to respond to these issues
must do much more than promote a standard of disclosure and
patients' rights to choose their own treatment.

The goal is

to develop a context of health-care deliver y in which
professionals and patients come to a mutually acceptable
treatment decision based on an under standing of medical,
practical and financial alternatives and consequences.

But

such a goai is impeded by the or ganization of the
physician-patient relationship as asymmetr ical and the
influence and reinforcement of i r relevant or
patient-interest-conflicting social factors.

The asymmetry

must be balanced and the influence of those social factor s,
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or at least those which conflict with patient interests,
must be eliminated or controlled.
Just as the social analysis showed that the
influence of the organizational or structural social factors
on medical practice is manifested in concrete interaction,
any effective response to those factors will need to address
both levels.

The influence of certain factors on medical

settings may be dealt with in part by policy responses, and
in part by interactional innovation.

Consider the influence

of pharmaceutical companies on physicians' prescribing
practices, specifically through stocking clinics with
samples.

I argued in Chapter IV that Maria's non-treatment

may have been influenced in this manner.

The physician

arrived with a drug sample which was contraindicated for
pregnant or nursing mothers and, because Maria was pregnant,
he did not dispense the drug, recommending over-the-counter
medicine instead.
forms.

A policy response could take a variety of

One form would be to forbid pharmaceutical companies

from dispensing free samples.

This would also decrease the

cost of marketing such drugs.

Another policy response would

be to require that the physician prescribe before checking
the availability of a sample, so that the decision would not
be influenced by availability or supply by the
pharmaceutical company.

Either of these policies would

probably have resulted in Maria receiving a prescription for
a non-contrain dicated drug, which she would need to fill at
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her expense.

The policies prevent the physician's possible

concern over Maria's financial status, combined with sample
availability, influencing his prescribing practice as it
seems to have done in Maria's case.
There are clearly controversial aspects of either
policy response.

While they are discussed, and other policy

responses are considered, there are interactional responses
which might equalize this social factor for Maria. If the
physician were more expressive of his reasons for not
prescribing the drug sample (protection of fetus) as well as
his concern for Maria's expenses, and Maria were more
assertive in negotiating her pain relief, a different
outcome is predictable.

One possiblity is the treatment of

Maria's pain by prescribing a pain-relief medication which
is not threatening to fetal health, avoiding the violation
of the physician's conscience.

Another would be that Maria

ins ist on seeing a colleague of the phys ician who is not
concerned with protecting the fetus but has a moral attitude
more like Maria's. This physician could then dispense the
sample medication.

This latter response may also have the

benefit of Maria's receiving the abortion information she
requested.

In this manner, as an interactional practice,

informed consent has a role to play within the larger
program.
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The "New" Doctrine and Practice of Informed Consent
The part that informed consent can play in a
program to reduce the asymmetry of the physician-patient
encounter (and its profession-public counter-part in the
area of policy matters) and to promote shared
profession-pat i ent responsibility for health care (and
health-related social issues), is two-fold.

First, the

practice of informed consent is to encourage those patients
and/or physicians who already desire this " balancing" and to
enable them to fulfill such goals as much as is now possible
within the current social context of medical care.

Second,

the practice of informed consent may bring to patients' and
physicians' attention the reasons for treating " routinely, "
opening these to examination and thereby increasing both
- professionals' and clients' discomfort with medical
paternalism.
It is important to realize that fulf i llment of the
first task may undercut the goal expressed in the second.
If all and only those patients who desired a detailed
disclosure, and negotiation of their treatment with their
physician received such care, there might be a considerable
drop in the general sense and expression of frustration over
such issues.

Those who are not troubled by medical

paternalism could go on allowing medical professionals to
make decisions in their behalf.
24 2

" Advocates, " " ethicists, "

and others who are working for a change in the practice of
paternalism in medicine might then find that their audience
is less receptive because they are more comfortable.

If the

only ethical concern were unconsented-to cases of medical
paternalism, this might also fully respond to the ethical
issue.
As the preceding four chapters have endeavoured to
establish, allowing (competent, mature, etc. ; autonomous)
patients as much control over their medical care as they
wish is not the only ethical concern.

Patients who do not

desire such autonomy are responding to, and reinforcing,
medical paternalism and authority, both of which are
generally overextended in unjustified ways.

Th�se patients

who do desire such control have their ethical claims
strengthened and extended by the social analysis which
identifies specifically that over which they have not
previously had such control and why.

That the asymmetry in

knowledge, control of diagnostic and treatment modes and
interactional ability to initiate and control topics is the
met hod whereby undisclosed, and frequently unconsented to,
treatment has been prescribed and accepted shows the need to
share information in order to alter this lack of patient
participation and contol.

But it also shows that

information alone is not enough.

Interactional asymmetry

can insert itself into the very process of informed consent
which may then function as persuasion ( Robillard, White, and
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Maret zki, 1983). The organ i zat ion and set t ing of the medical
interview serve to reinforce this asymmetry, as do societal
at t i tudes about illness, treatment and work (see Chapter
IV ) . None of these are consented to by pat ients, nor can
they be construct ively responded to by the doctr ine of
informed consent, as i t is generally understood.
Medical profess ional control of treatment and
diagnost ic opt ions is not only interact ionally expressed
through non-disclosure, but i t is also more effect ively
controlled through profess ional dominance and cultural
authori ty (Freidson, 1970a, 1970b; Mechanic, 1974; Conrad
and Kern, 1981; Wai t zkin, 1983; Wai t zkin and Stoekle , 1976;
Wai t zkin and Waterman, 1974; Ehrenre ich and Ehrenre ich,
1970; Ehrenreich and English, 1978; Starr, 1982; Stevens,
1971; Navarro, 1976; F isher, 1979, 1982, 1983, 1986 ) I t is
far beyond any reasonable expectat ion of informed consent
that individual pat ients will be capable of challenging this
control, much less the social factors which affect the
format ion of treatment pract ices and are in conflict w i th
the interests of pat ients.

Nevertheless, awareness of such

format ive factors gives further ethical grounds to quest ion
the reason for specific medical treatment recommendat ions
and to insist on act ive part icipat i 9n in their cho ice and
construct ion.
Not only do such cons iderat ions strengthen ·clai ms
to informed consent in the sense described above, but they
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extend the ethical claim beyond that of a right to informed
consen t.

What is mandated by this analysis is patient and

public participation in the (re-)organization of medical
in terviews and practice.

Non-medical factors which affect

patien ts' medical options, participation in medical
decisions and even tually the non-medical aspects of their
lives ought to be scrutinized by "patien ts " in the form of
public or political criticism of the organization and
institutional goals of medicine.

Of course, such · directive

action by professional and non -professional groups also
implies shared ethical responsibility for the consequences
of the choices .
The second purpose of informed consent (cf., page
69) is to increase patien ts' and the "public's "
understanding of the ambiguities of medical practices, as
well as the influence of non-medical social factors on
treatmen t decisions and general medical practice.

Such an

increased awareness will result in an increase in the
discomfort with medical paternalism and with the asymmetry
of both medical in terviews and professional-public
discussions of health-care or medical-institution related
issues.

This di�comfort may also increase among medical

practitioners, so that they will seek more and
better-informed patient input in medical interviews and
public input in to broader issues.

Of course, such threats

to professional autonomy (the freedom of the profession to
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define both the context and conditions of its practice) have
historically been heavily resisted (Freidson, 1970a, 1970b,
Starr, 1982; Stevens, 1971). This resistance has no effect
on the normative force of the current argument that patients
ought to be more aware of these conflicts of interest and
share in policy, institutional and treatment decisions.

The

profession' s past political resistance may forecast that
some of these issues will become political-economic
battles.

Since these discussions will make normative and

empirical claims regarding professional and patient rights
and obligations, they too are extensions of the present
discussion of normative goals and social critique.
More specifically, the normat ive concerns
supporting the doctrine and practice of informed consent
also support other recommenda tions for social change in the
organization of medical practice.

Among these social

concerns are the dernedicalization of social problems, the
reduction of profit-motivated influences, the reduction of
professional control over medical treatment, a more
" rat ional " division o f labor and an increase in public
participation in the structuring of the " conditions " of
medical practice ( including considerations of allocation of
research and development funds, development of health-care
delivery systems, access to technology, geographical
distribution of medical professionals, etc. )

Each of these

have been discussed at length in medical sociological and
246

political literature, but the normative basis for their
necessity is rarely discussed.
The U. S. President's Commission report (1982)
recognizes that the normative concern for joint
decision-making in medical treatment leads to considerations
of legal, educational and economic dimensions of health
care.

The Commission suggests that hospitals, professional

schools, courts and legislatures must reflect this concern
for ethically valid consent (U. S. President's Commission
Report, 198 2: 1-5, 102-111, Part 3). Correctly perceiving
that the education and socialization of health care
professionals, legal standards and method of payment
influences physician-patient encounter s, the Commission's
suggestions are prim arily organizational.

While the

concentration on the context of medical care is a
considerable improvement, there may be other organizational
factors, as well as structural, which reinforce the
Commission's targeted-for-change organizational factors and
their effects on medical encounters.
The social analysis in Chapter IV established that
structural factors influence the organization and practice
of medicine, and makes patients' compliance more
intelligible to the analyst.

There are many medical

sociologists and social critics who focus on structural
criticism and change.

I will now examine some of their
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claims, illustrating their relevance to the ethical concerns
underlying my normative social goal of informed consent.
Demedicalization is a term used by several social
theorists in calling for dif ferent sorts of change .

Ivan

Illich (1975: 37) criticizes the medical care industry as
therapeutically ine f fective as well as stimulating the
overuse o f the medical system resulting in patients who
search out a technological response to their social
problems .

As he is so well known for doing, Illich argues

for personal and public scrutiny, legal licensing o f
professionals as a means of assuring adequate health care
( Illich, 1975: 121) . Health, for Illich, is a thing for
which each individual ha s personal responsibility (cf . ,
Illich, 1975: 167-169) .
Vincente Navarro argues that Illich is wrong, that
it is not industr ialization which is responsible for
manipulating people's in6reasing consumption o f medical
care .

Rather, the " capitalist mode of production and

consumption" stimulates "commodity fetishism" which is a
necessary condition of the capitalist production system
(Navarro, 1976: 112) . Navarro summarizes that " addiction and
dependency on consumption, " or medicalization in the
health-industry sector is the result o f the capitalist
socio-economic system which:
requires for its survival (a) the creation o f
wants, however artifical or absurd they may be, .
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(b) the existence of a passive and " massified"
population of consumers, and (c) the replication
of consumer ideology whereby the consumer is
judged not by what he � (his work) but by what
he has (his consumption). Within that system, the
citizen, the consumer, is made to believe that his
fulfillment depends in large degree on his
consumption, be it of drugs, pills, prescriptions,
cosmetics and whatever else may be required for
his fitness, well being, and pursuit of
happiness. (Navarro, 1976: 113).
Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich note how medical
practice has shifted from professionals practicing medicine
to medical institutions educating, "researching" , profiting
and providing medical services.

They argue that the

increased dependence on technology of post-war medical
practice resulted in greater dependence on hospital
facilities, increasing physicians ' dependency on hospitals
for expensive technology and support personnel and
increas ing the need for third-party financial support of
medical care and equipment.

Most of the public funding

plans (e.g., B lue Cross, commercial health insurance,
Medicare, the federal Hill-Burton program) financed
hospitals exclusively, or in addition to physicians
{ Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1970: 29-39 ; cf., Stevens, 1971:
274-275, 509-5 13 ; Starr, 1982: 347-35 1, 374-378) . This
independence and institutionalization of the health care
system has resulted in concerns other than health care (i.e . ,
technology, training, and profit) shaping medical practice .
Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, stating the thesis of their book,
claim that "the American health system is not in business
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for people's heaith " (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1970 ; vi).
If their analysis is at all accurate, much medical care is
influenced or directed by these concerns which conflict with
patients' medical needs.

As Illich and Navarro have also

claimed, "medicalizing " need, or defining certain health or
social problems as in need of medical care or technology,
results in inappropriate responses to patients' needs from
which institutions and sometimes medical professionals
benefit in terms of payment, public demand for funding, and
increased role in direc ting public and private policy.
Howard Waitzkin (1983) is also critical of the
medicalization of social problems and the influence of
non-health concer ns of a capitalist economic arrangement.
He suggests that the rapidly growing concern with the
financial burden of health care can be adequately analyzed
only when "the connections between the health sector and the
struc ture of the capitalist system " are recognized
{ Waitzkin, 1983: 89). The power of technological medicine,
combined with the pseudo-obj ectivity of medical science,
inspire hope among professionals, politicians and the public
for a value-free, effective and individualized response .
Responding to such issues as sexual dysfunction, family
discord, depression in the work place, ad j ustment problems
relative to stages of life {i . e . , child-rearing,
adolescence, aging, etc.), educational problems, and the
like, medicalization removes the desire or need for
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individuals and groups to take responsibility for social
change {Waitzkin, 1983: 41).
All of these authors agree that current Western
medical practice fails to meet certain medical needs
{especially Illich and Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich), mitigates
personal responsibility for health {especially Illich and
Waitzkin), and prevents recognition and organization to
confront social issues {especially Navarro, Ehrenreich and
Ehrenreich, Waitzkin). They also agree that the mechanism
through which these social facts are accomplished, and
conceded, is through medicalization of people's problems and
desires.

Medicalization defines problems or desires as an

event happening .t.,Q a person, to be treated by medical
professionals and institutions in a manner as minimally
disrupting of the social order as posible, usually through
prescribing some technological treatment to which patients
only have access through the medical profession.

They

further agree that this medicalization serves the interests
of the larger social order, often not that of patients.
Professionals, institutions, industry and corporations all
gain profit from such a process.

Medicalization of

patients' problems and desires, as well as their creation by
definition and marketing, occurs and is sustained because it
serves these purposes, not because it serves patients well,
or even in some cases, adequately.
Note that the analyses are of the social context,
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albeit a large and diverse one.

The breadth of the context

makes generalization or description more defeasible.

But

the argument that no one in the "system " acts with corporate
profit or market control as an intention, if accurate, does
not defeat the description.

It is, as was discussed in

Chapter II, a "scenic " description of the context within
which practices are formed, institutionalized and
sustained.

The description is of methodological assumptions

which shape the practices.

Their description is akin to

Coulter' s presupposition-ascription in that they make more
intelligible the particular organization and practice of
medical care.
Though different in their specific
recommendations, these authors are members of a group of
sociologists and political theorists who agree that a
complete analysis of problems in the delivery of health care
must include an examination of the effects of structural
level factors of cultural-economic-political arrangement s.
Since these s tructural factors describe part of the context
within which medical institutions and practices are formed,
they may reasonably be expected to shape the medical
institutions and practices.

Having become practices in a

social set ting which emphasizes or limit s concerns such as
profit, responsible employee behavior, prestigious
conditions of work, technological innovation, etc. , medical
diagnosis and treatment reflect the influence of structural
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factors and reinforce their assumption as acceptable
normative principles.
Medical practice is not unique in this, but
neither is it exempt.

Patients' acceptance and physicians'

prescriptions of medical definitions and treatments are each
based on the acceptance and legitimacy of medical
authority.

But this authority is not legitimately extended

to cover non-medical aspects of patients' lives, nor to
choosing to support social factors which are ir relevant to
or conflict with patients' health.

Informed consent , if it

is a doctr ine whose practice is to result in patients'
effective r esponsibility for their whole lives, and shared
responsiblity with medical professionals for health-issues,
requires that we fur ther analyze the definitions and control
of these aspects of people's lives thr ough medical
practice.
A car efully implemented practice of infor med
consent is not likely to result in more than a very limited
extension of patients' actual exercise of autonomy.
Recognizing that this is due to the social context of
implementation leads to consideration of medical paternalism
and cultural authority as expressed in interactional
asymmet ry.

Examining the social and historical basis for

these interactionally manifested factor s brings into focus
the fact that medical authority, practice and institutions
are, to a gr eat extent, constituted by social factors which
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are either not germane to, or actual ly conflict with health
care.

Informing patients of this social analysis is both

impractical and ethical ly irrelevant.

Patients who were

made aware of this analysis could not do much differently
individual ly, in terms of their own treatment, than could
those who are simply fully informed of the medical options
and consequences.
There is, however, much that can be done publicly
outside of the medical interviews.

For example, recognition

that certain issues, such as stress and depression in the
work place, are not individual-medical problems but social
problems may encourage organizat ion of workers for social
change rather than their division into private patients.
Perhaps pressure from organized patient groups, or from
malpractice suits, wil l result in future Sheilas
contemplating non�treatment, requesting a cheaper, generic
drug, or negotiating access to an antibiotic to be taken
only if the screen is positive and her symptoms worsen.
Future Marias might have easier access to abortion
information and pain medication, as well as be able to get
paid time ofD of work so that her leg can heal less
painfully.

Perhaps Vicki, at a "better" time, might choose

not to have her moles removed, or not have to be concerned
with whether she can afford the least hazardous location and
practitione r.

At least her choice of specia list should not

be made out of a sense of financial handicap.
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Physicians also stand to benefit by such changes.
Sheila's physician could share the responsibility of
unnecessary treatment versus adequate care, rather than
devising elaborate schemes to cover all the concerns.
Maria's physician could simply consider Maria's leg pain, or
could freely express his concern over fetal health,
negotiating with Maria or referring her to a colleague.
Perhaps he would never encounter her, if -the time off work
was permitted without endorsement of Maria's need by a
physician, and abortion information were more accessible.
Vicki's physician could not be caught in the middle of
concern over adequate patient care and the need for surgical
experience, if he were more adequately prepared . or Vicki did
not need to be concerned about money.
The doctrine of informed consent is a practical
attempt to extend patients' autonomy in medical encounters
in a mannner that gives them control over the non-medical
aspects of their lives and results in their sharin g
responsibility for medical issues with the medical
professionals.

But the asymmetry of medical interviews

prevents the goal from being achieved, since it results in
patients' and physicians' uncritical acceptance of routine
medical treatment, and conceals the non-medical factors
which exercise considerable influence on what practices
become routine in medical settings, as well as in the home,
work place, etc.

The normative goals of informed consent,
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requiring the expressions of autonomy mentioned above,
cannot be fulfilled simply by instituting the practice.
Explicit disclosure of the reasons for treatment decisions
or diagnostic procedures increases the visibility of
non-medical considerations, and raises the possiblity of
question ing the more basic assumptions which reflect the
presupposit ions of the practices ' formation and use.

The

more abstract social analysis of the organization of medical
practice and its institutionalization within the structure
of society are now more obviously relevant.

Now it is more

feasible for patients to recognize the concrete effects and
manifestations o f medicalization, pursuit of profit,
technology, etc.

Furthermore, though the analysts are not

in agreement on appropriate political recommendations, the
relevance of social organization and political-economic
factors would more adequately be dealt with by an educated
public.

Implications of combined social/Normative Analysis
Informed consent and medical paternalism are only
two of the complex issues which arise in discussions of
medical ethics.

Other issues could also be treated in a

similar fashion.

The issues of abortion, genetic

manipulation and reproductive technologies should be
examined in the context of medicalization of sexuality and
reproduction.

Much of these technologies and treatments
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reflect non-medical issues, the promotion of technology and
profit, and the concealing of personal and social problems
(cf. , Daly, 1978; Fisher, 1979; Gordon, 1974; Ehrenreich and
English, 1978; Scully, 1980; Scully and Bart, 1973; Todd,
1982). Issues in definitions of mental health and illness,
involuntary commitment and modes of treatment quite
obviously connect with social control (cf. , Chesler, 1972;
Szasz, 196 1). The effect of financial status on place and
mode of treatment or the emphasis on suicide prevention
rather than examination of high risk groups' socially caused
distress reflect individual istic-interventionistic
approaches rather than entertaining the need for
socio-economic change.

Euthanasia, non-treatment, refusal

of life-saving treatment, definitions of death, artificial
organs, and organ transplants should be discussed in a
context of the marketability, and thus profit-creation and
medicalization, of death-avoidance.
Of course, patients and practitioners must respond
to these issues today, in the current context of medical
care.

Policy decisions, such as allocation of research and

development funds, affect the options which will be
available to future physicians and patients.

The social

analysis may, in the short term, suggest non-medical, or
less technological medical responses to problems which
patients bring to physicians.

But the initiative to make

personal changes in promotion of health, and to organize for
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social change, might not be completely undermined by a
medical-technological response if analysts, professionals
and patien ts are more cognizant of the influence of the
social con text.
Some of the most resourceful organizing and
fund-raising gr oups today are those organized ar ound the
cause of disease research and t reatment.

It is the

rnedicalization of the social processes which r esults in
these gr oups' being mouthpieces and fund-raisers for medical
research and t r eatmen t.

They are also suppor t groups for

victims of disease and their loved ones.

Per haps a mor e

comprehensive social analysis could guide these g roups into
const ructive organization around social issues such as
reducing costs of t r eatment , channelling research money and
alter native ways of accepting and accommodating handicap and
death.
I have argued that a social analysis increases the
normative fo rce of ethical claims and recommendations,
broadens their scope and effectiveness , and unites as well
as increases the effectiveness of case and policy
appr oaches.

Concr ete exploration of how ethical problems

ar ise in medical interactions leads to reflection on the
legitimacy of the social processes which con t ribute to the
constitution of the ethical problem.

Recognizing the

complexity of the social setting within which these
processes are fo rmed and practiced, it is reasonable to
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consider what social factors have affected the formation of
the social proces ses and practices.

These social factors

may, in turn, be subjected to normative analysis.

There is,

as has been shown, good reason to be suspicious of medical
practice for reasons of efficacy as well as propagation of
undesirable, unhealthy or unethical social effect s.
Recommendations in medical ethics, or any other
area of applied ethics, need to be int egrated and
graduated.

Particular and immediate ethical problems, while

clarified by the social analysis, may or may not greatly
benefit in terms of increased options or normative clarity.
In Maria's case it is evident that she had options of which
she was not aware (insist on a prescription, ask for a
referral) and which social analysis might raise.

V ick i or

her physician might have chosen an experienced dermatologis t
if either had known that it would not cos t more than the
family practice resident, and if they had known of time and
equipment factors.

It is not obvious that Sheila or her

physician would have been aided by the social analysis.
Note, however, that a more complete disclosure of the
options and reasons for choosing them would accomplish these
immediate goals.
Considering the medicalization of needs raises a
different set of ethical recommendations, although not ones
wh ich help these pat ient s now.

Recognizing that personal or

social needs are often medicalized, we can see the need for
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those in Maria's situation to receive paid sick leave which
would reduce or avoid her need for medication .

Vicki's

cosmetic concerns may reasonably be responded to by her
talking about it to someone in her life who is making her
self-conscious.

She may, of course, decide to have the

moles removed anyway.

This raises the perhaps ethical

question of whether such a medical response to cosmetic
dissatisfaction ought to be covered by a privately or
publicly funded i nsurer.

The ethical analysis of these

issues leads to recommendations for change in minimum
cond itions of employment and in appropriate responses,
whether they are personally or publicly financed, to
cosmet ic desires .
Sheila rece ives antibiot ics for a sore throat,
poss ibly due to strept infection.

If this is so easily

d iagnosed and routinely treated, why do Sheila and her
physician need to engage in this interview?

Control of

diagnosis and access to treatment by the medical profession
may be an inefficient arrangement.

Such medical care can

and has been delivered by nurse practitioners .

Once in a

medical interview with a physician, patients are most
directly affected by the asymmetry and there is almost no
limit to the time, information and tests which physicians
may demand .

A vis it to a "technician, " who has limited

tasks of diagnosis and treatment may not only be more
efficient i n terms of patients' and physicians' time, but it
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avoids unnecessarily subjecting patients to the
inconvenience and personal invasiveness that medical
interviews may promote.

Physicians, especially those in

family practice, would benefit in conservation of time and
effort for more complicated task s.

The recommendation at

this level is for a rearrangement of the organization of
primary care within the hierarchy of medical professionals.
Some would object that patients need practitioners
who will be concerned with their general health.

For Vicki,

this does not seem assured by her going to a physician.
Maria, this is quite obviously not achieved.

For

Perhaps

recommendations of a team approach would have been more
helpful for Maria. A social or psychological professional
might pursue the fact that Maria has a history of abortions
which is not a healthy practice for her.

But this

medicalizes what is probably a social problem for Maria. The
presence of a health-psychologist in the set ting did not
help Maria, since the physician also controls access to this
resource.

Two ethical recommendations arise from these

social facts.

One is the increased use of support

professionals in the medical set ting.

However, since this

does contribute to the medicalization of sexuality and
reproduction (which is taken here, for the sake of argument,
to be " unhealthy" and perhaps unethical) a second
recommendation is the provision and promotion of non-medical
sources of such information and service.
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As the recommendations broaden in scope, two
further social factors affect their effective
implementation.

First as the scope of social organization

increases, the group (s) to which it must be addressed
becomes broader and more diverse.

With this increase in

scope comes an increase in reasons for opposition.

Some

employers do not want to pay workers for sick-time, family
physicians do not want to give up the routine treatment of
simple maladies, the medical profession does not want to
publish charges and information of experience, and patients
tend to want to consult physicians for even their simple or
questionably medical needs.

This set of social

circumstances provides opposition to the broader ethical
recommendations.

Social analysis of why this opposition

exists leads to the influence of profit, prestige and
professional autonomy on medical practice.

This level of

social analysis generates yet another set of ethical
recommendations.
The broader ethical recommendations are
necessarily harder to implement and more likely to meet
opposition.

they are also more dependent on the accuracy of

the social analysis.

As discussed in Chapter I I, less

context-specific descriptions are less dependable because
they cannot account for context-specific elements.

It is

for this reason that such recommendations run the risk of
being too general and ineffective, or wrong, and thus having
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undesirable or even unethical effects on the interaction.
This problem can be (fallibly) responded to by breadth of
discussion of the analyses and by constant reference to the
interactional level.

Reductions in controversy over points

of a social analysis through discussion with other analysts
capitalizes on inter-subjectivity and breadth of
experience.

Medicalization of social and personal needs i s

perceived as problematic by analysts who disagree on the
social analysis of why it exists.

Reflecting on

interactional manifestations of medicalization gives further
empirical support to this factor' s influence on medical
practice and patients' attitudes.
Ethical and social analysts must also guard
against paternalism.

Recommendations for re-organization of

medical practice or of other institutions embody compromises
of interests which cannot always be decided through ethical
deliberation.

Decisions of allocation of funds toward

rep roductive technologies have implications for the quality
of life of individuals.

The provision of more basic health

needs (nutrition, shelter, etc. )

take ethical priority over

such medicalized responses to infertility, due to their
being basic to pursuit of any quality of life.

But if such

needs are adequately provided for, then decisions of what
quality-of-life enhancing options to pursue, questions of
equal access aside, are less ethical than a matter of
personal or social preference.
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Compared to other items in a

national budget, these may collectively be of greater or
lesser i mportance.

Such decis ions on behalf of ind ividuals

ought to be made by them in as democrat ic a manner as is
poss ible .

But th is too impl ies a critique of the current

irrational "system" of allocation of health resources and
pr iorities (Waitzk in, 1983: Chapter Four; Ehrenre ich and
Ehrenre ich, 1970: especially 19-20, 191-198 ) .
A comb ined social-normative analys is clarif ies the
eth ical problems at var ious levels of compl ication of social
organization, starting with the phys ician-patient
interaction and conclud ing w ith criticism of pol itical and
economic structures.

The normat ive analys is of the more

concrete eth ical problems actually ga ins force from the
social analys is .

Recogn ition of the concrete man ifestat ions

of eth ical problems based on broader social analyses
increases the ir support as accurate normative and soc ial
analyses.

An integrated social-normative analys is is

necessary to ver ify accuracy and to construct effective
recommendat ions.

Failure to integrate interactional

recommendations w ith the broader recommendations w ill result
in only short-term change wh ich will accommodate rather than
challenge the social production of the eth ical problems.
Fa ilure to integrate the broader recommendations w ill result
in ineffective, undes irable or uneth ical effects on the
interactions among people.
The necess ity of a social-normative analys is in
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medical ethics has several implications for the role of the
applied philosopher in medical ethics (hereafter referred to
as " medical ethicist" ).

First, and most obvious, this type

of analysis reaffirms the already widely acknowledged claim
that medical ethics is an interdisciplinary effort.

More

specifically, health-care professionals, philosophers,
sociologists, political theorists, economists,
administrators, politicians and representatives of public
opinion all have a contribution to make.

Obviously,

different levels of analysis and recommendations will
require the relevant contribution from different people.
But as a philosopher, the medical ethicist ought to be able
to engage in such interdisciplinary endeavors, at least as a
member of the community of applied philosophers who may draw
on colleagues' expertise.
The second implication is due to the need for
medical ethicists, or at least some members of that academic
community, to have access to medical professional-patient
interaction.

For reasons discussed in Chapter I I, recording

these interviews greatly enhances the analysis.

Clearly,

this requires some relation with a medical practitioner or
institution.

Within this setting, the ethicist will need to

be concerned with the most concrete of recommendations and
policy.

Whenever the context of the delivery, or its

practitioners, are criticized, it is important that the
social production of the problem (how it came about or why
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it arose) be emphasized so that whatever practitioners,
patients or administrators are able to do to avoid the
problem's recurrence is clear.

Malicious actions ought not

simply be condemned but features of the setting which
permitted or encouraged the action should be critiqued.
Third, recommendations for change in the
organization of medicine require that the ethicist convince
medical professionals, administrators, patients and others
affected or in a position of power that there exists an
ethical need . and of the social advantage of the change.
Careful social analysis ought to aid this effort, though
social change is often not responsive to careful analysis as
much as to emotional appeal.

Encouraging such practices as

informed consent, however, may stimulate enough suspicion
and frustration among health professionals and patients that
these groups might be more interested in education and
social change.

Once again, a familiarity with, and

illustration of, the analysis through medical interviews is
a better and more convincing analytic basis.

Case studies,

policy discussions, issue-oriented seminars ought to provide
both immediate responses to the ethical issues, while
emphasizing that the response is limited in effectiveness
and ought not be treated as a final answer or panacea (cf.,
Burgess, 1985 ; Burgess and Wylie, 1985).
Fourth, in recognition of the homogeneity of the
medical professions, the class structure of society and
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their own academic membership, medical ethicists ought to
call for and facilitate the public's involvement in ethical
and policy discussions and decisions.

Emphasizing the

ethical reasons for countering medical paternalism with
patient/public par ticipation and shared responsibility,
ethicists should provide meditil professionals and
institutions with the social analysis which shows their
prudential advqntage in this approach over full
responsibility ; litigation, legislation, and complete
control (cf., · starr, 1982 ; Waitzkin, 1983).
Fifth, wh��e social or political action
(organizing, campaigning, lobbying, etc.)

is r equir ed,

those medical ethicists who ar e involved with medical
institutions ought to call medical professionals to fulfill
their social-ethical obligations in promoting public
health.

In recommending or directing such action, medical

ethicists ought to create a social description of the
desir ed changes in both the social organization and of the
medical interview.

If the connections between the

recommended social change and the ethically mandated change
in the medical encounter cannot be explained in detail, the
analysis is weak, and the recommendations not well
supported .
Sixth, a single medical ethicist clear ly cannot
fulfill all of the above duties with equal facility.
Rather, cooper ation with academic, professional, political
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and publ i c communit ies is requ ired.

It is the analys is as

an integrated soc ial-normat ive assessment of what soc ial
changes are required , and its interd isc iplinary essence,
wh ich the med ical ethics commun ity can most adequately
fulfill.

It is at such an end that th is d issertat ion is

aimed.
F inally , as . philosophers , med ical eth ic ists ought
to engage the ir ph ilosoph i cal colleagues in crit i c iz ing and
improv ing on the eth i cal and ep istemolog ical foundations of
th is endeavor.

Further d iscuss ion into the analys is of

human action along the lines suggested by Jeff Coulter
(1979) and outl ined in Chapter I I may a id efforts in appl ied
eth ics and , comb ined with soc ial analys is , may compl i cate
and challenge not ions in trad itional eth i cs and
meta-eth ics.

The emphas i s on soc ial contexts as

constra in ing but not determ ining people's behav ior ra ises
the issue of freedom and moral responsibility.

The

appl icat ion of the normat ive sub-d isc ipl ine of eth i cs in
soc ial contexts suggests that there ought to be a
theoret ical br idge between eth i cal and soc ial-political
philosophy.

Th is theoret ical development might ass ist the

understand ing of the normat ive connections here pos ited on
the bas is of a model soc ial analys is .
In affirming these philosophi cal roots , it is also
interesting to note how d ifferent areas of appl ication of
eth i cs have resulted in d ifferent types of approaches.
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For

example, medical ethics is frequently treated as if quite
different from business ethics, partly on the notion that
medicine is a " profession " and that business is a pursuit of
profit in exchange for goods or services.

As this analysis

has shown, this distinction does not run very deep.
Philosophers in different areas of application should be
cautious not to assume that the considerations in one area
are inapplicable to another.

This is quite obvious as the

analysis broadens.

Conclusion
Assuming that one of the objectives of medical
ethics is effective recommendations, I have argued that a
social analysis is required to understand the occurrence of
ethical problems.

Arguing for the superiority of an

ethnomethodological over a cognitive or intentional model of
analysis, I have shown that the normative analysis and
recommendations are best directed at elements of the social
context over wh ich actors have the most control.

By

extending the social analysis to better understand the
social constitution of the ethically problematic actions I
argued for further ethical recommendations and additional
support for the normative analysis.

But the social analysis

also shows the limitations or inadequacies of the
interactional-level recommendations.
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Consequently, it is

important that more normatively adequate goals be set as
part of an overall program.

Immediate-in teractional

recommendations must be carefully devised so as to
stimulate, rather than conceal, the need for further change
in the organization of the practice of medicine, as well as
in the structural elemen ts of society which promote
unethical practices.
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APPENDIX
University of Tennessee

consent to Act As Human subject

Consent to Act As Human Subject
Subject' s Name: ____________________

Date: _________________________

This study examines, for research and educational
purposes, how doctors and patients communicate.
I.

I hereby authorize Sue Fisher and the assistant
selected by her to gather information in the
following ways:
a) to audio-tape, video-tape and observe
interactions between my physician and I ;
b) to review my medical records;
c) to conduct interviews with my attending
physician.

I I.

I hereby authorize Sue Fisher and the assistant
selected by her to use these tapes and this
information to teach residents about
communicational skills.

I II.

I understand that the information-gathering
techniques described in Paragraphs I and II hold
the potential to enhance doctors' and patients'
abilities to communicate with each other.

IV.

v.

VI.

I understand that my confidentiality will be
protected by removing my name and all other
personally identifying information from all
teaching and reserching materials obtained by
audio-taping, video-taping and observing the
the interactions between my physician and I.
I understand that Sue Fisher and the assistant
selected by her will answer any inquiries I may
have at any time concerning the information
gathering techniques.
I understand that my participation in the study
is voluntary and that I may terminate it at any
time with no r i sk to my doctor/patient relationship
or to the quality of care I am receiving.
Subject' s Signature
Witness__________________
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